In re ExxonMobil Corp.

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: KEVIN JEWELL JUSTICE.
• Docket Number: 14-25-00446-CV
• Decision Date: 18 December 2025
• Citation: In re ExxonMobil Corp., 14-25-00446-CV (Tex. App. Dec 18, 2025)
• Parties: IN RE EXXONMOBIL CORP., Relator

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IN RE EXXONMOBIL CORP., Relator

No. 14-25-00446-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District

December 18, 2025

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING WRIT OF MANDAMUS 334th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2022-13735

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Wilson, and Boatman.

OPINION

KEVIN JEWELL JUSTICE.

In this original proceeding, relator ExxonMobil Corporation seeks mandamus relief from the trial court's order denying its second amended motion for summary judgment based on the workers' compensation bar. We conditionally grant relief.

Background

Real parties in interest, Jake Winters and Ashley Lowe, filed this lawsuit to recover for personal injuries Winters allegedly received on March 6, 2022 while working at ExxonMobil's facility in Baton Rouge Louisiana. Winters and Lowe are Texas residents. Winters^[1] alleged that he suffered head, neck, back brain, and other injuries from the unscheduled release of carbon dioxide into a vessel where he was working. He asserted claims under Texas common law for negligence, gross negligence, and premises liability.^[2]

Among other defenses, ExxonMobil asserted the exclusive-remedy defense under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"). Based on the workers' compensation bar, ExxonMobil moved for traditional summary judgment on Winters's negligence and gross negligence claims. After Winters amended the petition to add a claim for intentional torts, ExxonMobil filed a second amended motion for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment by which it sought summary judgment on all claims.

On the day of the incident, Winters was employed by a subcontractor, Brown & Root Industrial Services. ExxonMobil based its workers' compensation bar defense on its assertion that it procured workers' compensation insurance for Brown & Root employees, including Winters. The trial court denied ExxonMobil's second amended motion for summary judgment and its motion for reconsideration. ExxonMobil seeks mandamus relief from this order.

Mandamus Standard

Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy that is available only when the relator shows both that (1) the trial court clearly abused its discretion; and (2) no adequate remedy by appeal exists. In re Sherwin-Williams Co., 668 S.W.3d 368, 370 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). A trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). A trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts; thus, a clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. at 840.

"We determine whether an adequate appellate remedy exists by weighing the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments." In re Academy, Ltd., 625 S.W.3d 19, 32 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding). Because this balance depends heavily on circumstances, it must be guided by analysis of principles rather than simple rules that treat cases as categories. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). In evaluating the benefits against the detriments, we consider whether mandamus will preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). We consider whether mandamus will "allow the appellate courts to give needed and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments." Id. We also consider whether mandamus will spare the litigants and the public "the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings." Id.

The Act's Exclusive-Remedy Defense

The Act is "a comprehensive legislative framework that creates a statewide no-fault insurance system for workers injured or killed in the course and scope of their employment." Tex. Pol. Subdivisions Joint Self-Ins. Fund v. Tex. Dep't of Ins.- Div. of Workers' Comp., 681 S.W.3d 491, 493 (Tex. App.-Austin 2023, pet. denied). It provides reciprocal benefits to both subscribing employers and their employees. Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Stevenson, 622 S.W.3d 273, 285 (Tex. 2021); TIC Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin, 498 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Tex. 2016).

"Covered employees sustaining work-related injuries are guaranteed prompt payment of their medical bills and lost wages without the time, expense, and uncertainty of proving liability under common-law theories." TIC Energy & Chem., 498 S.W.3d at 72. "In exchange, the Act prohibits employees from seeking common-law remedies from their employers by making workers' compensation benefits an injured employee's exclusive remedy." Id. at 72-73. The supreme court has historically "construed the [the Act] liberally in favor of coverage as a means of affording employees the protections the Legislature created." Waste Mgmt. of Tex., 622 S.W.3d at 285.

Participation in the Act's protections is voluntary. See Port Elevator-Brownsville v. Casados, 358 S.W.3d 238, 241 (Tex. 2012); Tex. Labor Code § 406.002. If an employer subscribes to workers' compensation insurance, employees of the subscribing employer may opt out and waive coverage, thereby "retain[ing] the common-law right of action to recover damages for personal injuries or death." Tex. Lab. Code § 406.034(b). But employees of subscribing employers who do not elect to opt out of coverage within the prescribed time waive their "right of action at common law or under a statute of this state to recover damages for personal injuries or death sustained in the course and scope of the employment." Id. § 406.034(a).

For the subscribing employer, the Act provides a defense to the injured employee's common-law claims. HCBeck, Ltd. v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d 349, 350 (Tex. 2009). This defense provides in material part that "[r]ecovery of workers' compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by workers' compensation insurance coverage or a legal beneficiary against the employer or an agent or employee of the employer for the death of or a work-related injury sustained by the employee." Tex. Lab. Code § 408.001(a).

To establish the exclusive-remedy defense, and therefore defeat a common-law claim for personal injury damages, a defendant must show that (1) it was the plaintiff's employer within the meaning of the Act; and (2) it subscribed to workers' compensation insurance. ExxonMobil Corp. v. Alvarez, 693 S.W.3d 794, 801 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.).

ExxonMobil was not Winters's employer; Winters was employed by ExxonMobil's subcontractor, Brown & Root. But for purposes of the Act, a general contractor may be deemed the employer of a subcontractor's employees if there is "a written agreement under which the general contractor provides workers' compensation insurance coverage to the subcontractor and the employees of the subcontractor." Tex. Labor Code § 406.123(a), (e); see Alvarez, 693 S.W.3d at 801.

Thus, to establish the exclusive-remedy defense, ExxonMobil had to prove the existence of such an agreement and that coverage was provided to Winters. An employer that meets this burden is immune from liability for common-law negligence, and the employee's exclusive remedy lies within the Act. Phillips v. Am. Elastomer Prods., L.L.C., 316 S.W.3d 181, 186-87 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). Although the exclusive-remedy provision bars a subscribing employee from recovering damages for work-related injuries that are attributable to the subscribing employer's negligence and gross negligence, it does not bar the employee from recovering damages for work-related injuries that are attributable to intentional conduct if the employee can establish the employer's specific intent to inflict such injuries. Mo-Vac Serv. Co., Inc. v. Escobedo, 603 S.W.3d 119, 125, 128 (Tex. 2020). That is, for the intentional-tort exception to apply, an employer must believe that its actions are substantially certain to result in a particular injury to a particular employee, not merely highly likely to increase overall risks to employees in the workplace. Id. at 130.

Because it was the moving party below, ExxonMobil had the initial burden of showing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its exclusive-remedy defense. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). If ExxonMobil proved that defense, then the burden shifted to the plaintiffs to raise a fact issue or otherwise show that summary judgment was improper. See M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23-24 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam). When deciding whether the parties have met these respective burdens, we consider the trial court's ruling de novo, and we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs because they are the nonmovants. See Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).

ExxonMobil's motion challenged the intentional-tort claim under no-evidence standards. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(i). In such a motion, the movant must assert that no evidence exists to support one or more essential elements of the claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. Id.; see Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81, 88 (Tex. 2021). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce more than a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on each challenged element. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(i); see King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). If the nonmovant does not meet its burden, the trial court must grant the no-evidence motion. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(i).

Analysis

A. The Act's...