In re ference To the Interdiction of Jeannette Weadd Jones.

• Decision Date: 09 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 10–CA–66.,10–CA–66.
• Citation: 54 So.3d 54
• Parties: In Reference to the Interdiction of Jeannette Weadd JONES.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

54 So.3d 54

In Reference to the Interdiction of Jeannette Weadd JONES.

No. 10–CA–66.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 9, 2010.

Belhia V. Martin, Attorney at Law, New Orleans, LA, for Appellants.Roderick Alvendia, J. Bart Kelly, III, Jeanne K. Dermarest, Attorneys at Law, New Orleans, LA, for Appellee.Panel composed of Judges FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, JUDE G. GRAVOIS, and MARC E. JOHNSON.FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, Judge.

[5 Cir. 2] This is an appeal from a judgment holding the appellants in constructive contempt of a consent judgment and amending that consent judgment. The appeal arises from an inchoate interdiction proceeding in which Charles R. Jones (Mr. Jones) sought to interdict his mother, Jeannette W. Jones (Mrs. Jones), who was 94 years of age at the time of the petition. Four of the 12 children—Cynthia Jones (Cynthia), Marybelle Jones Carter (Marybelle), Claudette Jones Hills (Claudette), and Henry O. Williams (Henry)—filed an opposition to the interdiction. After the interdiction was partially tried, the parties, including Mrs. Jones's counsel, entered into a consent judgment that was made the judgment of the court. Later, Mr. Jones filed a rule for contempt and motions to vacate the consent judgment and to render a new judgment. The trial judge found Cynthia, Marybelle, and Claudette, ¹ appellants, in contempt and she amended the consent judgment. The appellants now appeal.² Mr. Jones, appellee, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely. For the reasons that follow, we grant the motion to dismiss in part and deny it in [5 Cir. 3] part. We dismiss as untimely the appeal from the amended consent judgment but address the merits of the timely appeal from the contempt judgment.³ On the merits, we affirm the contempt judgment as amended.

Timeliness of the Appeal

Before we reach the main issues, we address Mr. Jones's motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely.

Two judgments were rendered in this matter—the consent judgment dated October 23, 2008 ( Judgment I ) and the judgment on appeal rendered June 30, 2009 ( Judgment II ). It is undisputed that the parties entered into a consent judgment that was made the judgment of the court on October 23, 2008.

Judgment II—the subject of this appeal—consists of two judgments. It consists of the judgment of a constructive contempt for violation of an order of the court and the judgment amending Judgment I.

We first address the contempt judgment.

Courts have considered contempt judgments to be final and appealable on two grounds.

First, courts have found statutory authority for the appeal. “A final judgment is appealable in all causes in which appeals are given by law, whether rendered after hearing, by default, or by reformation under Article 1814.” La.C.C.P. art. 2083(A). “An interlocutory judgment is appealable only when expressly provided by law.” La.C.C.P. art. 2083(C). Prior to the 1999 amendments to La.C.C.P. art.1915, a contempt judgment was considered an interlocutory decree, reviewable only on application for supervisory writs. [5 Cir. 4] Stiltner v. Stiltner, 00–2079, p. 1 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/8/00), 772 So.2d 909, 910 (citations omitted). However, La.C.C.P.1915(A)(6) now considers certain enumerated judgments as final appealable judgments. These include: “[W]hen the court imposes sanctions or disciplinary action pursuant to Article 191, 863, or 864 or Code of Evidence Article 510(G).” La.C.C.P.1915(A)(6). La.C.C.P. art. 191 states: “A court possesses inherently all of the power necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction even though not granted expressly by law.” The court's inherent power includes the power to punish for contempt. See: State ex rel. Phelps v. Judge of Civil District Court, 45 La.Ann. 1250, 14 So. 310 (La.1893). Articles 863, 864 and 510(G) refer to contempt or sanctions. Thus, relying on Article 1915(A)(6), courts have held that a contempt judgment is now considered a final judgment, subject to appeal. Stiltner, at 2, 91, 772 So.2d 909; Hodges v. Hodges, 02–0489, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/2/02), 827 So.2d 1271, 1276, writ denied, 02–2485 (La.11/8/02), 828 So.2d 1122. But see: Succession of Bell, 06–1710, pp. 6–7 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/8/07), 964 So.2d 1067, 1072 (Court did not discuss Article 1915 but concluded “[t]here is no statute allowing an immediate appeal of a judgment of contempt.”).

Second, where the object of the proceedings before the court, as in this case, is to hold someone in contempt for violating the orders of the court, a direct appeal has been held to be an appropriate remedy since, in those instances, the trial court judgment would be final. Pittman Const. Co., Inc. v. Pittman, 96–1079 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/12/97), 691 So.2d 268, 269, writ denied, 97–0960 (La.5/16/97), 693 So.2d 803. “For example, a judgment on a rule to hold a spouse in contempt for failure to meet court ordered support obligations would be a final, appealable judgment even though it is technically a contempt judgment.” Id. This court in Thibodeaux v. Thibodeaux, 99–618, p. 1 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/10/99), 748 So.2d 1180, 1181 adopted the Pittman view. We held: “Because the contempt judgment complained [5 Cir. 5] of here is one for violation of an order of the court, it is final and therefore appealable.” Id. Accord: Parish of St. Charles ex rel. Dept. of Planning and Zoning v. Bordelon, 08–385, p. 2 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/28/08), 998 So.2d 751, 752.

Thus, in light of Thibodeaux and Bordelon, the instant contempt judgment is final and appealable. Moreover, the appeal from the contempt judgment is timely because it was taken well within the delays for taking a 60–day devolutive appeal. Thus, we deny Mr. Jones's motion in part as it pertains to the contempt judgment.

The appeal from the amended judgment, however, is untimely. For the reasons that follow, we find that the amended judgment constitutes an amendment of a consent judgment that effectively interdicts Mrs. Jones. Thus, the modification judgment of that interdiction is subject to the delays for filing a 30–day appeal.

In Judgment I, the trial judge made no finding that Mrs. Jones was interdicted. She did, however, issue an order that effectively interdicted Mrs. Jones. The judgment appointed various curators over Mrs. Jones's person and property. It also provided that any juridical acts Mrs. Jones desired to take would be reviewed and approved by the trial judge. Richard Jones, Jr. (Richard) was appointed curator to administer any and/all financial matters and financial interests of Mrs. Jones. However, the judgment ordered that Marybelle and Richard would be co-signatories on any and/all financial accounts of Mrs. Jones, such that both individuals' signatures would be required for the distribution of any funds or to affect the financial interest of Mrs. Jones. Judgment II ordered that Richard shall have exclusive authority over all financial matters relating to Mrs. Jones, which includes his exclusive authority to execute, solely, checks and instruments relating to Mrs. Jones.

[54 So.3d 59 , 5 Cir. 6]

In Judgment I, Marybelle and Miriam Jones Milton (Miriam) were appointed curators for the daily care giving and needs of Mrs. Jones. Judgment II modified Judgment I to state that Miriam, Patricia J. Amedee and Marybelle, along with the other siblings and grandchildren, were to provide for the day-to-day care of Mrs. Jones.

In Judgment I, Dr. Warren Jones (Dr. Jones) was appointed curator for the medical care and administration of any and/all issues and/or interests relating to the medical care of Mrs. Jones. Judgment II further provided that Dr. Jones shall be immediately notified of any and all medical appointments of Mrs. Jones, except for medical emergencies, and that immediate notice is to be given by all parties to their siblings relating to any and all medical emergencies of Mrs. Jones.

“Owners of private things may freely dispose of them under modifications established by law.” La.C.C. art. 454. “All natural persons enjoy general legal capacity to have rights and duties.” La.C.C. art. 27. “All persons have capacity to contract, except unemancipated minors, interdicts, and persons deprived of reason at the time of contracting.” La.C.C. art.1918. “A natural person who has reached majority has capacity to make all sorts of juridical acts, unless otherwise provided by legislation.” La.C.C. art. 28.

The Legislature has, however, provided a means for a person to be interdicted, who is unable to take care of his or her person. La.C.C. art. 389. La.C.C. art. 389 authorizes a court discretion to “order the full interdiction of a natural person of the age of majority, or an emancipated minor, who due to an infirmity, is unable consistently to make reasoned decisions regarding the care of his person and property, or to communicate those decisions, and whose interests cannot be protected by less restrictive means.” Or, a court may order a limited interdiction. La.C.C. art. 390. La.C.C. art. 392 permits the appointment of a [5 Cir. 7] curator to represent the interdict in juridical acts and to care for the person or affairs of the interdict, or any aspect of either.

The effects of an interdiction are these:

A full interdict lacks capacity to make a juridical act. A limited interdict lacks capacity to make a juridical act pertaining to the property or aspects of personal care that the judgment of limited interdiction places under the authority of his curator, except as provided in Article 1482 or in the judgment of limited interdiction.

La.C.C. art. 395.

Despite appellants' statement in brief that the parties did not intend that Mrs. Jones be interdicted, the consent judgment provided otherwise. It provided that any juridical acts Mrs. Jones desired to take would be reviewed and approved by the trial judge, thereby removing her capacity to make juridical acts as legislatively provided for by interdiction. See: La.C.C. art. 28 and La.C.C. art. 389.

Since the former...