In re For

• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Johnson, Judge
• Decision Date: 02 February 2015
• Docket Number: A14-0737
• Citation: In re Cummins, A14-0737 (Minn. App. Feb 02, 2015)
• Parties: In the Matter of the Petition of Melvin J. Cummins for an Order Determining Boundary Lines.

In the Matter of the Petition of Melvin J. Cummins for an Order Determining Boundary Lines.

A14-0737

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

February 2, 2015

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Johnson, Judge

Hubbard County District Court

File No. 29-CV-11-1453

Thomas B. Olson, Katherine L. Wahlberg, Olson & Lucas, P.A., Edina, Minnesota (for appellant Melvin J. Cummins)

Paul Haik, Krebsbach and Haik, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents Randall Urdahl, Anthony Urdahl, and Jill Urdahl)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Stoneburner, Judge.^*

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge

This appeal arises from a boundary dispute. Appellant Melvin J. Cummins seeks to establish that a fence is the boundary between his property and property owned by respondents Randall Urdahl, Anthony Urdahl, and Jill Urdahl (the Urdahls). Cummins's petition is based on the theory of boundary by practical location. Before trial, the districtcourt sua sponte concluded that Cummins's petition is barred by the doctrine of laches. The district court subsequently denied the Urdahls' motion for sanctions. We conclude that the district court erred by applying the laches doctrine to bar Cummins's claim. We also conclude that the district court did not err by denying the Urdahls' motion for sanctions. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for trial.

FACTS

The facts relevant to the ultimate determination of this case are relatively complicated. For purposes of this non-precedential opinion, we will provide only an outline of the procedural history of the case and a brief summary of the facts that are necessary to resolve the issues raised on appeal.

Cummins owns a 57-acre parcel of land in Hubbard County that is located north of Sixth Crow Wing Lake and south of state highway 34. Cummins acquired the property in 2001 from Gene Rugroden, who acquired it in 1993 from John and Carol Raun, who acquired it in 1983 from Vernon Vogt, who acquired it in 1962 from Charles and Eva Rohrer, who acquired it in 1953.

The Urdahls own a parcel of land that lies to the west of Cummins's property and is somewhat smaller than Cummins's parcel but runs south to the shoreline of the lake. The Urdahls' parcel is within a development known as North Oaks, which was subdivided by one of their predecessors in interest in the 1980s. The Urdahls acquired the property in 2005 from Robert and Susan Panzer, who acquired it in 1996 and 1997 from Palmer and June Peterson, who acquired it in 1982 from Carl and Emma Knutson, who began acquiring it in 1946.

Cummins and the Urdahls share a boundary that runs north and south for 580 feet. The essence of the parties' dispute is the location of that boundary. Cummins commenced this action in November 2011 by filing a petition pursuant to section 508.671 of the Minnesota Statutes. His petition seeks to establish that the boundary between his property and the Urdahls' property is a fence that runs north and south. He relies on the theory of boundary by practical location. The Urdahls contend that the boundary is the government lot line, which is marked by monuments that correspond to the original government survey, and is parallel to and approximately 39 feet to the east of the fence. Thus, the disputed parcel is a rectangle that is 39 feet wide, east to west, and 580 feet long, north to south.

In July 2012, the Urdahls moved to dismiss the petition. The district court denied the motion in October 2012. The Urdahls filed a motion for summary judgment in November 2012, and Cummins filed a cross-motion for summary judgment in December 2012. The district court denied both summary-judgment motions in February 2013.

In July 2013, Cummins renewed his summary-judgment motion. In November 2013, the district court denied Cummins's renewed motion for summary judgment. In addition, the district court sua sponte concluded that Cummins's petition is barred by the doctrine of laches. The district court administrator entered judgment for the Urdahls. In December 2013, Cummins moved for reconsideration. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration in March 2014. In the same order, the district court denied the Urdahls' motion for sanctions.

Cummins appeals from the dismissal of his petition, the denial of his motion for reconsideration, and the adverse judgment. The Urdahls cross-appeal from the district court's order denying their motion for sanctions.

DECISION

The doctrine of boundary by practical location is used to resolve disputes between private parties regarding a boundary between their respective properties. Slindee v. Fritch Invs., LLC, 760 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Minn. App. 2009).

A party can establish a boundary by practical location in three ways: (1) by acquiescing in the boundary for a sufficient period of time to bar a right of entry under the statute of limitations; (2) by expressly agreeing with the other party on the boundary and then by acquiescing to that agreement; or (3) by estoppel.

Id. (citing Theros v. Phillips, 256 N.W.2d 852, 858 (Minn. 1977)).

Cummins's petition is based on the theory of boundary by practical location by acquiescence. Acquiescence requires actual or implied consent to some action by the disseizor, such as erecting a fence or some other physical boundary, and acknowledgment of that boundary by the disseized. LeeJoice v. Harris, 404 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. App. 1987). The boundary line must be "certain, visible, and well-known" to demonstrate acquiescence in a boundary location. Ruikkie v. Nall, 798 N.W.2d 806, 819 (Minn. App. 2011) (quoting Beardsley v. Crane, 52 Minn. 537, 546, 54 N.W. 740, 742 (1893)), review denied (Minn. July 19, 2011). A person alleging a boundary-by-practical-location claim (hereinafter BPL claim) also must prove "by evidence that is clear, positive, and unequivocal that the alleged property line was acquiesced in for a sufficient length oftime to bar a right of entry under the statute of limitations," which is 15 years. Britney v. Swan Lake Cabin Corp., 795 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotations omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 541.02 (2014).

I. Laches

Cummins argues that the district court erred by concluding that his BPL claim is barred by the doctrine of laches. Cummins challenges the district court's decision on both procedural and substantive grounds. As a matter of procedure, he contends that the district court erred by not giving him notice that it would consider disposing of the case before trial based on laches. Indeed, the Urdahls did not have a motion pending before the district court, and they had not previously made a motion based on laches, though they had pleaded laches as an affirmative defense in their answer. As a matter of substance, Cummins contends that the doctrine of laches does not apply. We will begin our analysis by considering Cummins's substantive argument.

"Laches is an equitable doctrine that prevents one who has not been diligent in asserting a known right from recovering at the expense of one who has been prejudiced by the delay." Carlson v. Ritchie, 830 N.W.2d 887, 891 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). The application of the doctrine of laches usually depends on the facts of the case. Aronovitch v. Levy, 238 Minn. 237, 242, 56 N.W.2d 570, 574 (1953). In deciding whether to apply laches, a court must determine "whether there has been such an unreasonable delay in asserting a known right, resulting in prejudice to others, as would make it inequitable to grant the relief prayed for." Carlson, 830 N.W.2d at 891 (quotation omitted). However, "lapse of time is only one of the elements to beconsidered . . . [as] [m]ere delay does not constitute laches, unless the circumstances were such as to make the delay blamable." Elsen v. State Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Minn. 315, 321, 17 N.W.2d 652, 656 (1945) (internal citation and quotation omitted). "[A] party is not guilty of laches until he discovers the mistake, or until he is chargeable with knowledge of facts from which, in the exercise of proper diligence, he ought to have discovered it." Clark v. Reddick, 791 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). Laches is not "'a mere matter of time; but principally a question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced.'" Kahnke v. Green, 695 N.W.2d 148, 152 (Minn. App. 2005) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ward v. Sherman, 192 U.S. 168, 177, 24 S. Ct. 227, 230 (1904)). This inequity must be "'founded upon some change in the condition or relations of the property or the parties.'" Id. (quoting Ward, 192 U.S. at 177, 24. S. Ct. at 230). Laches applies if "'a court of equity finds that the position of the parties has so changed that equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired.'" Id. at 153 (quoting Ward, 192 U.S. at 177, 24 S. Ct. at 230). This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court's summary-judgment decision based on laches. Jackel v. Brower, 668 N.W.2d 685, 690 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003); see also Lloyd v. Simons, 97 Minn. 315, 317, 105 N.W. 902, 903 (1906).

A. Torrens Registration System

The district court's laches analysis was based in substantial part on the fact that the Petersons and Emma Knutson had registered the North Oaks subdivision with HubbardCounty's Torrens registration system. The district court reasoned that the registration conclusively established the boundary between the parties' properties as the government lot line. In its order denying Cummins's motion for reconsideration, the district court stated that "boundary lines can be determined and established pursuant to an initial Torrens registration proceeding" and, thereafter, "a petition which seeks to alter those boundaries [under ...