In re Ford Motor Co., 05-0374.

CourtSupreme Court of Texas
Citation165 S.W.3d 315
Docket NumberNo. 05-0374.,05-0374.
PartiesIn re FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Relator.
Decision Date27 May 2005

Michael W. Eady, Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons, L.L.P., Jose Santiago Solis, Harlingen, Craig A. Morgan, Austin, and Jaime A. Saenz, Rodriguez, Colvin Chaney & Saenz, L.L.P., Brownsville, for Relator.

Michael Matthew Guerra, Mikal C. Watts, John Gregory Escamilla, Watts Law Firm, L.L.P., McAllen, Thomas O. Matlock Jr., College Station, TX, for Real Party.

J. Michael Myers, Ball & Weed, P.C., San Antonio, for other.

PER CURIAM.

On May 28, 2004, Robin Fuentes, her husband, and her two children were involved in a car accident. Fuentes suffered serious injuries that rendered her a quadriplegic. Less than three months later, the Fuentes family sued Ford Motor Company, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, and the tire repair shop that installed tires on the pick-up truck for damages arising from an alleged tire failure that caused the truck to roll over. The case was set for trial to commence on May 16, 2005, less than nine months after it was filed. On April 1, 2005, Ford filed a motion for legislative continuance under Section 30.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. On April 21, 2005, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. Four days later, the trial court denied the motion and set the case for trial on May 31, 2005. The court of appeals denied Ford's petition for writ of mandamus, and on May 13, 2005, Ford filed its petition with this Court.

To be entitled to mandamus relief, Ford must show that the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion and that it has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex.2004); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex.1992). A trial court abuses its discretion if "`it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law'" or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply the law. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839, 840 (quoting Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1985)). Although this Court has acknowledged that the second requirement for mandamus relief "has no comprehensive definition," we have explained that determining whether a party has an adequate remedy by appeal requires a "careful balance of jurisprudential considerations" that "implicate both public and private interests." In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136. "When the benefits [of mandamus review] outweigh the detriments, appellate courts must consider whether the appellate remedy is adequate." Id.

Section 30.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that a court shall grant a motion for continuance if an attorney representing a party is a member of the legislature and will be attending a legislative session. Specifically, the statute provides as follows:

(a) This section applies to any criminal or civil suit, including matters of probate, and to any matters ancillary to the suit that require action by or the attendance of an attorney, including appeals but excluding temporary restraining orders.

(b) Except as provided by Subsections (c) and (c-1), at any time within 30 days of a date when the legislature is to be in session, at any time during a legislative session, or when the legislature sits as a constitutional convention, the court on application shall continue a case in which a party applying for the continuance or the attorney for that party is a member or member-elect of the legislature and will be or is attending a legislative session. The court shall continue the case until 30 days after the date on which the legislature adjourns.

(c) Except as provided by Subsection (c-1), if the attorney for a party to the case is a member or member-elect of the legislature who was employed on or after the 30th day before the date on which the suit is set for trial, the continuance is discretionary with the court.

(c-1) If the attorney for a party to any criminal case is a member or member-elect of the legislature who was employed on or after the 15th day before the date on which the suit is set for trial, the continuance is discretionary with the court.

(d) The party seeking the continuance must file with the court an affidavit stating the grounds for the continuance. The affidavit is proof of the necessity for a continuance. The affidavit need not be corroborated.

(e) If the member of the legislature is an attorney for a party, the affidavit must contain a declaration that it is the attorney's intention to participate actively in the preparation or presentation of the case and that the attorney has not taken the case for the purpose of obtaining a continuance under this section.

(f) The continuance provided by Subsection (b) is one of right and may not be charged against the party receiving it on any subsequent application for continuance.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 30.003(a)-(f). The statute provides that when a lawyer-legislator is retained more than thirty days before the date a civil case is set for trial, a trial court lacks discretion to deny a properly requested motion for legislative continuance. Id. § 30.003(b), (c); see also Waites v. Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex.1977);1 Collier v. Poe, 732 S.W.2d 332, 343, 346 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (analyzing previous version of statute).

In Waites v. Sondock, this Court recognized a constitutional limitation on the mandatory nature of the legislative continuance. 561 S.W.2d at 776. In Waites, a mother initiated a contempt proceeding to compel her former husband to comply with a child support order. Id. at 772. The husband's lawyer filed a motion for legislative continuance with supporting affidavit, which the mother opposed. She argued that the child support payments were "critical to her ability to feed and support her children." Id. at 774. This Court held that requiring mandatory continuances when the party opposing the continuance "faces irreparable harm from the delay in enforcing existing rights" violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 13 (open courts) and 19 (due process) of the Texas Constitution. Id. at 773. However, the Court emphasized the limited nature of its holding: "a legislative continuance is mandatory except in those cases in which the party opposing the continuance alleges that a substantial existing right will be defeated or abridged by delay." Id. at 776. When a party opposes a legislative continuance in such circumstances, the trial court must conduct a hearing on the allegations and deny the motion if the allegations are shown to be meritorious. Id. Subsequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals and several lower courts of appeals have addressed the scope of the Waites exception to mandatory legislative continuances, but we have not. See, e.g., Collier, 732 S.W.2d at 344 (holding that the Waites exception cannot be invoked by the prosecutor in a criminal proceeding); In re Starr Produce Co., 988 S.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1999, orig. proceeding) (holding that loss of attorney's services because of his inability to continue representation through the new trial date did not create the type of irreparable harm described in Waites); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Salyer, 814 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1991, orig. proceeding) (holding that the harm caused by lost business opportunities did not "rise to the level of a due process violation"); Condovest Corp. v. John Street Builders, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex.App.Austin 1983, no writ) (concluding that inability to convey title to real property was "clearly a substantial right" protected by the Waites exception).

Ford's motion for a legislative continuance meets the requirements of the statute. Representative Jim Solis's affidavit states that he is a member of the Texas House of Representatives, that the session extends from January 11, 2005 through May 31, 2005, and that he will be attending the legislative session. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 30.003(d), (e). Solis also stated that he represents Ford and intends to participate actively in the preparation and presentation of the case. See id. Finally, the affidavit also declares that Solis did not take this case for the purpose of obtaining a continuance under Section 30.003 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. See id. Because Ford's motion was filed more than thirty days before the scheduled trial date and met the statutory requirements, the trial court was without discretion to deny the motion unless Fuentes established her entitlement to an exception. See id. § 30.003(b), (c), (f); Waites, 561 S.W.2d at 776.

Fuentes opposed the motion, essentially contending that because her participation in a comprehensive rehabilitation services program with the Texas Department of Assistive and Rehabilitation Services2 will conclude soon, any continuance will prevent access to needed medical care. Fuentes argues that she has an "existing right to rehabilitation and medical care" that constitutes a "substantial existing right" under our decision in Waites. Additionally, Fuentes argues that granting the continuance in this case violates her rights to access the court system. To support these contentions, Fuentes attached the affidavits of her husband, Robert Fuentes, and Dr. Joe Gonzales.

Robert Fuentes's affidavit explains that his wife has been a quadriplegic since the accident and requires constant medical attention and therapy. He also states that he and his wife recently received a letter from the Texas Department of Assistive and Rehabilitative Services explaining that the temporary funding provided for her treatment will soon expire. The letter is attached to the affidavit. Finally, Robert Fuentes explains that he is not qualified to provide the treatment that his wife requires. He does not indicate when the current funding ends, whether other funding...

To continue reading

Request your trial
295 cases
  • In re Reece
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Texas
    • 27 Mayo 2011
    ...In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 151 (Tex.2003) (per curiam) (granting mandamus in the discovery context); In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Tex.2005) (per curiam) (granting mandamus in the legislative-continuance context). 132. 96 Tex. 360, 73 S.W. 4 (1903). FN133. Id. at 5. 134. ......
  • W. Dow Hamm III v. Millennium Income Fund, 01-06-00499-CV.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas
    • 12 Julio 2007
    ...a clear abuse of discretion or a violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex.2005) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex.2004)); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex.1992). A tri......
  • In re C.J.C.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Texas
    • 26 Junio 2020
    ...2004) (orig. proceeding).24 See Walker v. Packer , 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).25 In re Ford Motor Co. , 165 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); see In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs. , 210 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (citing Wa......
  • In re McAllen Medical Center, Inc.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Texas
    • 29 Agosto 2008
    ...22.002 of the Texas Government Code on the interlocutory trial court order, I respectfully dissent. 1. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Tex.2005) (holding mandamus available to protect legislative continuance); In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex.2004) (holdin......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT