In re Fordiani

• Decision Date: 01 March 1923
• Citation: 120 A. 338,98 Conn. 435
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: IN RE FORDIANI.

120 A. 338

98 Conn. 435

IN RE FORDIANI.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 1, 1923

Appeal from City Court of Meriden; Thomas P. Dunne, Judge.

Petition for naturalization by Ostilio Fordiani. The petition was dismissed, and petitioner appeals. On motion to dismiss appeal and on demurrer to plea to jurisdiction and in abatement. Motion to dismiss denied, and demurrer to plea sustained.

Lewis J. Somers, of Meriden, for appellant.

George H. Cohen, of Hartford, for the United States.

WHEELER, C.J.

The appeal from the dismissal of the petition of Fordiani for naturalization is based upon a number of assigned errors which include the conduct of the hearing by the trial court in so arbitrary and capricious a manner as to constitute an unreasonable exercise of the judicial discretion, and such as to deny the petitioner a fair and impartial hearing, the equal protection of the laws, and due process of law. The motion to dismiss and the plea to the jurisdiction are based upon the same grounds, and we will dispose of such as have been pursued in argument of counsel.

The government of the United States contends that the naturalization proceedings by the city court of Meriden are federal instead of state in their nature, and that the city court of Meriden for the time being was a court of the United States acting under the laws of the United States. The Congress of the United States, in article 1 § 8, was given power " to establish an uniform rule of naturalization." Acting within this power, Congress conferred exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize aliens as citizens of the United States upon certain courts, including " all courts of record in any state * * * having a seal a clerk, and jurisdiction in actions at law or equity, * * * in which the amount in controversy is unlimited." United States Compiled Statutes, § 4351. By virtue of this act the city court of Meriden assumed jurisdiction of this petition for naturalization. No state court designated by act of Congress could be compelled to take jurisdiction of naturalization proceedings; it might, in the absence of a statute of its own jurisdiction specifying which of its courts should take such jurisdiction, exercise or decline to act.

General Statutes, § § 5454-5456, imposed upon the superior court the duty of admitting aliens to citizenship, and that court was thereafter bound to take such jurisdiction.

" The right of the state to limit the exercise of the jurisdiction involves the right to select the court which may act or forbid any to act." Freeholders v. Slater, 85 N.J.Law, 621, 90 A. 378; Rushworth v. Judges, 58 N.J.Law, 97, 98, 32 A. 743, 30 L.R.A. 761.

After the deposit of this power in the superior court whether any court other than that court could act upon this subject-matter unless subsequently authorized by our General Assembly we leave undecided, since neither of the parties to this proceeding questions the power of the city court to act. We shall accordingly dispose of the matter upon the claims made of record.

Assuming that the city court of Meriden had power to hear and determine his petition, it acts by virtue of its general jurisdiction. That, if existent, is ample to permit it to hear and determine such a petition, and what the act of Congress does is to permit it to act upon this subject-matter which it might have kept within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. The act of Congress says that it confers jurisdiction upon the courts named in the act; what it does is to permit jurisdiction to be taken by these courts over this new subject-matter.

" Congress cannot compel [a state court] to entertain jurisdiction in any case, or to perform any judicial act." Morgan v. Dudley, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 715, 68 Am.Dec. 735.

Whether the state court acts, as does our superior court by virtue of our own statute, or by virtue of its own jurisdiction, unaided and unrestricted by a statute of its state, in either case it exercises its power over petitions in naturalization proceedings upon the terms and conditions stated in the act of Congress. And it can act in no other way. United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 37 Sup.Ct. 422, 61 L.Ed. 853; Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 240, 32 Sup.Ct. 613, 56 L.Ed. 1066; County of Hampden v. Morris, 207 Mass. 171, 93 N.E. 579, Ann.Cas. 1912A, 815; note to Oehlert v. Oehlert, 6 A.L.R. 406.

This is far from saying that the court in this proceeding becomes a court of the United States. Neither Congress nor the Executive Department of the federal government can impose upon any court of a state the performance of a judicial duty. The two governments federal and state are separate entities and the framers of the federal Constitution intended that they should so remain. But since the subject of naturalization is within the exclusive power of Congress it may determine what qualifications the alien shall possess before he be admitted to citizenship or it may determine that none shall be admitted. It grants or it withholds a political privilege. Whatever it determines to be the qualifications for admission, those the Federal court or the State court taking jurisdiction, must observe and enforce strictly. In this connection the government contends that admission to citizenship is a political privilege extended by sovereign grace, and therefore it is within the discretion of the naturalization court to grant or withhold this privilege. A few courts have so held through, as we conceive, a misunderstanding of the function of the court. Congress may grant or withhold the privilege of naturalization at its will, for its act is one of sovereign grace; but when it determines that aliens possessing certain qualifications may be admitted to citizenship by certain courts, it leaves to the court the judicial function of determining whether an applicant possesses these qualifications or not. The court, unlike the Congress, does not act as a matter of sovereign grace; it never so acts, for that would be beyond and outside the judicial function. Whenever it acts, it acts judicially and by a recognized procedure. When it hears a petition in naturalization, it can act in no other way than its normal and legal way, for the proceeding is a judicial proceeding. The court's decision is a judgment of the court and is duly recorded as such. It possesses the characteristics of any other judgment of the court and therefore is unassailable collaterally.

In Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 236, 32 Sup.Ct. 614, 56 L.Ed. 1066, the court says:

" It was long ago held in this court, in a case arising upon the early acts of Congress which submitted to courts of record the right of aliens to admission as citizens, that the judgments of such a court upon the question was, like every other judgment, complete evidence of its own validity. Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Pet. 393, 408. This decision, however, goes no further than to establish the immunity of such a judgment from collateral attack." United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 474, 37 Sup.Ct. 422, 61 L.Ed. 853; Dean, Petitioner, 83 Me. 489, 22 A. 385, 13 L.R.A. 229; State ex rel. v. Brandhorst, 156 Mo. 461, 56 S.W. 1094, 79 Am.St.Rep. 538; Oehlert v. Oehlert, 233 Mass. 497, 124 N.E. 249, 6 A.L.R. 406; Morgan v. Dudley, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 713, 68 Am.Dec. 735; In re Henning (D. C.) 248 F. 991.

The applicant for naturalization who has made his petition in due form and to the right court, and has by adequate proof complied with the terms and conditions prescribed by the federal law, is entitled to be admitted to citizenship. The privilege which he had to petition for naturalization has now become a right which cannot be denied him. This conclusion is a necessary corollary to the determination that a naturalization proceeding before a court is a judicial proceeding and its decision a judgment of the court. We find authoritative sanction for this conclusion in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Johannessen v. United States, supra; United States v. Ginsberg, supra; United States v. Shanahan (D. C.) 232 F. 169, 171.

The government's next position is that there is no direct review by writ of error or appeal provided for by Congress, hence none can exist in the state court. It is true that the Naturalization Act does not specifically make provision for a review by writ of error or appeal.

In United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319. 38 Sup.Ct. 118, 62 L.Ed. 321, it is said:

" For Congress did not see fit to provide for a direct review by writ of error or appeal."

Prior to this decision the great majority of federal courts had allowed such a review. The Naturalization Act does not attempt to control the procedure of the state court. The state court, as we have held, takes jurisdiction, at its will, or that of the statute of its state, and when it hears a petition in naturalization it acts judicially and renders a judgment thereon. Its power to act over this subject- matter is controlled by the terms and conditions of the Act of Congress. But the procedure governing its action is its own. The manner in which the petition for naturalization is heard is in accordance with its own and not the Federal procedure. This, too, is the necessary sequence to the holding that the proceeding is judicial and the decision thereon a judgment. Where the precise point has come before the state courts, they have with two exceptions sustained or permitted the right of review.

In United States v. Hrasky, 240 Ill. 560, 88 N.E. 1031, 130 Am.St.Rep. 288, 16 Ann.Cas. 279, the United States appealed from a decision of a city court granting a petition for naturalization, and the appeal was sustained. The court, at page 563 of 240 Ill., at page 1033 of 88 N.E. (130 Am.St.Rep 288, 16 Ann.Cas. 279),...