In re G.M.

• Decision Date: 25 February 2009
• Docket Number: No. DA 08-0229.,DA 08-0229.
• Citation: 349 Mont. 320,203 P.3d 818,2009 MT 59
• Parties: In the Matter of G.M., Respondent and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

203 P.3d 818

2009 MT 59

349 Mont. 320

In the Matter of G.M., Respondent and Appellant.

No. DA 08-0229.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs January 14, 2009.

Decided February 25, 2009.

For Appellant: Thomas A. Dooling, Andree Larose; Disability Rights of Montana, Helena, Montana.

For Appellee: Hon. Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Sheri K. Sprigg, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Leo Gallagher, Lewis & Clark County Attorney; K. Paul Stahl, Deputy County Attorney, Helena, Montana.

Chief Justice MIKE McGRATH delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 G.M. appeals from an order of the District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, involuntarily recommitting him to residential treatment at the Montana Developmental Center (MDC) in Boulder, Montana. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 G.M. is a developmentally disabled man in his mid-thirties who has been committed and recommitted to MDC for about half of his life. Cases concerning these commitments have been before this Court in the past. In the Matter of G.M., 261 Mont. 499, 862 P.2d 415 (1993); In the Matter of G.M., 2008 MT 200, 344 Mont. 87, 186 P.3d 229. In both instances we reversed the District Court's decision to recommit G.M. to MDC.

¶ 3 Involuntary commitment of a seriously developmentally disabled person to a residential facility in Montana is governed by Title 53, Chapter 20, MCA. When a petition seeking commitment is filed, the district court must refer the petition to the Residential Facility Screening Team (RFST) of the Developmental Disabilities Division of the Department of Health and Human Services. Sections 53-20-125 and -133, MCA. The RFST makes a report to the court on its determination as to whether the individual is seriously developmentally disabled as defined in § 53-20-102(18), MCA:

(18) "Seriously developmentally disabled" means a person who:

(a) has a developmental disability;

(b) is impaired in cognitive functioning; and

(c) cannot be safely and effectively habilitated through voluntary use of community-based services because of behaviors that pose an imminent risk of serious harm to self or others.

The court may not consider commitment to a residential facility unless the RFST determines that the person is seriously developmentally disabled. Sections 53-20-125 and -133, MCA. See In the Matter of T.W., 2005 MT 340, ¶ 5, 330 Mont. 84, 126 P.3d 491. The maximum period of commitment is one year. Section 53-20-126, MCA.

¶ 4 This appeal arises from the State's August, 2007, petition to recommit G.M. to MDC. The District Court continued his then current commitment and referred the matter to the RFST as provided by law. Section 53-20-133, MCA. The RFST reported on August 17, 2007 that G.M. continued to be seriously developmentally disabled and recommended that he be recommitted to MDC.

¶ 5 G.M., through counsel, requested that he be evaluated at public expense by a professional of his choice. The District Court, after receiving briefs and a cost estimate of over $8,000 for the evaluation by G.M.'s chosen professional, granted the request for an evaluation, but limited the cost to be paid by the county to $1,160. That figure was based upon eight hours of evaluation at the expert's $145 hourly rate. G.M. represents in this appeal that he found funds from other sources to make up the difference between the expert's estimate and the amount allowed by the District Court, and that the evaluation was completed. The complete evaluation was placed into the record below and was referred to in the District Court's order of commitment.

¶ 6 G.M. also filed pre-hearing motions asking the court to construe the term "seriously developmentally disabled" as used in § 53-20-102(18), MCA, and requesting that the State be required to prove "physical facts or evidence" beyond a reasonable doubt and all other matters by clear and convincing evidence. The State filed a pre-hearing motion requesting that G.M. be barred from offering evidence of licensing infractions at MDC or evidence that MDC "does not properly evaluate or treat individuals." The District Court denied G.M.'s motions and granted the State's motion.

¶ 7 Thereafter, the hearing in the case was vacated at the request of the parties. No facts were presented to the District Court concerning G.M.'s recommitment except that the report of the RFST and the report of G.M.'s chosen professional¹ were placed into the record. G.M. and the State entered a stipulation that G.M. would be recommitted to MDC from August 2007 until August 2008. The parties also stipulated that if G.M. displayed no "aggressive or other harmful behaviors" for the next six weeks, he would be referred for placement in community-based services. The stipulation also recited that G.M. did not admit that he is "seriously developmentally disabled" or that he "otherwise meets the criteria for recommitment," but that given the District Court's prior orders on the cost of the expert evaluation and on the respective pre-hearing motions, "the District Court will have sufficient evidence upon which to recommit the Respondent."

¶ 8 The District Court then entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order committing G.M. to MDC for one year. The present appeal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

¶ 9 G.M. raises the following issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the District Court erred in applying the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof in commitment proceedings for persons with developmental disabilities.

2. Whether the District Court erred in limiting evidence concerning conditions and practices at MDC.

3. Whether the District Court erred interpreting the term "seriously developmentally disabled" with regard to the availability of community-based services.

4. Whether yearly recommitment requires this Court to fashion a remedy to produce some other outcome.

5. Whether the District Court erred in limiting the amount of public funds for payment of the evaluation professional chosen by G.M.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10 This Court reviews de novo a district court's legal conclusions, including interpretations of statutes, to determine whether they are correct. In the Matter of E.P.B., 2007 MT 224, ¶ 5, 339 Mont. 107, 168 P.3d 662. The standard of review of a district court's grant or denial of fees and costs is whether the court abused its discretion. Denton v. First Interstate Bank, 2006 MT 193, ¶ 19, 333 Mont. 169, 142 P.3d 797.

¶ 11 We review discretionary trial court rulings, including trial administration issues and evidentiary rulings, for abuse of discretion. A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment, or in excess of the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. Pumphrey v. Empire Lath and Plaster, 2006 MT 255, ¶ 9, 334 Mont. 102, 144 P.3d 813. In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion, the question is not whether the reviewing court agrees with the trial court, but rather whether the trial court acted arbitrarily. State v. Price, 2006 MT 79, ¶ 17, 331 Mont. 502, 134 P.3d 45. The burden to demonstrate an abuse of discretion is on the party seeking reversal of an unfavorable ruling. State v. Sheehan, 2005 MT 305, ¶ 18, 329 Mont. 417, 124 P.3d 1119.

DISCUSSION

¶ 12 Issue 1. The first issue is whether the District Court erred in its prehearing order that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof would apply to the case. Since there was no hearing and G.M. ultimately stipulated to recommitment, the standard was not actually applied to any evidence in this case. By stipulating to recommitment, G.M. necessarily conceded that there was sufficient clear and convincing evidence to recommit him.

¶ 13 The established rule in Montana is that in commitment or recommitment proceedings involving persons with developmental disabilities, the State bears the burden of proving the grounds for commitment by clear and convincing evidence. In the Matter of W.M., 252 Mont. 225, 229, 828 P.2d 378, 381 (1992). Adoption of this heightened standard of proof is required by the United States Constitution and is based upon the express recognition that civil commitment is a significant deprivation of liberty that requires significant due process protection. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). A standard of proof higher than clear and convincing evidence is not appropriate for commitment proceedings involving persons with developmental disabilities. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-28, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2643-47, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993).

¶ 14 The United States Supreme Court's decision in Addington v. Texas, relied upon by this Court in Matter of W.M. in setting the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof, analyzed the function of a standard of proof as it relates to due process and the reasons why different standards of proof are appropriate in differing settings.

[A] civil commitment proceeding can in no sense be equated to a criminal prosecution. In addition, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard historically has been reserved for criminal cases. This unique standard of proof, not prescribed or defined in the Constitution, is regarded as a critical part of the "moral force of the criminal law," and we should hesitate to apply it too broadly or casually in noncriminal cases.

Addington, 441 U.S. at 428, 99 S.Ct. 1804 (citations omitted). The Court emphasized that both the State and the individual have significant and legitimate interests in the commitment process that are protected by the clear and convincing evidence standard. Addington, 441 U.S. at 430, 99 S.Ct. 1804.

¶ 15 Montana statutes governing the commitment of developmentally disabled persons contain no required standard of proof for commitment proceedings. The hearing is held before the district court without a jury, and the maximum period of involuntary...