In re Gabriella A.

• Decision Date: 25 November 2014
• Docket Number: No. 36632.,36632.
• Citation: 104 A.3d 805,154 Conn.App. 177
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re GABRIELLA A.

154 Conn.App. 177

104 A.3d 805

In re GABRIELLA A.^*

No. 36632.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 16, 2014.

Decided Nov. 25, 2014.^**

Dana M. Hrelic, with whom was Brendon P. Levesque, Hartford, for the appellant (respondent mother).

John E. Tucker, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Benjamin Zivyon and Patricia E. Naktenis, assistant attorneys general, for the appellee (petitioner).

Valeria Caldwell–Gaines, for the minor child.

LAVINE, ALVORD and HARPER, Js.

Opinion

ALVORD, J.

The respondent mother, Tanesha E.,¹ appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights and denying her motion to revoke commitment as to her daughter, Gabriella A.² The respondent claims that the court improperly (1) found that the Department of Children and Families (department) had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with Gabriella, (2) found that she was unable to benefit from reunification efforts, and (3) considered the best interests of the child in the adjudicatory stage of the proceedings. We disagree with the respondent's claims, and accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the respondent's appeal. The trial court described the respondent as having endured “extreme long-term trauma....” She reported having been exposed to domestic violence between her mother and her stepfather, and that her stepfather had tried to rape her. The respondent gave birth to Gabriella on February 28, 2011, while visiting the United States for her brother's funeral.³ In April, 2011, the respondent left Gabriella in Connecticut with a woman named Nicolette R. and returned to Jamaica. Gabriella was removed from Nicolette's home on August 25, 2011. The court described the circumstances under which Gabriella was removed as “relatively horrific....” The petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, filed a motion for an order of temporary custody, which was granted on August 29, 2011. Also on August 29, 2011, the petitioner filed a neglect petition. The respondent returned to the United States in September, 2011. On November 18, 2011, Gabriella was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of the petitioner. Gabriella has been in her current foster placement since December, 2011.⁴ The respondent filed a motion to revoke commitment in February, 2013. In March, 2013, the petitioner filed a petition pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112 to terminate the respondent's parental rights as to Gabriella for, inter alia, failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation.

The trial was held over the course of five days, and the court issued an oral decision rendering judgment terminating the parental rights of the respondent as to Gabriella.⁵ The court issued its findings on February 26, 2014. This appeal followed.

I

We first review the respondent's claimed error as to two findings made by the trial court. She claims that the court improperly found (1) that the department had made reasonable efforts toward reunification and (2) that she was unable to benefit from reunification efforts.⁶

“A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition.... In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights [under § 17a–112 (j) ] exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase ... [in which] the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child.” (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Etta H., 146 Conn.App. 751, 755–56, 78 A.3d 295 (2013).

“To terminate parental rights under [§ 17a–112 (j) ] the department is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with the parent unless the court finds that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. In accordance with [§ 17a–112 (j) ], the department may meet its burden concerning reunification in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3) by a previous judicial determination that such efforts were not appropriate.... The trial court's determination of this issue will not be overturned on appeal unless, in light of all of the evidence in the record, it is clearly erroneous.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 348, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002). “A finding is clearly erroneous when either there is no evidence in the record to support it, or the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.... [G]reat weight is given to the judgment of the trial court because of [the trial court's] opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence.... [An appellate court does] not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached.... [Rather] every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial court's ruling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Keyashia C., 120 Conn.App. 452, 455, 991 A.2d 1113, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 637 (2010).

A

The respondent first argues that the court erred in finding that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with Gabriella. Specifically, the respondent claims that the department's efforts were per se unreasonable, in that it (1) terminated the only assistance, provided by Radiance Innovative Services (Radiance), that she was receiving with regard to her immigration status, (2) referred her to Dr. Beverly Coker, a licensed clinical social worker, and then filed a petition to terminate the respondent's parental rights before receiving Dr. Coker's report, and (3) “contended that the respondent failed to rehabilitate sufficiently because she received the wrong type of trauma therapy from [Dr. Coker], the therapist to which it referred her.” (Emphasis omitted.) The petitioner argues in response that just because the treatment was unsuccessful does not mean that the department did not make reasonable efforts and that the department provided the respondent with “a myriad of services,” including “mental health treatment ... to address [her] severe history of trauma.” We conclude that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the court's finding.

“The reasonableness of the department's efforts must be assessed in the context of each case. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn.... [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.... [R]easonableness is an objective standard ... and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 855, 872–73, 83 A.3d 1264, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923, 86 A.3d 468 (2014).

The trial court, in its February 19, 2014 oral decision, recounted the efforts made by the department. First, it noted that the department consistently had referred the respondent to providers who were of similar cultural background, which the court recognized as a benefit in seeking out appropriate treatment for her. Second, the trial court discussed the parent education program provided through Radiance and remarked that the respondent was able to make some gains, but was unable to achieve the goal of “provid[ing] a safe environment for her children.”⁷ Third, the trial court discussed the other services provided by Radiance, which consisted of counseling to assist the respondent with depression and unstable housing. Fourth, the court discussed the treatment provided by Dr. Coker, and it explained that the respondent also made some progress in that setting. Fifth, the trial court noted the availability of a nonoffender caregiver program, which the respondent attended early in her involvement with the department. The trial court found that the department had made reasonable efforts toward reunification, as required by § 17a–112 (j).

Our review of the record reveals that the evidence presented at trial supports the finding that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with Gabriella. The trial court issued specific steps; see General Statutes § 46b–129 (b) ; which, in relevant part, required the respondent to take part in both parenting and individual counseling, and to make progress toward the treatment goals of meeting Gabriella's need for safety and developing appropriate parenting techniques, cooperate with service providers recommended for counseling, and acquire and maintain adequate housing and a legal income.

The court heard testimony describing the services provided to the respondent to achieve these goals. By October, 2011, the department already had made two referrals. The respondent was referred to the Wheeler Clinic for a substance abuse evaluation, which revealed that substance abuse was not an issue for her. The respondent was also referred to the Greater Hartford Children's Advocacy Center's nonoffender caregiver group, a seven week program designed for parents whose children have been sexually abused, to better help her parent her child through the healing process.⁸ While the respondent completed the program and scored high on the posttests, the program manager testified to her concerns that “most of the sharing was about her own trauma or her...