In re Gallardo

Decision Date11 September 2018
Docket NumberInterim Decision #3936
Citation27 I&N Dec. 449
PartiesMatter of Agustin VALENZUELA GALLARDO, Respondent
CourtU.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals

(1) An "offense relating to obstruction of justice" under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2012), encompasses offenses covered by chapter 73 of the Federal criminal code, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1521 (2012), or any other Federal or State offense that involves (1) an affirmative and intentional attempt (2) that is motivated by a specific intent (3) to interfere either in an investigation or proceeding that is ongoing, pending, or reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, or in another's punishment resulting from a completed proceeding. Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I&N Dec. 838 (BIA 2012), clarified.

(2) A conviction for accessory to a felony under section 32 of the California Penal Code that results in a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year is a conviction for an aggravated felony offense relating to obstruction of justice under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act.

FOR RESPONDENT: Frank P. Sprouls, Esquire

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Donald W. Cassidy, Associate Legal Advisor

BEFORE: Board Panel: GUENDELSBERGER, MALPHRUS, LIEBOWITZ, Board Members.

MALPHRUS, Board Member:

This case is before us on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further consideration of the respondent's removability under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2016). The respondent's appeal will be dismissed.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on May 23, 2002. On December 28, 2007, he was convicted of accessory to a felony in violation of section 32 of the California Penal Code and was sentenced to 16 months in prison.1 Based on this conviction, the respondent was placed in removal proceedings where an Immigration Judge found him removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act, as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony offense relating to obstruction of justice under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2012). The respondent contested his removability before the Immigration Judge, arguing that his conviction was not an offense relating to obstruction of justice because it did not relate to an ongoing judicial proceeding, and he filed a motion to terminate his proceedings. The Immigration Judge found that the definition of an offense relating to obstruction of justice under the Act is not limited to obstruction offenses involving an ongoing judicial proceeding. He then denied the respondent's motion and ordered him removed to Mexico.

We dismissed the respondent's appeal from the Immigration Judge's decision and denied his motion to reconsider our order in this regard. On May 17, 2011, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2011). In that case, the court looked to our two prior precedents interpreting section 101(a)(43)(S) and held that a crime is an offense relating to obstruction of justice under that provision when "it interferes with an ongoing proceeding or investigation." Id. at 1164.

In light of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hoang, we sua sponte reopened the respondent's appeal for further consideration of his removability. On June 27, 2012, we issued a published decision, clarifying our prior precedents interpreting section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act and holding that an offense relating to obstruction of justice must have as an element "the affirmative and intentional attempt, with specific intent, to interfere with the process of justice . . . . [T]he existence of [an ongoing criminal investigation or trial] is not an essential element of 'an offense relating to obstruction of justice.'" Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I&N Dec. 838, 841 (BIA 2012) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Because a violator of section 32 of the California Penal Code must act with the intent to aid a principal in avoiding arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment, we concluded that the respondent's State crime has as an element the affirmative and intentional attempt, with specific intent, to interfere with the process of justice and is therefore an offense relating to obstruction of justice. See id. at 841-42.

The respondent filed a petition for review of our decision, which the Ninth Circuit granted, concluding that our definition of "an offense relating to obstruction of justice" is impermissibly "vague" because it does "not give[] an indication of what it does include in 'the process of justice,' or where that process begins and ends." Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 819. Based on this conclusion, the court remanded the case to us either "for consideration of a new construction or application of the interpretation [of section 101(a)(43)(S) we] previously announced in" Matter of Espinoza, 22 I&N Dec. 889 (BIA 1999), to which the Ninth Circuit had deferred in Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1161. Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 812-13.

II. ANALYSIS

Section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act defines an aggravated felony as "an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year." To establish whether the respondent's conviction is for "an offense relating to obstruction of justice" under section 101(a)(43)(S), we apply the categorical approach by focusing on whether the elements of his State statute of conviction proscribe conduct that categorically falls within the Federal generic definition of an offense relating to obstruction of justice. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016).

The Ninth Circuit found the "phrase . . . 'process of justice'" in the generic definition of an offense relating to obstruction of justice we articulated in Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo to be "amorphous." Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 822. The court stated, "Absent some indication of the contours of 'process of justice,' an unpredictable variety of specific intent crimes could fall within it, leaving us unable to determine what crimes make a criminal defendant deportable under [section] 101(a)(43)(S) and what crimes do not." Id. at 820.2 We respectfully take the opportunity to clarify our prior precedents regarding the contours of the generic definition of an aggravated felony offense relating to obstruction of justice under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984); see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the language of section 101(a)(43)(S) is ambiguous because it does not clearly answer whether an offense relating to obstruction of justice must involve interference in an ongoing investigation or proceeding. See Valenzuela Gallardo, 818 F.3d at 815-19, 824;3 see also Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I&N Dec. at 839 (citing Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1060-61). Because that language is susceptible to varying interpretations in this regard, it is our duty to resolve any "ambiguities in [that] statute[]" and "to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion." Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 523 (2009) (citation omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also, e.g., Matter of Richmond, 26 I&N Dec. 779, 788 (BIA 2016).

The Act does not define the phrase "obstruction of justice." We therefore find it appropriate to adopt a generic definition "based on the 'generic, contemporary meaning' of [that phrase] at the time the statute was enacted." Matter of Sanchez-Lopez, 27 I&N Dec. 256, 260-61 (BIA 2018) (citation omitted); see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). To do so, we survey Federal and State law,4 Federal sentencing guidelines, theModel Penal Code, and scholarly commentary to determine the common meaning of the phrase "obstruction of justice" in 1996, when section 101(a)(43)(S) was enacted.5 See Matter of Alvarado, 26 I&N Dec. 895, 897 (BIA 2016); see also Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1570-72 (2017) (employing a similar analysis to discern the definition for "sexual abuse of a minor" under section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Act).

A. Interference in an Investigation or Proceeding

We have previously looked to chapter 73 of the Federal criminal code, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1520 (2006), which lists a number of offenses under the heading "Obstruction of Justice," for guidance regarding the contours of section 101(a)(43)(S). See Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 26 I&N Dec. at 842-43; see also Matter of Espinoza, 22 I&N Dec. at 892-94 & n.4. Many of the provisions listed under chapter 73 require interference in an ongoing investigation or proceeding. See Matter of Espinoza, 22 I&N Dec. at 892. "The intent of the two broadest provisions, § 1503 (prohibiting persons frominfluencing or injuring an officer or juror generally) and § 1510 (prohibiting obstruction of criminal investigations), is to protect individuals assisting in a federal investigation or judicial proceeding and to prevent a miscarriage of justice in any case pending in a federal court." Id.6

However, several crimes proscribed under chapter 73 do not contain this limitation. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512, 1519 (2012). In fact, prior to the enactment of section 101(a)(43)(S), chapter 73 proscribed, among other things, the knowing use of intimidation, physical force, threats, corrupt persuasion, or misleading conduct

toward another person, with the intent to—
(1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding;
(2) cause or induce a person to—
. . .
...

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