In re Gannon

• Decision Date: 29 June 1889
• Citation: 18 A. 159,16 R.I. 537
• Parties: In re GANNON.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

18 A. 159

16 R.I. 537

In re GANNON.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 29, 1889.

On petition for writ of habeas corpus, Providence county.

Petition of Michael Doyle, as guardian of the person and estate of Michael Gannon, for his release from confinement in the Butler Hospital for Insane.

Charles A. Wilson and Thomas A. Jenckes, for petitioner. Ziba O. Slocum, Edward D. McGuinness, and John Doran, contra.

PER CURIAM. This is a petition preferred by the petitioner, as guardian of the person and estate of Michael Gannon, and in behalf of said Gannon, for his delivery from confinement in the Butler Hospital for the Insane. Said Gannon was committed to said hospital upon the application of his wife, before the appointment of the petitioner as his guardian, and is detained there under Pub. St. R. I. c. 74, §§ 11, 12.² Section 11 authorizes the confinement of insane persons in institutions for the insane within the state by their parents or guardians, and, if they have none, by their relatives and friends, subject to the proviso that the superintendent shall not receive any person "without a certificate from two practising physicians of good standing, known to him as such, that such person is insane." Section 12 provides that the person so committed may be lawfully received and detained until discharged in one of the modes provided by said chapter, none of which, however, can be resorted to by the person confined directly, as of right, in his own behalf.

The petitioner contends that these sections are void, because they are in conflict with the

Sec. 12. Any person committed to the charge of any of said institutions for the insane, as aforesaid, in either of the modes hereinbefore prescribed, may be lawfully received and detained in said institution by the superintendent thereof, and by his keepers and servants, until discharged in one of the modes herein provided; and neither the superintendent of such institution, his keeper or servants, nor the trustees or agents of the same, shall be liable, civilly or criminally, for receiving or detaining any person so committed or detained constitution of the state, art. 1, § 10, and with the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. We will consider the question, under said amendment, the provision of the state constitution being narrower in its scope, unless extended by construction. The special clause of the fourteenth amendment referred to is this: "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The contention is that sections 11 and 12 of chapter 74 deprive the persons committed under them of their liberty without due process of law. Without attempting to define the exact meaning of the phrase "due process of law," it suffices for the present inquiry to say that it means at least some legal procedure in which the person proceeded against, if he is to be concluded thereby, shall have an opportunity to defend himself. The sections of chapter 74 referred to do not provide such a procedure. The only safeguard against an improper commitment which they afford is the certificate of two practising physicians of good standing,—a certificate which may be given entirely ex parte. We are not prepared to say that even so the sections would be void, if they were intended simply for temporary detention, preliminary to or pending a proper judicial inquiry. The right of personal liberty is to be reasonably understood, and there are many restraints which are allowed as consistent with it. Thus the passengers and crew of a ship are liable to restraints other than those which are merely incident to their position on shipboard. They must submit to such restraints as are necessary for due discipline and the general safety. So a man who attends a religious meeting is bound to observe the decorum appropriate thereto, or he may be arrested and removed. The man who is committing or has committed crime may be taken into custody and held for trial. Children may be confined for instruction or punishment. Sick people, in the delirium of fever, may be held on their beds by force, and lunatics, who are dangerous to themselves or others, may be shut up in the dangerous periods of their lunacy. The restraints in these instances are simply such as are appropriate to the occasions for them, or necessary to public justice or security. In these and other such instances, too, the writ of habeas corpus, or a civil action for damages, is an effectual remedy for any abuse or excess in the restraints imposed. See Cooley, Const. Lim. 339, 340, for other instances of permissible restraint. The counsel for the respondents directs our attention to the cases of In re Oakes, (Supreme Judicial Ct. Mass. Jan. 1845,) 8 Reporter, 122, and Denny v. Tyler. 3 Allen, 225. In the former case an aged man was committed to an insane asylum by his son. On habeas corpus for his release the court held that a person who is insane or delirious may be confined or restrained of his liberty by his family or others to such extent, or for such time, as may be necessary to prevent injury or danger to himself or others, and that the restraint may be in his own house or in a suitable asylum. In the second case, a married woman was committed to an insane...