In re Garden's Estate

• Decision Date: 06 May 1944
• Docket Number: 36130.
• Citation: 148 P.2d 745,158 Kan. 554
• Parties: In re GARDEN'S ESTATE. v. HAINES et al. GARDEN
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

148 P.2d 745

158 Kan. 554

In re GARDEN'S ESTATE.

GARDEN v. HAINES et al.

No. 36130.

Supreme Court of Kansas

May 6, 1944

Syllabus by the Court.

Antenuptial contracts which are fairly and understandingly made, just and equitable in their provisions and free from fraud and deceit are valid and enforceable.

Antenuptial contracts are not regarded as ordinary contracts between persons dealing with each other at arm's length, since persons engaged to marry stand in such a confidential relationship toward each other that each has the duty to deal with the other with the utmost fairness, candor and sincerity.

Parol evidence was admissible to show circumstances under which antenuptial agreement by which affianced wife relinquished all interest in intended husband's estate and antenuptial will devising a substantial share of his estate to affianced wife were executed.

Evidence to which a demurrer has been sustained must be accepted as true on appeal.

Where affianced wife signed antenuptial agreement relinquishing all interest in intended husband's estate upon his representation that its purpose was to give him unrestricted freedom to transact extensive business affairs and would not bar her of all interest in his estate and that he would make a will devising to her a substantial share of his estate which he accordingly did, antenuptial agreement and antenuptial will should be construed together as complementary instruments constituting but one agreement.

Parol evidence is admissible to show the circumstances under which complementary instruments were executed.

All contemporaneous writings relating to the same subject matter are admissible to show the entire agreement.

A disproportion or seeming inadequacy in the amount affianced wife is to receive out of intended husband's estate under antenuptial agreement, though not alone controlling, is a circumstance to be considered with all the other evidence to determine whether affianced wife was fairly dealth with.

Where antenuptial agreement stripping affianced wife of all interest in intended husband's estate and antenuptial will devising to her a substantial share of his estate were executed as complementary parts of entire agreement between betrothed parties, and after their marriage husband revoked antenuptial will and made a new will omitting the provision for wife, she had the right to elect to take her statutory share of husband's estate and not under the will executed after marriage. Gen.St.Supp.1943, 59-504, 59-2233.

Widow was not estopped from claiming her statutory share of husband's estate because she offered his will for probate and did not appeal from order admitting it to probate or because she qualified and served as executrix thereunder for a time. Gen.St.Supp.1943, 59-504, 59-618, 59-2221, 59-2233.

That creditor has a claim against estate does not disqualify him to serve as executor or administrator, though he cannot serve in such capacity when his own claim is up for consideration.

A widow's election to take under husband's will or under the law will be set aside unless widow was fully informed as to her rights under the law and under the will before making election. Gen.St. Supp.1943, 59-504, 59-2233.

A widow cannot be held to have waived her right to take her statutory share of husband's estate instead of under his will upon mere inference but only upon her unequivocal assent with full knowledge of her rights and the condition of estate. Gen.St.Supp.1943, 59-504, 59-2233.

Insured's widow who was named as beneficiary in life policy acquired a vested interest therein upon death of insured and where policy made no provision for testamentary change of beneficiary, acceptance of payments under policy did not estop widow from claiming her statutory share of insured's estate though insured's will declared that widow's beneficial interest in insurance was deemed sufficient for her needs without any share of estate. Gen St.Supp.1943, 59-504, 59-2233.

Proceeds of life policy designating insured's wife as beneficiary were not a part of insured's estate and were not subject to testamentary disposition in absence of provision in policy authorizing testamentary change of beneficiary.

Widow's continued occupancy of homestead did not estop her from claiming her statutory share of husband's estate, though his will provided that she should have the right to occupy homestead as long as she remained his widow, since widow had such right under the law regardless of terms of will. Gen.St.Supp.1943, 59-504, 59-2233.

Constitutional and statutory restrictions on alienation of a homestead are for the protection of the family and cannot be waived or avoided by antenuptial contract providing that, if wife survives husband, she is to have no part in his estate.

Where affianced wife signed antenuptial contract after explanation by intended husband and his confidential secretary that its purpose was to give husband unrestricted freedom to transact varied and extensive business affairs and that it would not bar her of all interests in his estate and husband's assurance that he would make a will devising to her substantial share of his estate, it would be presumed that she signed agreement in reliance on such representations without the necessity of introducing testimony to establish such reliance.

In view of probate court's enlarged equitable jurisdiction, it was proper practice for widow to petition that court to set aside antenuptial contract, so that all matters pertaining to her right of election to take her statutory share of husband's estate and not under his will could be adjudicated in the same proceedings. Gen. St.Supp.1943 59-504, 59-2233.

1. Where an affianced wife signed an antenuptial pact with her betrothed husband upon his representation and explanation that its purpose was to give him unrestricted freedom to transact his varied and extensive business affairs as he saw fit, and upon his assurance that the pact would not bar her of all interest in his estate and that he would make a will devising to her a substantial share of his estate, which he accordingly did, the antenuptial pact and the antenuptial will should be read and construed together as complementary instruments constituting but one agreement of the betrothed parties.

2. Parol evidence is admissible to show the facts and circumstances under which the antenuptial agreement and the will were executed.

3. Where, after the making of such an antenuptial agreement and will as indicated in Syl. par. 1, the contracting parties were married, and thereafter the husband made another will which varied materially from the one he had executed on the eve of his marriage, his widow had the right to elect to take her statutory share of her husband's estate and not under the will executed after the marriage.

4. The widow was not estopped to claim her statutory share of the estate on the ground that she had offered the will for probate, nor because it was probated, nor because she did not appeal from the order admitting it to probate, nor because she qualified and served as executor for a time.

5. Where after the marriage the husband caused a $25,000 policy of life insurance held by him to be changed so that his wife was named as beneficiary if she survived him,--the proceeds of the policy to be paid to her in monthly installments of $150 per month so long as she remained his widow, the proceeds of the policy became vested in her according to its terms immediately upon the death of the husband, irrespective of a declaration in the will that the testator deemed that the widow's beneficial interest in his insurance would be sufficient for her needs without any share of his estate.

6. The proceeds of the life insurance policy were not a part of the testator's estate, nor subject to testamentary disposition by the testator.

7. Although a husband's will contains a testamentary provision that his widow should have the right to occupy the family homestead as long as she remained his widow, she is not estopped to claim her statutory right to a share of his estate by continuing to occupy the homestead,-- since that privilege is conferred on her by law, irrespective of the terms of the will.

8. It was a proper practice for the widow to file a petition in the probate court to set aside the antenuptial contract, so that all matters pertaining to her right of election to claim her share of the estate under the law and not under the will could be adjudicated in the same proceedings.

Appeal from District Court, Reno County; Franklin B. Hettinger Judge.

Proceeding in the matter of the Estate of Harry B. Garden, deceased, upon petition of Wila H. Garden to set aside an antenuptial agreement, opposed by Roy A. Haines and Walter F. Jones, as executors of the estate of Harry B. Garden, deceased, and others. The probate court sustained the agreement, and from a judgment of the district court dismissing her appeal from the probate court, petitioner appeals.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded with instructions.

Donald C. Martindell, of Hutchinson, and Robert C. Foulston, of Wichita (William D. P. Carey, Wesley E. Brown, and Edwin B. Brabets, all of Hutchinson, and George Siefkin, Samuel E. Bartlett, George B. Powers, C. H. Morris, and John F. Eberhardt, all of Wichita on the briefs), for appellant.

Harold R. Branine and Roy C. Davis, both of Hutchinson (Walter F. Jones, Claude E. Chalfant, J. Richards Hunter, Warren H. White, Frank S. Hodge, William H. Vernon, and Eugene A. White, all of Hutchinson, on the briefs), for appellees.

DAWSON Chief Justice.

This appeal presents the question whether an appellant was barred of her widow's share of her deceased husband's estate because of an antenuptial agreement....