In re George Beck

• Decision Date: 11 May 1901
• Docket Number: 12,029
• Parties: In re GEORGE BECK, Petitioner
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

64 P. 971

63 Kan. 57

In re GEORGE BECK, Petitioner

No. 12,029

Supreme Court of Kansas

May 11, 1901

Decided January, 1901.

Original proceeding in habeas corpus.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. CRIMINAL PRACTICE -- Sentence. In a prosecution on an information containing a number of counts, the jury finding the defendant guilty of several of the offenses charged, the court should pronounce a single judgment declaring the full measure of punishment to be imposed for all such offenses.

2. CRIMINAL PRACTICE -- Sentence on Several Counts. A judgment regularly rendered on one of the offenses included in the verdict, which has been executed in part by the imprisonment of the defendant, is the end of the prosecution and exhausts the power of the court in the case; and the action of the court in bringing in the defendant several years after the rendition of the judgment and sentencing him again on the remaining offenses embraced in the verdict is wholly without authority.

W. R. Hopkins, for petitioner.

A. A. Godard, attorney-general, and G. L. Miller, county attorney, for respondent.

JOHNSTON, J. CUNNINGHAM, GREENE, JJ., concurring.

OPINION

JOHNSTON, J.:

The question presented for our decision is, Has a court power to divide a judgment of conviction in a criminal case into sections and pronounce parts of it from time to time and at different terms of court?

In a prosecution for violations of the prohibitory liquor law George Beck was convicted on six counts. The verdict was returned February 28, 1898, and on the following day a motion for a new trial was overruled. At the same term of court, and on March 14, 1898, a motion in arrest of judgment was overruled as to one count and final judgment was pronounced, sentencing the defendant to imprisonment for thirty days and to pay a fine of $ 100, as well as an attorney's fee of twenty-five dollars and the costs. On the same day it was ordered that the motion in arrest of judgment as to the other counts included in the verdict be continued until March 25, 1898. The defendant was at once imprisoned under the judgment and remained in prison until July 25, 1898, when he was released upon an order of the county commissioners, and a few days thereafter the governor granted a full pardon of the offense for which he was adjudged guilty. No steps were taken as to the other offenses embraced in the verdict at the term of court when judgment was rendered against the defendant, nor until December 7, 1900, nearly three years after judgment had been rendered and more than two years after the sentence of imprisonment had been executed and the pardon by the governor had been granted. At that time a bench warrant was issued, the defendant was again arrested, and brought before the court for further sentence and judgment. The court then overruled the motion in arrest of judgment as to the other counts, approved the verdict, and proceeded to pronounce another judgment sentencing the defendant to forty days' imprisonment and $ 100 fine on each of the five remaining counts.

The court was then wholly without authority to render an additional judgment or to impose other and additional punishment. Its power was exhausted when the final judgment of 1898 was rendered and executed. A judgment is the final determination of the issues submitted, and the criminal code contemplates that but one final judgment shall be rendered, however many distinct offenses may have been charged in the information or included in the verdict. (Crim. Code, §§ 241, 242, 248-250; Gen. Stat. 1901, §§ 5686, 5687, 5693-5695.) It was competent for the court temporarily to suspend judgment for the purpose of hearing motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, also to gain information that would enable the court to impose a just sentence on the defendant, to give the defendant an opportunity to perfect an appeal, or for other proper relief; but an indefinite suspension, or the holding of the sentence over the head of the defendant, to be executed from time to time as the court may see fit, is wholly unauthorized. (In re Strickler, Petitioner, 51 Kan. 700, 33 P. 620.)

A final judgment in either a civil or criminal case is open for correction or revision until the end of the term at which it is rendered. During the term and while it remains unexecuted it is regarded to be within. the breast of the court, subject to amendment, alteration, or a change or increase of the sentence; but when the term ends every judgment regularly entered becomes final and passes beyond the revisory power and control of the court. (The State v. Hughes, 35 Kan. 626, 12 P. 28; Freem. Judg. § 96; 17 A. & E Encycl. of L., 2d ed., 816.) During the term and before the execution of the judgment had been entered upon, the court might have amended it and imposed penalties for each of the offenses included in the verdict; but when the term was allowed to pass, the case dropped from the docket, and the judgment rendered executed, the state practically abandoned the prosecution, and ...