In re George
| Citation | 726 A.2d 1237 |
| Decision Date | 18 March 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-BG-334.,98-BG-334. |
| Parties | In re David E. GEORGE, Respondent. A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Before TERRY and FARRELL, Associate Judges, and BELSON, Senior Judge.
On February 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals of Maryland suspended respondent David E. George from the practice of law in Maryland for a period of sixty days commencing on May 1, 1998. The suspension was to be followed by a six-month supervised probationary period, subject to an additional six months should the practice monitor not be satisfied with respondent's cooperation. Respondent admitted to violating MARYLAND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.3 (), 1.4 (failing to keep client reasonably informed), 1.8(h) (), and 8.4(d) (). Respondent consented to this discipline in Maryland.
Pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(d), this court temporarily suspended respondent on March 17, 1998, and referred the matter to the Board on Professional Responsibility ("the Board") for a determination of the appropriateness of reciprocal discipline. Respondent filed an affidavit in compliance with D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g) on March 24, 1998. On April 9, 1998, respondent filed a motion to terminate his interim suspension in the District of Columbia after sixty days. Bar Counsel responded, agreeing that the appropriate reciprocal discipline should be a suspension of the respondent for sixty days in the District of Columbia. Bar Counsel asserted that the starting date of suspension period should be March 24, 1998, the day respondent complied with D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14, and its termination date sixty days later, on May 23, 1998. On May 4, 1998, this court ordered that the interim suspension order would be vacated effective May 23, 1998, without prejudice. Further, the court ordered the Board to appoint a practice monitor to supervise respondent's six-month probationary period.
The Board recommends that the sanction finally imposed by this court (as distinguished from the interim suspension) be suspension for sixty days, imposed nunc pro tunc to March 24, 1998, to be followed by a six-month period of supervised probation effective May 28, 1998. The Board recommends that respondent be supervised by the same monitor who supervised respondent's Maryland probation period during the same time. The facts pertaining to respondent's conduct are set forth in the Board's Report and Recommendation, which is attached as an appendix to this opinion.
When an attorney has been subject to discipline in another jurisdiction, reciprocal discipline should be imposed by this court unless there is clear and convincing evidence that one of the enumerated exceptions of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c) applies. See In re Gentile, 706 A.2d 27, 28 (D.C.1998)
; In re Garner, 576 A.2d 1356, 1357 (D.C.1990). Respondent has not argued for any of the exceptions. Therefore, because respondent does not contest the proposed sanction, pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(g), we will accord heightened deference to the recommendations of the Board. See In re Golds-borough, 654 A.2d 1285, 1288 (D.C.1995).
There is a presumption in reciprocal discipline cases that the particular discipline imposed by the District of Columbia will be the same as that imposed by the original disciplining jurisdiction. See In re Jones, 686 A.2d 560, 561 (D.C.1996)
; In re Zilberberg, 612 A.2d 832, 834 (D.C.1992). The sixty-day suspension is within the range of sanctions this court has imposed for similar misconduct. See In re Drew, 693 A.2d 1127, 1127-28 (D.C.1997) (); In re Lyles, 680 A.2d 408, 414-18 (D.C.1996) (); In re Brown, 672 A.2d 577, 578-79 (D.C.1996) (); In re Landesberg, 518 A.2d 96, 96-97 (D.C.1986) (). Further, where suspended attorneys have notified their clients, pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14, of their suspension, and filed affidavits with this court confirming that notification, this court has imposed retroactive suspension. See In re Mulkeen, 606 A.2d 136, 137 (D.C.1992).
Accordingly, David E. George is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law for sixty days, the suspension to be imposed nunc pro tunc to March 24, 1998. It is furthered ordered that the suspension shall be followed by a probationary period of six months with a practice monitor, effective May 28, 1998.1
So ordered.
APPENDIX
This reciprocal discipline matter is before the Board following Respondent's 60-day suspension with conditions by the Court of Appeals in Maryland. Respondent is a member of the Maryland Bar, having been admitted on June 26, 1985, and a member of the District of Columbia Bar, having been admitted on September 27, 1985.
On August 25, 1997, a Petition for Disciplinary Action was filed by the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland. The Petition charged multiple violations with regard to Respondent's representation of three different clients.
On February 17, 1998, Respondent and Maryland Bar Counsel entered into a Joint Petition For Suspension By Consent in which Respondent admitted violations of several rules of Maryland's Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rule 1.3 (); Rule 1.4 (); Rule 1.8(h) (); Rule 8.1(b) (); and Rule 8.4(d) (). Respondent agreed to the imposition of a 60-day suspension, commencing on May 1, 1998.
On February 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals of Maryland ordered Respondent suspended for 60 days to commence May 1, 1998, with reinstatement conditioned on Respondent agreeing to a practice monitor for six months, subject to an additional six months if the practice monitor is not satisfied with Respondent's cooperation. Reinstatement was also conditioned on Respondent paying $1,390 DIUS interest to the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland.
On March 17, 1998, approximately one and one-half months prior to the commencement of Respondent's Maryland suspension, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals issued an Order temporarily suspending Respondent for 60 days effective immediately and referred this matter to the Board on Professional Responsibility for a determination as to whether identical, greater or lesser discipline should be imposed as reciprocal discipline. On March 24, 1998, Respondent complied with the requirements of D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 14(g).
On April 9, 1998, Respondent filed a motion with the Court of Appeals to terminate his interim suspension imposed in the District of Columbia after 60 days, on the grounds that his Maryland suspension was only 60 days.
In a response filed with the Board, Bar Counsel agreed with Respondent that the appropriate reciprocal discipline should be the same as Maryland's discipline—i.e., a suspension of Respondent's District of Columbia license for 60 days. See, e.g., In re Gentile, 706 A.2d 27 (D.C.1998)
. Bar Counsel further suggested that the starting date of Respondent's suspension should be March 24, 1998 (the day when Respondent complied with Rule XI, § 14(g)) and that the interim order of suspension should be vacated 60 days later on May 23, 1998. Bar Counsel added the caveat that because the Court retains the ultimate authority to impose a more severe sanction as final discipline, and because the Court looks to the Board in the first instance for a report and recommendation concerning appropriate final discipline, the vacatur of the interim suspension after 60 days should be without prejudice to the Board's authority to recommend, and the Court's authority ultimately to impose, different or more substantial discipline than that ordered in Maryland.
On April 29, 1998, Bar Counsel moved the Board for the expedited appointment of a practice monitor so that the monitor would be available when Respondent concluded his suspension in the District of Columbia and commenced his probationary period.2
On May 4, 1998, the Court ordered that its March 17, 1998 interim order of suspension be vacated, effective May 23, 1998, without prejudice to the authority of the Board to recommend, and the Court to impose, different or more substantial discipline than that ordered in Maryland, as final discipline in the present proceeding. The Court further ordered the Board to appoint a practice monitor to supervise Respondent's six-month period of probation effective May 28, 1998.
In the Joint Petition for Suspension by Consent, Respondent admitted violating five separate disciplinary rules of...
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