In Re Gerald Coley
Decision Date | 29 July 2010 |
Docket Number | Adversary No. 09-0307.,Bankruptcy No. 09-14999 ELF. |
Citation | 433 B.R. 476 |
Parties | In re Gerald COLEY, DebtorGMAC Inc., Plaintiff,v.Gerald Coley, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
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Warren S. Wolf, Cureton Clark, P.C., Mt. Laurel, NJ, for Debtor and Defendant.
Regina Cohen, Lavin O'Neil Ricci Cedrone & Disipi, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.
Gerald Coley, West Chester, PA, pro se.
Gerald Coley (“the Debtor”) filed a voluntary petition under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on July 8, 2009. In his bankruptcy schedules, the Debtor listed forty-six (46) unsecured debts totaling more than $2.3 million. Among the scheduled creditors is GMAC, Inc. (“GMAC”), the plaintiff in this adversary proceeding. GMAC is the Debtor's largest creditor, having obtained an $869,429.97 judgment against him prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.
GMAC initiated this adversary proceeding by filing a Complaint on October 6, 2009. In the Complaint, GMAC:
The Debtor filed a pro se Answer to the Complaint on November 3, 2009. 1
Before the court is GMAC's Motion for Summary Judgment (“the Motion”), which was filed on April 6, 2010. The Debtor filed a pro se Response to the Motion on May 6, 2010.
As detailed below, while the Debtor has not offered much in the way of evidence in response to the Motion, neither has GMAC offered much evidence in support of the Motion. Based on the summary judgment record, the Motion will denied in its entirety because GMAC has not offered evidence sufficient to meet its burden of proof with respect to at least one element of each of its claims. 2
GMAC styles its Motion as one for summary judgment. However, GMAC did not submit any evidentiary matter in support of the Motion, relying exclusively on admissions in the Debtor's Answer to the Complaint.
In the Motion, GMAC asserts that the following facts are undisputed: 3
1. Exton Motors, Inc. (“Exton Motors”) is an automobile dealership that previously operated in Exton, Pennsylvania. (Complaint ¶ 2; Answer ¶ 2).
2. The Debtor was the owner, president and principal of Exton Motors and controlled its operations. (Complaint ¶ 3; Answer ¶ 3).
5. In April 2007, the Debtor provided a personal financial statement to GMAC in consideration for and in connection with: (a) GMAC's continued provision of financing to Exton Motors (“the April 2007 Financial Statement.”) and (b) his personal guarantee of Exton Motors' debt to GMAC. (Complaint ¶ 6; Answer ¶ 6).
10. The Forbearance Agreement contained a warrant of attorney. (Complaint ¶ 10; Answer ¶ 10).
In his Response to the Motion, the Debtor admits all of the above allegations, except for Paragraph Nos. 6, 7 and 8.7 However, his denials of Paragraphs 6-8 are inconsistent with the earlier admissions in his Answer to the Complaint. For purposes of resolving the Motion, I will assume arguendo that the Debtor is bound by the admissions in the Answer to the Complaint.8
In his Response to the Motion, the Debtor also states that he “did not defraud nor intend to defraud GMAC at any time during their relationship-especially upon filling out the GMAC credit statement” and that:
Finally, the Debtor contends that he signed the Forbearance Agreement “under duress [and] without legal counsel.”
The standard for evaluating a summary judgment motion is well established and has been stated in numerous written opinions in this district.9 Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment should be granted when the “pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 10
Before a motion for summary judgment may be granted, the court must find that the motion alleges facts that, if proven at trial, would require a directed verdict in favor of the movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993). If the movant meets this initial burden, the responding party may not rest on his or her pleadings, but must designate specific factual averments through the use of affidavits or other permissible evidentiary material that demonstrate a triable factual dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Such evidence must be sufficient to support a factfinder's factual determination in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Evidence that merely raises some metaphysical doubt regarding the validity of a material facts is insufficient. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
In considering the evidentiary matter submitted in support of and in opposition to a summary judgment motion, the court's role is not to weigh the evidence, but only to determine whether there is a disputed, material fact for determination at trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A dispute about a “material” fact is “genuine” only if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. All reasonable inferences...
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