In re GO, 87476.

• Citation: 727 N.E.2d 1003,245 Ill.Dec. 269,191 Ill.2d 37
• Decision Date: 23 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 87476.,87476.
• Parties: In re G.O., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. G.O., Appellee).
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

727 N.E.2d 1003
191 Ill.2d 37
245 Ill.Dec. 269

In re G.O., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant,
v.
G.O., Appellee)

No. 87476.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 23, 2000.

727 N.E.2d 1005

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, Renee G. Goldfarb, Kenneth T. McCurry and Susan R. Schierl, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People

Donald J. Mizerk and Craig O. Donaldson, Winston & Strawn, Chicago, for Appellee.

Amicus Curiae Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, Chicago (Elizabeth E. Clarke, of counsel).

Steven A. Drizin, Chicago, Adnan Arian, Beth A. Colgan, L. Kate Mitchell and Kate W. Shank, law students, for amicus curiae Northwestern University Legal Clinic.

Justice RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:

The State appeals from an order of the appellate court holding that respondent, G.O., is entitled to a jury trial and that respondent's confession was involuntary. See 304 Ill.App.3d 719, 237 Ill.Dec. 717, 710 N.E.2d 140. We vacate the appellate court's holding that respondent is entitled to a jury trial and reverse the holding that respondent's confession was involuntary.

BACKGROUND

The State, relying upon a theory of accountability, filed a petition in the circuit court of Cook County to adjudicate respondent delinquent for the first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1998)) of Rafael Kubera. Respondent also faced related allegations of aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 1998)), aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a) (West 1998)), and aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 1998)). Respondent requested a jury trial. The trial court denied respondent's request. Respondent also sought to suppress incriminating statements that he had made. After a hearing, the trial court denied this motion.

Subsequently, the trial court adjudicated respondent delinquent on all charges. Pursuant to section 5-33(1.5) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-33(1.5) (West 1996) (now 705 ILCS 405/5-750(2) (West 1998))), the trial court declared respondent a ward of the court and ordered him committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, until his "21st birthday, without the possibility of parole, furlough, or non-emergency authorized absence for a period of 5 years." See 705 ILCS 405/5-33(1.5) (West 1996). Respondent timely appealed.

The appellate court held that the trial court denied respondent his right to equal protection as guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions (see U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2) when it denied his request for a jury trial.

727 N.E.2d 1006

The court explained that the sentence to which respondent was subject was similar to the sentences imposed upon habitual and violent juvenile offenders.¹ Compare 705 ILCS 405/5-33(1.5) (West 1996) with 705 ILCS 405/5-35(f) (West 1996) (now 705 ILCS 405/5-815(f) (West 1998)) (requiring a habitual juvenile offender to be committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, "until his 21st birthday, without possibility of parole, furlough, or non-emergency authorized absence") and 705 ILCS 405/5-36(f) (West 1996) (now 705 ILCS 405/5-820(f) (West 1998)) (requiring a violent juvenile offender to be committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, "until his or her 21st birthday, without possibility of parole, furlough, or non-emergency authorized absence"). The court described all three sentences as "punitive, determinate, nondiscretionary sentences of commitment to the age of 21 without hope of parole or furlough for at least five years from the date of commitment." 304 Ill.App.3d at 727, 237 Ill.Dec. 717, 710 N.E.2d 140. The court reasoned that the similar sentences rendered respondent similarly situated to habitual and violent juvenile offenders. Notwithstanding the fact that the three are similarly situated, the Juvenile Court Act treats juveniles charged with first degree murder differently than it treats juvenile offenders and violent juvenile offenders. Specifically, the Juvenile Court Act grants a jury trial to both habitual and violent juvenile offenders, but it does not grant such a right to juveniles charged with first degree murder. See 705 ILCS 405/5-35(d), 5-36(d) (West 1996). The appellate court concluded that no rational basis existed for granting a jury trial to habitual and violent juvenile offenders while denying one to juveniles charged with first degree murder. 304 Ill.App.3d at 727-29, 237 Ill.Dec. 717, 710 N.E.2d 140

The appellate court also examined the evidence that had been presented at the suppression hearing and concluded that the trial court erred in denying respondent's motion to suppress. Subsequently, the State sought leave to appeal, both as a matter of right and as a matter of discretion (see 177 Ill.2d R. 315; 134 Ill.2d R. 317).² We granted the State's petition and ordered that the action be considered on an expedited basis. We also granted the motions of the Cook County public defender and the Children and Family Justice Center to file briefs as amici curiae.

ANALYSIS

Equal Protection

We address first the State's argument that the appellate court erred in concluding that the trial court's refusal to grant respondent a jury trial denied him the equal protection of the laws. The basis for the appellate court's opinion is the similar sentences imposed on juveniles adjudicated delinquent of first degree murder and those imposed on juveniles adjudicated delinquent as habitual and violent juvenile offenders. See 304 Ill.App.3d at 727, 237 Ill.Dec. 717, 710 N.E.2d 140.

727 N.E.2d 1007

The sentencing provision for juveniles charged with first degree murder is found at section 5-33(1.5). This section was enacted as part of Public Act 88-680 (Pub. Act 88-680, eff. January 1, 1995), commonly known as the Safe Neighborhoods Law. In People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill.2d 80, 243 Ill.Dec. 233, 723 N.E.2d 265 (1999), this court held that the General Assembly violated the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, § 8(d)) when it enacted Public Act 88-680. When an act is held unconstitutional in its entirety, it is void ab initio; the state of the law is as if the act had never been passed. People v. Tellez-Valencia, 188 Ill.2d 523, 525, 243 Ill.Dec. 191, 723 N.E.2d 223 (1999); see also People v. Gersch, 135 Ill.2d 384, 390, 142 Ill.Dec. 767, 553 N.E.2d 281 (1990). Thus, respondent is no longer subject to a mandatory sentencing requirement. Instead, he is now treated similarly to all juvenile offenders except habitual and violent juvenile offenders. Because respondent is unquestionably not similarly situated to habitual and violent juvenile offenders, we have no basis upon which to conclude that the trial court's denial of respondent's request for a jury trial denied respondent the equal protection of the law

Due Process

Respondent argues that, even if he is not entitled to a jury trial as a matter of equal protection, both the federal and state constitutions guarantee him such a right both as a matter of due process and as a matter of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial. See U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, §§ 2, 8. Both this court and the Supreme Court have previously rejected such arguments. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971); People ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, 83 Ill.2d 67, 46 Ill.Dec. 156, 413 N.E.2d 1269 (1980); In re Fucini, 44 Ill.2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380 (1970). Respondent urges us to reconsider these decisions in light of the fact that the mandatory minimum sentence required by section 5-33(1.5) renders the process to which respondent is subject much more punitive than rehabilitative. Here, however, respondent is no longer subject to the mandatory minimum sentence, and respondent has given us no other reason to reexamine our earlier decisions.³ Consequently, we must reject respondent's argument.

Because the law underlying the appellate court's judgment has now been rendered void, we must vacate the appellate court's judgment holding that respondent was denied his equal protection rights when the trial court denied his request for a new trial.

Respondent's Motion to Cite Supplemental Authority and the State's Reply Brief to the Briefs of the Amici Curiae

After this court issued its opinion in Cervantes, respondent sought leave to cite Cervantes as additional authority. In section II of this motion, respondent asserts that the legislature has reenacted the mandatory sentencing provision for juveniles charged with first degree murder (see 705 ILCS 405/5-750(2) (West 1998)). Respondent contends that, because this provision has been reenacted, this court should, because of the "great public interest," decide whether a juvenile charged with first degree murder is entitled to a jury trial.

Similarly, the State, in its reply brief to the briefs of the amici curiae, devotes approximately a third of its brief to discussing the effect of Cervantes. The State argues that (1) because of the reenactment of the sentencing provision, we should address whether juveniles charged with first degree murder are entitled to a jury trial;

727 N.E.2d 1008

and (2) respondent is subject to the reenacted sentencing provision even though it was not effective until after the events forming the foundation of the finding of delinquency occurred. Subsequently, respondent moved to strike the State's reply brief. We ordered that motion taken with the case.

This court's rules governing appeals provide, "The reply brief, if any, shall be confined strictly to replying to arguments presented in the brief of the appellee * * *." (Emphasis added.) 177 Ill.2d R. 341(g). The first third of the State's reply brief addresses issues contained within neither...