In re Grand Jury Proceedings
| Decision Date | 29 July 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. M-425.,M-425. |
| Citation | 4 F. Supp. 283 |
| Parties | In re GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Randolph C. Shaw and Norman J. Morrisson, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., for the United States.
Harold Simandl, of Newark, N. J., for petitioner Union City Brewing Co., Inc.
On July 14, 1933, I entered an order relating to the testimony of George Leo Meyers and Harold Meyers, who had appeared and testified before the grand jury of this court sitting in Philadelphia in an investigation in the course of which a number of indictments have been returned charging a large number of persons with conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act. The relevant portion of the order is as follows: "Consent of this Court is given for the use of the said testimony by the Government and the disclosure of the same by the stenographer who reported it."
The present petition is for the vacation of this order and to restrain the stenographer and the government attorneys from disclosing the testimony. A demurrer to the petition was filed by the United States attorney.
The petitioner is Union City Brewing Company, a New Jersey corporation, and the petition recites:
That proceedings are pending in New Jersey for the revocation of the petitioner's beer permit; that one of the matters involved in those proceedings is the purchase of a bottling equipment unit which was sold to the petitioners by the two Meyers; that the government had attempted to get information from the Meyers about the purchase and that the Meyers had refused to give it; that for the purpose of obtaining the testimony of these two witnesses so that it might be subsequently offered in the revocation proceeding, the Assistant Attorney General of the United States subpœnaed the witnesses and that in obedience to the subpœna the witnesses appeared and testified before the grand jury.
The standing of the petitioner here is more than doubtful. In Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 39 S. Ct. 468, 63 L. Ed. 979, the witness himself was not allowed to question the jurisdiction of the grand jury. However, in view of the well-considered arguments presented, as well as some apparent misunderstanding of the scope of the order, I take the opportunity to re-examine the question.
Naturally, the petitioner does not attempt to define the lawful scope of the inquiry which this grand jury is conducting. There are no precisely defined issues before a grand jury exercising its inquisitorial powers by which its jurisdiction may be limited. The decision of the Supreme Court in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 375, 50 L. Ed. 652, has settled beyond all question that in the federal courts an investigation by the grand jury need not be preceded by any definition whatever of the crimes to be investigated or the persons against whom an accusation is sought. Of course, there are limits to the power, but they are wide. "Doubtless," said the court, "abuses of this power may be imagined," but the only example of such abuses which occurred to the court was prying into the details of domestic or business life. This court knows from the indictments already found that the subject-matter of the inquiry in which this grand jury is engaged is, in part at least, the existence of widespread corruption, crime, abuses, and evasions having to do with the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA). Beyond all question it had power to summon these witnesses and interrogate them upon their sale of brewery equipment.
The inquisitorial power of the grand jury is the most valuable function which it possesses to-day and, far more than any supposed protection which it gives to the accused, justifies its survival as an institution. As an engine of discovery against organized and far-reaching crime, it has no counterpart. Policy emphatically forbids...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Pitch v. United States, No. 17-15016
...apprehended, the policy of the law does not require the same secrecy as before") (citations omitted); In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 4 F. Supp. 283, 285 (E.D. Pa. 1933) ("The fact that the grand jury has adjourned and been discharged has often been considered as one reason for abandoning se......
-
United States v. Smyth
...783; United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 63 S.Ct. 1233, 87 L.Ed. 1546. Sound discussions are found in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, D.C.E.D.Pa., 4 F.Supp. 283 (Kirkpatrick); United States v. Central Supply Association, D.C.N.D.Ohio, 34 F.Supp. 241 No attempt will be made to give a gener......
-
Cammer v. United States
...for an attorney, without a court order, to interrogate grand jurors about their motives or personal habits; and In re Grand Jury Proceedings, D.C.E.D.Pa. 1933, 4 F.Supp. 283, which also indicates that a court order is necessary in order to avoid contempt in questioning grand 1 For subsequen......
-
United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc
...or other governmental units for use in pursuing related civil litigation and for other purposes. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F.Supp. 283 (E.D.Pa.1933) (minutes of grand jury that led to indictment for violation of prohibition laws disclosed for use in subsequent action to rev......