In re Grant

• Decision Date: 21 February 1906
• Citation: 143 F. 661
• Parties: In re GRANT.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

143 F. 661

In re GRANT.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

February 21, 1906

Cooke &amp Angell, for Doe.

Robert W. Burbank, for trustee.

BROWN District Judge.

By the referee's certificate, it appears that, after a hearing the referee entered on October 25, 1905, an order denying the prayer of the petition. Copies of the findings were sent to the attorneys for Doe and the trustee respectively, and the attorney for Doe was notified that a petition for a review by the judge, of the referee's order, if desired, should be filed within 10 days from said October 25, 1906, were sent to creditors, and on the same day Doe's attorney was notified of said proceedings, and the failure of Doe to file his appeal was again called to his attention. No further steps being taken toward an appeal, on February 10, 1906 said attorney was notified that unless an appeal were filed on February 12, 1906, the date set for the declaration of said dividend, the funds in question would be distributed among the general creditors of said Grant; and on February 12, 1906, the petition for a review of the referee's order was filed by said Edgar J. Doe. At the expiration of 10 days from October 25, 1905, the attorney for the trustee notified the referee that he should object to the filing of any petition for a review of the above-mentioned order, on the ground that it had not been filed in time, and, upon notification of the filing of the present petition, has objected to the granting of the same, and to the certification of the facts and findings of the referee to the judge, alleging that the petitioner has not come within the terms of General Order No. 27, (89 F. xi, 32 C.C.A. xxvii). The referee thus discusses the question of law involved:

'The length of time which may be had for an appeal under General Order No. 27 seems to be uncertain. An opinion of Hon. Nathan W. Littlefield reported in the sixth of American Bankruptcy Reports, in 6 Am.Bankr.Rep. 709, in Re Chambers, Calder & Co., very forcibly sets forth the suggestion that a limit of ten days if proper for such appeals and supports the position by analogy to other provisions of the bankrupt law. Since said opinion the law in this jurisdiction has been administered on this basis, all appeals having hitherto been taken within ten days. This time limit is fixed by rule of the court in some jurisdictions (Erie Co., N.Y.,Rule 16), and in others it is held that an appeal may be taken within a reasonable time, each case standing on its own foundation (Re Scott, 3 Am.Bankr.Rep. 625, 99 F. 404; Crim v. Woodford, 14 Am.Bankr.Rep. 302, 136 F. 34, 68 C.C.A. 584 (4th Circuit). Twenty days held reasonable, no objection being made.

'The test of a reasonable time undefined leaves the administration of each estate unsettled pending the caprice or whim of a dissatisfied creditor. Prompt settlement is an aim of the bankruptcy law. That law requires dividends to be paid as often as there is sufficient to pay 10 per cent. (section 65b of Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 563 (U.S.Comp.St. 1901, p. 3448)), and the test of a

...