In re Greenleaf

• Decision Date: 19 February 1900
• Citation: 56 N.E. 295,184 Ill. 226
• Parties: In re GREENLEAF.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

184 Ill. 226

56 N.E. 295

In re GREENLEAF.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 19, 1900.

Appeal by E. S. Greenleaf from an order of the board of review confirming an assessment of shares of stock. Affirmed.

Wm. Brown and Julian P. Lippincott, for appellant.

Edward C. Akin, Atty. Gen., C. A. Hill, and B. D. Monroe, for appellee.

BOGGS, J.

The appellant, Greenleaf, is a resident of the county of Morgan, in the state of Illinois. On the 1st day of April, 1899, he owned and had in his possession in this state certain certificates of shares, of the par value of $80,000, in a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Kansas, and chartered by the state under the corporate name of the Greenleaf-Baker Grain Company. The entire capital stock of the corporation was then invested in real estate, grain elevators, grain, and other tangible property, all of which were located in the state of Kansas, and were assessed in the state for taxation. He was required by the assessor to list as assessable for taxation in the said county of Morgan the said shares of capital stock in the said corporation. The board of review of the county approved the action of the assessor. This is an appeal from such holding of the board of review, certified to this court by the auditor of public accounts.

It is not contended the certificates of stock, if assessable, should be valued at less than their par value. The argument of counsel for appellant is that the certificates of shares in the capital stock of the corporation are mere tokens or evidence of the owner's relative interest in the tangible property owned by the corporation, that the situs of such tangible property is in the state of Kansas, that it is there properly and lawfully taxed, and that the assessment of the shares of stock for taxation in this state is simply taxing the tangible property a second time. We need not consider whether it is entirely beyond the power of the state, represented by the general assembly, to impose double taxation upon the same property, for the reason that it is well settled that the tangible property of a corporation and the shares of stock therein are separate and distinct kinds of property, and belong to different owners,-the first being the property of the artificial person, the corporation; the latter the property of the individual owner thereof. Trust Co. v. Parks, 88 Ill. 170; 25 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 662-670; Desty, Tax'n, 353. The general assembly, representing the sovereignty of the state, has ample inherent power to impose taxes on all property within the state, the only limitations being such as are declared in the constitution of the state or that of the United States. Porter v. Railroad Co., 76 Ill. 561, 25 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 18, note 11. Neither in the organic law of the general government or in that of the state is there any prohibition against the imposition of taxes on shares of capital stock of foreign corporations held and owned by residents of this state. A share of stock in a corporation is personal estate, and, in the absence of any statute to the contrary, is taxable to the owner, as other personal estate, at the place of his residence, whether the corporation be foreign or domestic. Cooley, Tax'n (2d Ed.) pp. 22, 23; Burroughs, Tax'n, 188; Desty, Tax'n, supra; Trust Co. v. Parks, supra. The authorities are uniform upon the proposition that a...