In re Greenwasser, Bankruptcy No. 01-20287-BKC-PGH. Adversary No. 01-02121-BKC-PGH-A.
| Decision Date | 04 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 01-20287-BKC-PGH. Adversary No. 01-02121-BKC-PGH-A. |
| Citation | 269 BR 918 |
| Parties | In re Ralph H. GREENWASSER, Debtor. Stacey Allen and Michael Allen, Plaintiffs, v. Ralph H. Greenwasser, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of Florida |
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Michael Garcia Petit, Miami, FL, for plaintiffs.
Daniel C Stump, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for debtor/defendant.
THIS MATTER came before the Court on July 31, 2001 upon Stacey Allen and Michael Allen's ("Plaintiffs") Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant Ralph H. Greenwasser (the "Debtor"). On August 20, 2001, the Debtor filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Response"). On August 24, 2001, the Plaintiff filed a Response to Debtor's Reply to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Reply"). On August 31, 2001, the Plaintiff and the Debtor filed a Joint Stipulation of Facts (the "Stipulation of Facts"). Having carefully reviewed the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Response, the Reply, and the Stipulation of Facts, the Court hereby enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Ralph H. Greenwasser (the "Debtor") filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 17, 2001. On December 27, 1999 at approximately 11:40 A.M., the Plaintiff, Stacey Allen, was driving her car and was stopped at a red traffic light. While the Plaintiff was waiting for the traffic light to turn green, the Debtor crashed into the rear of the Plaintiff's vehicle. The impact resulted in physical injury to the Plaintiff, as well as property damage to the Plaintiff's vehicle. After the accident occurred, the Debtor exited his car and fled the accident scene.
The Debtor was later apprehended by the Town of Davie Police. Upon apprehension, Officer Daniels of the Town of Davie Police Department stated that the Debtor had an odor of alcohol on his breath. The Debtor admitted to the police that he had been drinking. The police had also discovered an open bottle of alcohol in the Debtor's car at the accident scene. Subsequently, the Debtor was unable to successfully complete a roadside sobriety test, and refused to submit to a blood or breath alcohol test. The Debtor was arrested for leaving the scene of an accident with injury, driving under the influence with property damage or personal injury, and possession of an alcoholic open container. On July 7, 2000, the Debtor pleaded no contest to all counts, and was adjudicated guilty for driving under the influence with injury to the person of another.
On September 6, 2000, the Plaintiffs filed a civil lawsuit against the Debtor in the circuit court for Broward County. The state court proceeding has been stayed as a result of the Debtor's bankruptcy filing.
On April 20, 2001, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint to Deny Discharge of Debt (the "Complaint"), instituting the instant Adversary Proceeding. In the Complaint, the Plaintiff asserts that under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and (a)(9), the Debtor cannot receive a discharge as to any debt owed to the Plaintiffs as a result of the Debtor's driving under the influence of alcohol.
The Motion for Summary Judgment seeks a determination that the Debtor's plea in the underlying criminal prosecution estops him from denying the fact that he was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident. As such, the Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the Debtor's discharge; vis-a-vis, any money judgment awarded to the Plaintiff in a state court proceeding for damages against the Debtor.
In the Response, the Debtor denies all allegations of intoxication and injury to the Plaintiff therefrom. The Debtor further argues that Florida Statutes § 772.14 does not operate as to bar his denial of the allegation that he was intoxicated at the time of the accident.
The Court has jurisdiction over this Adversary Proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 157(b)(1), and 157(b)(2)(I). This is a core proceeding in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), made applicable to bankruptcy proceedings by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056(c), provides that "the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Rice v. Branigar Org., Inc., 922 F.2d 788 (11th Cir.1991); Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir.1987); In re Pierre, 198 B.R. 389 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1996). Rule 56 is based upon the principle that if the court is made aware of the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the court should, upon motion, promptly adjudicate the legal questions which remain and terminate the case, thus avoiding the delay and expense associated with a trial. See United States v. Feinstein, 717 F.Supp. 1552 (S.D.Fla.1989). In considering a motion for summary judgment, "the court's responsibility is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried, while resolving ambiguities and drawing reasonable inferences against the moving party." Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1570, 94 L.Ed.2d 762 (1987) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). "Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing FED R. CIV. P. 1). "Summary judgment is appropriate when, after drawing all reasonable inference in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought, no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party." Murray v. National Broad. Co., 844 F.2d 988, 992 (2d Cir. 1988).
The legal standard governing the entry of summary judgment has been articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Celotex and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In Celotex and Anderson, the Supreme Court focused on the question of what constitutes a genuine issue of material fact within the meaning of Rule 56. In Celotex, the Court held that the moving party may satisfy the burden imposed by Rule 56 in two ways: the moving party may submit affidavit evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim and/or the moving party may demonstrate that the non-moving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the non-moving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 328, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
In Anderson, the Court stated that the standard for summary judgment mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which provides that the trial judge must direct a verdict if there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Court explained that the inquiry under summary judgment and directed verdict are the same: "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment under this standard, the non-moving party must do more than simply show that there is some doubt as to the facts of the case. See id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Rule 56 must be construed not only with regard to the party moving for summary judgment but also with regard to the non-moving party and that party's duty to demonstrate that the movant's claims have no factual basis. See id. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party." Id. Thus, the non-moving party must establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and may not rest upon its pleadings or mere assertions of disputed fact to prevent a court's entry of summary judgment. See First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968); Resolution Trust Corp. by the FDIC v. Clark, 741 F.Supp. 896 (S.D.Fla.1990); In re Pierre, 198 B.R. 389 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1996).
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs assert that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the Debtor from denying the fact that he was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that under Florida Statutes § 772.14, the Debtor is estopped in a civil action from denying conduct for which he was found guilty of in an underlying criminal prosecution. In support of their argument, the Plaintiffs rely heavily on the Florida Supreme Court's holding in Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So.2d 1064 (Fla. 1995)
Chapter 772 of the Florida Statutes is entitled the Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices Act. As set forth in Chapter 772, Florida Statutes § 772.14 reads as follows:
772.14 Estoppel of defendant.—A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state in any criminal proceeding concerning the conduct of the defendant which forms the basis for a civil cause of action under this chapter,...
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