In re H.R.J.

• Decision Date: 02 April 2019
• Docket Number: No. COA18-995,COA18-995
• Parties: In the MATTERS OF: H.R.J., B.J., and G.J.J.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

825 S.E.2d 278 (Table)

In the MATTERS OF: H.R.J., B.J., and G.J.J.

No. COA18-995

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: April 2, 2019

Ward, Smith & Norris, P.A., by William F. Ward, III, for petitioner-appellees.

Administrative Office of the Courts, by GAL Appellate Counsel Matthew D. Wunsche, for guardian ad litem.

Mary McCullers Reece for respondent-appellant.

ARROWOOD, Judge.

Respondent-mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights as to the juveniles "Hillary,"¹ "Brian," and "Greg" ("the children"). Though the order also terminates the parental rights of Hillary’s father and Brian and Greg’s father, the fathers are not parties to this appeal. We affirm.

I. Background

On 12 July 2013, Pamlico County Department of Social Services ("DSS") filed petitions alleging five-year-old Hillary, three-year-old Brian, and seven-month-old Greg were neglected and dependent juveniles under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9), (15) (2017). At the time the petitions were filed, the children resided with respondent-mother and their maternal grandmother, Diane. The petitions alleged that respondent-mother admitted to daily marijuana use and that she and Diane failed to provide adequate supervision for the children. Furthermore, after being denied access to the home over a period of several months, the DSS social worker was allowed into the residence on 11 July 2013 and observed it to be "cluttered," "filthy," and "not child proof." Upon the filing of the petitions, DSS took the children into nonsecure custody and placed them with Brian and Greg’s paternal grandmother, Tammy. Greg was subsequently moved to a kinship placement with his paternal great uncle, Danny, and his wife, Tiffany.

At a hearing on 11 September 2013, respondent-mother signed a written stipulation to facts supporting the children’s adjudication as dependent juveniles. Inter alia , she stipulated that her "substance abuse was so significant" and her "living conditions were so unsafe and unsanitary and in need of immediate remediation [as] to make the juveniles in need of assistance or placement." The trial court adjudicated the children dependent by order entered 22 January 2014. It awarded respondent-mother two hours per week of supervised visitation and ordered that the children remain in their kinship placements.

The trial court established an initial permanent plan of reunification for the children. After a hearing on 21 May 2014, however, the court ceased reunification efforts and changed the permanent plan to guardianship or custody with a court-approved caretaker. In a subsequent permanency planning order entered 14 May 2015, the court granted legal guardianship of the children to their current caretakers² (hereafter "petitioners") and waived further review hearings.

Respondent-mother appealed the guardianship order. While her appeal was pending, the trial court terminated respondent-mother’s visitation with the children by order entered 24 September 2015. On 15 February 2016, respondent-mother filed a "Motion for Review of Placement of the Children; and for Contempt" asking the court to return the children to her custody and to hold petitioners and Brian and Hillary’s therapists in contempt. In an opinion filed 5 April 2016, this Court affirmed the guardianship order. In re G.J.J., B.J., H.R.J. , 246 N.C. App. 515, 785 S.E.2d 187, 2016 WL 1359065 (2016) (unpublished). Citing our decision, DSS filed motions for review and for additional permanency planning on 13 April 2016.

After a hearing on 18 May 2016, the trial court denied respondent-mother’s motion for custody and contempt, granted custody of the children to petitioners, terminated the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and converted the cases to civil custody proceedings in file numbers 17 CVD 117-18. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-911 (2017). Respondent-mother was granted three hours per month of supervised visitation with the children, contingent on her submission of two negative drug screens to petitioners’ counsel within thirty days of the requested visitation.

Petitioners filed petitions to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights on 16 September 2016. After a hearing conducted on 6 December 2017, 9 January 2018, and 27 March 2018, the trial court ruled that petitioners had established grounds for termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a) (2017) and that terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2017). The order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights was filed 30 May 2018. Respondent-mother filed timely notice of appeal from the termination order.

II. Discussion

Respondent-mother now claims the trial court erred in adjudicating the existence of grounds to terminate her parental rights. We disagree.

We review an adjudication under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a) to determine (1) whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and (2) whether its findings in turn support its conclusions of law. In re Shepard , 162 N.C. App. 215, 221, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6, disc. review denied sub nom. In re D.S. , 358 N.C. 543, 599 S.E.2d 42 (2004). "[T]he trial court’s findings of fact supported by clear and convincing competent evidence are deemed conclusive, even where some evidence supports contrary findings." In re Helms , 127 N.C. App. 505, 511, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997). Unchallenged findings of fact are presumed to be supported by the evidence and are binding on appeal. In re H.S.F. , 182 N.C. App. 739, 742, 645 S.E.2d 383, 384 (2007). "Further, where the trial court finds multiple grounds on which to base a termination of parental rights, and ‘an appellate court determines there is at least one ground to support a conclusion that parental rights should be terminated, it is unnecessary to address the remaining grounds.’ " In re P.L.P. , 173 N.C. App. 1, 8, 618 S.E.2d 241, 246 (2005) (quoting In re Clark , 159 N.C. App. 75, 78 n.3, 582 S.E.2d 657, 659 n. 3 (2003) ), aff’d per curiam , 360 N.C. 360, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006).

As one of its grounds for terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights, the trial court concluded that she

willfully left [her]

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