In re Harper-Elder, Bankruptcy No. 94-01280.
Decision Date | 27 July 1995 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 94-01280. |
Citation | 184 BR 403 |
Parties | In re Rose HARPER-ELDER, Debtor. |
Court | United States Bankruptcy Courts – District of Columbia Circuit |
Reed P. Sexter, Barry Levine, Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin, Washington, DC, E. Macey Russell, Riemer & Braunstein, Boston, MA, for Creditor.
Wendell W. Webster, Washington, DC, for debtor.
DECISION ON DEBTOR'S MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the court on a motion by the debtor, Rose Harper-Elder, to dismiss her chapter 13 case in the face of a motion to convert filed by a creditor, Robert Lee Elder ("Elder"). Also filing separate motions to dismiss the debtor's case are a creditor, Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston, Dunwody & Cole ("Mershon Sawyer"), and the Chapter 13 Trustee ("Trustee").
The relevant facts of this case are as follows:
The debtor filed her voluntary chapter 13 petition under the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.) on December 7, 1994. The debtor filed an amended plan of reorganization on April 28, 1995. On May 19, 1995, the court denied confirmation of the debtor's amended plan because the court found it failed to satisfy the requirement under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) that creditors receive under the plan more than they would under a chapter 7 liquidation. At the hearing Elder moved to convert the debtor's case for cause under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c), a motion which the court deferred ruling on until after the confirmation hearing. Following the denial of confirmation, the debtor moved to dismiss her case under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b). The Trustee and Mershon Sawyer also moved to dismiss the case under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) based on the denial of confirmation.
Elder renewed his prior oral motion to convert this case under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) based on allegations of bad faith by the debtor. Specifically, Elder's allegations of fraud and bad faith arise out of alleged misstatements of known facts and material omissions in the debtor's bankruptcy schedules listing her assets filed in her bankruptcy case.
The debtor moves to dismiss her case under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b), which provides that:
On request of the debtor at any time, if the case has not been converted under section 706, 1112, or 1208 of this title, the court shall dismiss a case under this chapter. Any waiver of the right to dismiss under this subsection is unenforceable.
Elder, along with Mershon Sawyer and the Trustee, relies on 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c), which provides in relevant part that:
The parties have argued over whether the court has the discretion to consider a pending motion to convert the debtor's chapter 13 case for cause when the debtor has filed a request for voluntary dismissal under § 1307(b). This is an issue about which the courts are clearly divided. Some courts have held that the debtor's right to dismiss is an absolute right and that the court has no discretion to consider the creditor's pending motion to convert under § 1307(c) when faced with the debtor's motion to dismiss under § 1307(b). See In re Beatty, 162 B.R. 853, 856-57 (9th Cir. BAP 1994); In re Gillion, 36 B.R. 901, 904-906 (E.D.Ark.1983); In re Sanders, 100 B.R. 338 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1989); In re Looney, 90 B.R. 217 (Bankr. W.D.Va.1988); In re Rebeor, 89 B.R. 314, 322 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1988); In re Turiace, 41 B.R. 466 (Bankr.D.Or.1984); In re Merritt, 39 B.R. 462, 465 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1984); In re Benediktsson, 34 B.R. 349 (Bankr.W.D.Wash. 1983); In re Hearn, 18 B.R. 605 (Bankr. D.Neb.1982); see also In re Nash, 765 F.2d 1410, 1413 (9th Cir.1985) (dicta). The courts reason that "this view comports with the plain language of section 1307(b) which states that the court `shall' dismiss the case upon the debtor's request as well as the purposes of Chapter 13 and the voluntary nature of the relief under that Chapter." See In re Beatty, 162 B.R. at 857 (citations omitted).
In contrast, other courts have held that they do have the discretionary authority to grant a pending motion to convert a chapter 13 case in the face of a debtor's competing request for dismissal, particularly where there is evidence of improper conduct by the debtor. See In re Gaudet, 132 B.R. 670, 673-76 (D.R.I.1991); In re Vieweg, 80 B.R. 838, 840-41 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1987) (bad faith); In re Powers, 48 B.R. 120 (Bankr.M.D.La. 1985); In re Jacobs, 43 B.R. 971 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.1984) (bad faith); In re Whitten, 11 B.R. 333, 340 (Bankr.D.D.C.1981) (dicta; bad faith); see also In re Tatsis, 72 B.R. 908, 910 (Bankr.W.D.N.C.1987) ( ); In re Zarowitz, 36 B.R. 906 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1984) ( ). The courts reason that harmonizing § 1307(b) and (c) leads to the conclusion that Congress could not have intended to "give the debtor unfettered power to prevent conversion under § 1307(c) by simply filing a motion to dismiss whenever conversion was requested." See In re Gaudet, 132 B.R. at 676; In re Vieweg, 80 B.R. at 841. Thus, these courts hold that a hearing should be held to consider the merits of both motions, and the court should act in accordance with the best interest of creditors and the estate. See In re Vieweg, 80 B.R. at 841.
Id. at 385-86 (citation omitted).
The court concludes that the debtor's right to a dismissal under § 1307(b) is absolute. At the outset, the court wants to make clear that the courts of appeals decisions interpreting § 1208(b) are not distinguishable from this chapter 13 proceeding. The heart of this dispute is whether the language under § 1307(b) is mandatory — in essence, whether "shall" really means "shall." If shall does mean shall, then the case must be dismissed before the court even considers any alternative motions. Interpreting identical language in § 1208(b), the courts of appeals ruled that shall does not mean shall, granting the bankruptcy court the discretion to consider other currently pending motions. That the other pending motion to convert was based on the narrower chapter 12 standard of fraud does not change the significance of the courts' ruling. The bottom line is that the courts ruled that dismissal is not mandatory and the debtor's right to such was not absolute. Accordingly, the court will not attempt to distinguish these decisions. If they were correctly decided, then the debtor's right to dismissal under § 1307(b) is not absolute.3
However, this court disagrees with these rulings. Although not lightly disagreed with, the court concludes that the courts of appeals have ignored the clear language of the statute. See United States v. Ron Pair Ent., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1031, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) ( ). The clear language of § 1307(b) provides that the court "shall" dismiss the debtor's chapter 13 case upon the debtor's request, a request which the debtor may make "at any time"4 by motion under F.R.Bankr.P. 1017(d) and 9013. Furthermore, no waiver of the dismissal right under subsection (b) is enforceable. The only limitation on the debtor's right of dismissal, clearly spelled out in subsection (b), provides that the debtor's request will not be granted "if the case has been converted under section 706, 1112, or 1208 of this title," which prevents the debtor from returning to a chapter she has already been in. Based on the foregoing the court joins other courts in concluding that "from the plain and ordinary meaning of the language contained in § 1307(b) . . . a Chapter 13 debtor has an absolute right to dismiss his action prior to the conversion of such proceeding to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding." See In re Gillion, 36 B.R. at 905; In re Beatty, 162 B.R. at 857.
Such a conclusion is in harmony with the "design of the statute as a whole and . . . its object and policy." See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158, 110 S.Ct. 997, 1001, 108 L.Ed.2d 132 (1990). The most compelling reason for the court's...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
In Re Jacqueline Williams
... 435 B.R. 552 In re Jacqueline WILLIAMS, Debtor. No. 10 B 07121. United States Bankruptcy Court,N.D. Illinois,Eastern Division. Aug. 18, 2010 ... 435 B.R. 553 Timothy K. Liou, Liou ... See Barbieri, 199 F.3d at 620; Gillion, 36 B.R. at 905; Harper-Elder, 184 B.R. at 408. Under the Bankruptcy Act, a court could not convert a case from Chapter XIII to ... ...
-
In re Doucet
... In re: Jennifer Jo Doucet, Debtor. Case No. 15-21531 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS May 3, 2016 Chapter 13 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OVERRULING ... 55. 365. 56. 507 and 1326(b)(1). 57. 303. See also In re Harper-Elder, 184 B.R. 403, 408 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1995) ("Chapter 13 was intended to be purely voluntary ... ") ... ...