In re Harraden

• Decision Date: 20 December 1917
• Docket Number: No. 10087.,10087.
• Citation: 66 Ind.App. 298,118 N.E. 142
• Parties: In re HARRADEN.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

66 Ind.App. 298

118 N.E. 142

In re HARRADEN.

No. 10087.

Appellate Court of Indiana.

Dec. 20, 1917.

Certified Questions by Industrial Board.

Proceeding for workmen's compensation by Charles Harraden, opposed by the Columbia Insurance Company. Question certified by the Industrial Board answered affirmatively.

FELT, J.

The Industrial Board of this state has submitted a statement of facts on which it has certified a question of law in substance as follows:

“Statement of Facts.

The Columbia Insurance Company is a duly organized corporation under the laws of the state of Indiana, and prior to March 19, 1917, had been duly authorized to transact the business of fire insurance in the states of Ohio and Michigan; that on and prior to March 20, 1917, Charles H. Harraden was employed by said insurance company at the monthly salary of $175, and was under the control of the home office of said company which was located in the city of Indianapolis; that Harraden was agent of said company for the states of Ohio and Michigan, and the duties of his employment required him to visit agencies of the company in said states, to adjust losses, and transact other business for the company; that said company had duly complied with section 68 of the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act, and it is conceded that the company and Harraden were subject to the provisions thereof at the time of the occurence hereinafter stated; that on the 19th day of March, 1917, said Charles H. Harraden was in Detroit, Mich.; that on said date he was instructed by the home office of said insurance company to proceed to Boyne City, Mich., to adjust a loss covered by a policy of said company and to transfer its agency; that in response to said telegram the said Charles H. Harraden did proceed to Boyne City, Mich.; that he arrived at Boyne City on the evening of March 20th, after dark, by rail; that at said time the streets and sidewalks of Boyne City, Mich., were covered with snow and ice; that upon alighting from the train at the railroad station at Boyne City the said Charles H. Harraden, in company with other traveling men, started to walk from the railroad station upon the sidewalk to the hotel; that the sidewalk over which the said Charles H. Harraden and other traveling men were walking was covered with ice; that while in the act of walking from the railroad station to the hotel the said Charles H. Harraden slipped upon the ice upon the sidewalk and fell, and in falling received a compound fracture of the upper third of the femur of the leg; that as a result of said injury said Charles H. Harraden has been totally disabled for work of any character continuously since the 20th day of March, 1917, and is now so disabled, and may result in a permanent partial impairment of his ability to work; that the insurance company did not provide the said Charles H. Harraden with an attending physician and with the necessary hospital and surgical services and supplies during the first 30 days after the injury; that provision therefor was made by the said Charles H. Harraden himself, and he thereby incurred an expense of $250 for surgeon's fees and supplies and $350 for hospital services and supplies; that the said Charles H. Harraden makes claim for compensation and for the approval of his physician and hospital expenses.

It is conceded by the insurance company that the accident of said Charles H. Harraden occurred in the course of his employment, and that he would be entitled to an award of compensation and the approval of his expenses for physician and hospital service, except that it claims that the accident resulting in his injury did not arise out of his employment.

Certified Question of Law.

Did the accident resulting in the injury to Charles H. Harraden, described in the foregoing statement of facts, arise out of his employment with the Columbia Insurance Company?”

The insurance company contends that the risk of falling on the icy sidewalk did not arise out of and in the course of Harraden's employment within the contemplation or meaning of the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act; that such risk was one to which the general public was equally exposed with Harraden, was not peculiar to his employment, and did not arise out of his employment, though his injury may have been received while he was on duty in the course of his employment.

Harraden contends that his claim is for “an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment” by the insurance company, and that he is entitled to the benefits prescribed by the act aforesaid; that his said employment was the proximate cause of his injury; that the hazard which resulted in the accident which caused his injury was peculiar to his employment, and but for such employment he would not have suffered the injury at the time and place indicated; that when so injured he was performing the duties of his employment at the time and place directed by his employer.

Section 2 of the act in question provides for “compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.” See, also, section 76 (d). Section 20 provides for compensation “whether injury by accident or death resulting from such injury occurs within the state or in some other state or in a foreign country.”

[1][2] The precise question presented is new in this state, though, as applied to certain facts, this court has given interpretation to the language of the statute which authorizes compensation for “an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.” Union Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 115 N. E. 676;In re Loper, 116 N. E. 324.

In the cases just cited the court recognizes the general rule adopted by the courts of Massachusetts and other states in dealing with statutes similar to ours. This general rule is stated by the Supreme Court of Massachusettes in Re Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation (In re McNicol) 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697, L. R. A. 1916A, 306, as follows:

“It is sufficient to say that an injury is received ‘in the course of the employment’ when it comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to perform. It arises ‘out of’ the employment when there is apparent to the rational mind upon a consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it arises ‘out of’ the employment. But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes form a hazard to which the workman would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the work, and not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.”

The statute imposes two conditions, both of which the claimant is required to satisfy before he is entitled to compensation, viz. the injury must arise out of and in the course of the employment. The cases present a variety of conditions which have been held to meet the requirements of the statute. Hopkins v. Michigan Sugar Co., 184 Mich. 87, 150 N. W. 325, L. R. A. 1916A, 310;Rayner v. Sligh Furniture Co., 180 Mich. 168, 146 N. W. 665, L. R. A. 1916A, 22, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 386; Fitzgerald v. Clark & Son, 99 L. T. 101, 1 B. W. C. C. 197; 1 Honnold, Workmen's Compensation, §§ 101-105; Rayner v. Sligh Furniture Co., 180 Mich. 168, 146 N. W. 665, L. R. A. 1916A, 22-40, and notes, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 386; C. J. Treaties Workmen's Comp. Acts, § 67, and notes; Pigeon v. Employer's, etc., Corporation, 216 Mass. 51, 102 N. E. 932, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 737, 4 N. C. C. A. 516; Martin v. Loveland & Louis, 5 N. C. C. A. 885, 7 B. W. C. C. 243; Pierce v. Provident, etc., Co., 4 B. W. C. C. 242; McNeice v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 4 B. W. C. C. 351.

The decisions of the courts of England and the courts of several of our states where the question has arisen announce the rule that the facts in any given case must show that the injury arose out of the employment and was a risk reasonably incident thereto, as distinguished from risks to which the general public is exposed. 1 Honnold, Workmen's Compensation, § 119, and notes; Blakey v. Robson Eckford, Ct. Sess. Cas. (1912) p. 334; Rodger v. School Board, Ct. Sess. Cas. (1912) p. 584; Kitchenhan v. Johannesburg, 4 B. W. C. C. 311; Amys v. Barton, 5 B. W. C. C. 471; Craig v. Calabria, 7 B. W. C. C. 932; Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. Law, 72, 86 Atl. 458;Milliken v. A. Towle & Co., 216 Mass. 293, 103 N. E. 898, L. R. A. 1916A, 337;City of Milwaukee v. Althoff, 156 Wis. 68, 145 N. W. 238, L. R. A. 1916A, 327.

Injuries resulting from exposure to conditions due to the weather or natural elements, such as heat, cold, ice, snow, or lightning, are generally classed as risks to which the general public is exposed, and as not coming within the purview of Workmen's Compensation Acts, though the injured person, at the time he receives his injury, may have been discharging duties incident to and in the course of his employment.

While recognizing the general rule above stated, there are many cases which the courts hold are not governed by it, or that they are controlled by well-recognized exceptions to such general rule.

Where the employment of the injured person requires him to be at the place where his injury is received, and he is in fact at such place in pursuance of...