In re Harris-lindsey, No. 17-BG-859
| Decision Date | 10 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-BG-859 |
| Citation | 242 A.3d 613 |
| Parties | IN RE Quinne HARRIS-LINDSEY, Respondent. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Hamilton P. Fox, III, Disciplinary Counsel, with whom Jennifer P. Lyman, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel at the time the brief was filed, for petitioner.
Abraham C. Blitzer, Washington, for respondent.
Before Glickman, Thompson and Beckwith, Associate Judges.
Between 1994 and 2002, respondent Quinne Harris-Lindsey was the required second signatory for withdrawals from a guardianship-estate account. The other required signatory was the court-appointed guardian of the estate account, who was respondent's cousin and client. The record in this case establishes that on three occasions in 1995, 1996, and 1999, with the client's consent, respondent authorized withdrawals from the account to pay her fees for the representation, and did so without prior court approval. The primary issue before us is whether respondent thereby misappropriated estate-account funds.
"Our disciplinary cases define misappropriation as any unauthorized use of client's funds entrusted to the lawyer[.]" In re Anderson , 778 A.2d 330, 335 (D.C. 2001) (italics added, internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). A majority of the Board on Professional Responsibility (the "Board") concluded that Disciplinary Counsel failed to prove misappropriation by clear and convincing evidence. In summary, the Board majority found that neither the court (the Superior Court Probate Division) nor the client had entrusted any funds to respondent and that respondent's withdrawal of the funds was not unauthorized because it was made with the client's consent.
Disciplinary Counsel, petitioner in this matter, urges us to hold that on the facts described above, respondent committed negligent misappropriation. Disciplinary Counsel emphasizes that "[b]ut for [respondent's] signature, the funds [in question] would [have] remain[ed] intact" and that respondent's client had "no right to disburse the[ ] [funds] on her own authority." Acknowledging, however, that this court has not previously found misappropriation in a case in which two signatures were required for disbursal of funds from an account, Disciplinary Counsel states that "it may be appropriate to apply the ruling [he urges] prospectively only."
Also before us is a recommendation by a plurality of the Board that we sanction respondent only by imposing an informal admonition for what the Board unanimously found was her failure to satisfy Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15 (a)1 and (former) D.C Bar Rule XI, § 19(f) record-keeping requirements in connection with her representation of the guardian of the estate account.2 Like the Board plurality, Disciplinary Counsel states that an informal admonition is warranted for respondent's record-keeping violation.
As explained below, one Division member agrees with the Board majority that misappropriation was not proven in this case. A majority of the Division concludes that facts satisfying the elements of misappropriation were proven by clear and convincing evidence, but that the Division's interpretation as to whether there was "entrustment" of the estate-account funds and use of the funds "without authorization" should apply only prospectively. Accordingly, the Division declines to impose a sanction on respondent for misappropriation. The Division is also unanimous in accepting the recommended sanction of an informal admonition for respondent's record-keeping violation.
In 1994, the Probate Division appointed respondent's cousin, Anglia Fulwood, to be guardian of the estate account of Ms. Fulwood's minor child D.F., who had been designated by a deceased relative as the beneficiary under a life insurance policy. Ms. Fulwood asked respondent to be her attorney in connection with the estate account. Respondent, who had been admitted to the Pennsylvania Bar in 1993 but at the time had not yet been admitted in the District of Columbia, was working as a paralegal at a personal injury law firm and was able to get a partner at the firm to agree to enter an appearance on behalf of Ms. Fulwood. The Partner disclaimed substantive involvement with the probate matter, telling respondent "[t]his is your case, you handle it."
The Hearing Committee and Board found that in December 1994, respondent deposited the insurance proceeds into an account at Independence Federal Savings Bank on behalf of the minor, with Ms. Fulwood identified as the guardian and with an opening balance of $40,760.75 from the life insurance policy proceeds. As shown on the signature card for the estate account, two signatures — Ms. Fulwood's and respondent's — were required for withdrawals from the account. The signature card for a second, money market fund account, "denominated [D.F.], minor/Anglia Fulwood, gdn./Quinne Harris Lindsey, Atty.," which was opened at the same bank, likewise required both Ms. Fulwood's and respondent's signatures for withdrawals.3 The record contains documentary evidence that respondent and Fulwood co-signed checks making withdrawals, and the Hearing Committee found that both women's signatures were required for withdrawals from the accounts.
Respondent told Ms. Fulwood that she did not want to be compensated for her work in connection with the estate account.
However, after respondent spent considerable time and effort on the matter, "Ms. Fulwood insisted that respondent be paid, and respondent relented." In 1995 and 1996, without prior court approval, but with Ms. Fulwood's consent, respondent withdrew two installments of attorney fees from the estate account: $1,650, in the form of a cashier's check, on or about December 27, 1995, and an additional $1,400, also as a cashier's check, on or about February 27, 1996. The Board found that Disciplinary Counsel did not present evidence that respondent "could have obtained or did obtain a cashier's check from the estate accounts without the client's signature on the check request form." In addition, at various times, Ms. Fulwood withdrew funds from the estate, without prior court approval but with respondent's consent, to pay for expenditures related to the minor. Respondent filed a petition for "retroactive approval" of Ms. Fulwood's 1996 withdrawals totaling $1,400. The Probate Division granted the petition in an April 11, 1997, order that did not include any admonition that prior court approval was required before expenditures could be made. As to her own withdrawals in 1995 and 1996, respondent testified to her understanding at the time that "according to [a form issued by] the Register of Wills, attorney's fees are included under the category of administrative expenses and therefore do not require an order of the [c]ourt for disbursement."
On June 3, 1996, respondent was admitted to the District of Columbia Bar. Sometime before March 1997, respondent spoke with a Probate Division employee who told her that prior court approval was required to withdraw attorney fees. That same month, respondent filed an accounting for the period of October 6, 1995, through December 31, 1996, in which she reported the two disbursals for attorney fees, stated that she had been unaware that prior court approval was required for the corresponding withdrawals, and informed the court that she had since reimbursed the estate for the two payments.4 The Hearing Committee found that Respondent repaid $3,069.46 for the two checks previously issued to her (including a $19.46 charge for a withdrawal penalty) into the money market account at Independence Federal Savings Bank.
In December 1997, respondent filed an accounting covering the period from January 1 through September 30, 1997, and disclosed an $800 cash disbursement to Ms. Fulwood, made from one of the estate accounts in February 1997. On or about March 3, 1998, Ms. Fulwood filed a petition for retroactive approval of that disbursement, which the petition stated was used for a bond, child care expenses, school uniforms, and supplies. The Probate Division granted the petition the following week in an order that included the following admonition: "ORDERED, that Anglia Fulwood is admonished not to expend estate assets without prior court authorization." The court mailed a copy of the order to respondent, who testified that she was timely aware of it.
On October 1, 1999, respondent received a payment of $2,250 paid by a check drawn on the estate account, signed by Ms. Fulwood and respondent.5 The $2,250 withdrawal was not disclosed to the Probate Division until more than eighteen months later, when, on June 21, 2001, respondent submitted an accounting covering the period from October 1, 1999, to June 11, 2001.6
On July 6, 2001, after reviewing that accounting, the Auditor for the Register of Wills requested that respondent explain both the October 1, 1999, withdrawal and her failure to file the estate's tax return for 2000. The Auditor also advised the Probate Division that respondent had accepted fees without prior court approval and recommended that the court direct respondent to redeposit the $2,250 fee and explain why the matter should not be referred to Disciplinary Counsel. On October 24, 2001, the Probate Court issued an order to that effect. On June 19, 2002, the Probate Division denied respondent's request to retain the compensation and referred the matter to Disciplinary Counsel for investigation. The court also issued an order on June 20, 2002, advising Ms. Fulwood that if she did not "proceed to obtain new counsel, a new guardian m[ight] be appointed in [Fulwood's] place." Thereafter, Ms. Fulwood wrote to the court requesting that respondent be removed as counsel. The Probate Division denied Ms. Fulwood's request, explaining that respondent had been retained by Ms. Fulwood, not...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Am. Studies Ass'n v. Bronner
- Saudi Am. Pub. Relations Affairs Comm. v. Institute for Gulf Affairs
-
In re Schuman
...that misappropriation might occur even where no "entrustment" has taken place, see In re Harris-Lindsey , 242 A.3d 613, 626 n.1 (D.C. 2020) (Glickman, J., joined by Beckwith, J., concurring). We need not grapple with this question—or what type of conduct would fall within this potential gra......