In Re Hayes, in Re

Citation72 Fla. 558,73 So. 362
PartiesIn re HAYES et al.
Decision Date20 December 1916
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

In the matter of contempt proceedings against Percy S. Hayes and another. On motion to quash rule upon defendants to show cause why they should not be attached for contempt. Motion denied.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The thirteenth section of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of Florida, which provides that 'every person may fully speak and write his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press,' etc., does not secure immunity from punishment to any citizen who falsely, and with the purpose to defame, attacks in the newspapers the character of any other citizen, or impugns the integrity, honor, and authority of the courts.

The exercise of the right to 'fully speak and write' one's sentiments on all subjects, a right secured by our Constitution, is always subject to the preservation of the governmental authority of the state as conferred by law.

This court has the inherent power, independent of statutory authority, to punish as for a direct contempt any person who during the pendency of a cause before this court publishes an article, referring to such cause, which reflects upon the efficiency and integrity of the court.

Publishers of newspapers have the right, but no higher right than others, to publish the conduct of the courts, but such right is limited by the obligation to observe respect for truth and fairness.

Under the right of freedom of speech and of the press, the public have a right to know and discuss all judicial proceedings but this does not include the right to attempt, by wanton defamation and groundless charges of unfairness and partisanship, to degrade the tribunal and impair its efficiency.

COUNSEL John P. Stokes, of Pensacola, for the motion.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This is the first time in the history of Florida that this court has issued a rule against the editor and reporter of a newspaper to show cause why they should not be attached for contempt because of the publication of a libelous article impugning the integrity, dignity, and authority of this court. It is to be hoped that the good sense of our people their love of order and respect for the institutions of our government, will operate to restrain the impulsive and ill-natured words of those among us who seem to be so alert to suspect and ready to condemn and that proceedings of this nature may not become necessary in the future to restrain the vicious tendencies of those who traffic in scandal and sensation and which lead them to attacks upon the integrity and authority of our institutions.

It is true that respect to the courts is the voluntary tribute which the people pay to worth, virtue, and intelligence and every man who has the honor to occupy judicial position in our government should strive to attain to that standard of judicial purity and efficiency which right-thinking people require of their judicial officers; but it is also true that malicious, designing persons may greatly impair the authority and efficiency of our courts by using the powerful arm of the press to scatter abroad suspicion and distrust by unfounded accusations against the intelligence, impartiality integrity, and mental honesty of the judges of our courts of justice.

Such accusations are an insult to the people whose agents the courts are; the injury accomplished is to the institution which the people by their government have established. The author and distributor of such publications, therefore, is an enemy to his people, a veritable traitor to his government whose protection he enjoys.

Mr. Chief Justice English in the case of State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 385, said:

'It was well remarked by counsel that no court could coerce public respect for its decisions; and we may add that no sane judge would attempt it. If it were the general habit of the community to denounce, degrade, and disregard the decisions and judgments of the courts, no man of self-respect and just pride of reputation would remain upon the bench, and such only would become the ministers of the law, as were insensible to defamation and contempt. But happily for the good order of society, men, and especially the people of this country, are generally disposed to respect and abide the decisions of the tribunals ordained by government as the common arbiters of their rights. But where isolated individuals, in violation of the better instincts of human nature, and disregardful of law and order, wantonly attempt to obstruct the course of public justice, by degrading and exciting disrepect for the decisions of its tribunals, every good citizen will point them out as proper subjects of legal animadversion. * * * The court looks to the sober judgment of all reflecting and intelligent men, and to none with more confidence than the enlightened and liberal conductors of the press, who, as before remarked, have generally manifested a disposition to maintain public respect for the judicial tribunals of the country.'

In the case of Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 341, the court said:

'In this country, all courts derive their authority from the people, and hold it in trust for their security and benefit. In this state, all judges are elected by the people, and hold their authority, in a double sense, directly from them; the power they exercise is but the authority of the people themselves, exercised through courts as their agents. It is the authority and laws emanating from the people, which the judges sit to exercise and enforce. Contempts against these courts, in the administration of their laws, are insults offered to the authority of the people themselves, and not to the humble agents of the law, whom they employ in the conduct of their government. The power to compel the lawless offender, against decency and propriety, to respect the laws of his country, and submit to their authority (a duty to which the good citizen yields hearty obedience, without compulsion) must exist, or courts and laws operate at least as a restraint upon the upright, who need no restraint, and a license to the offenders, whom they are made to subdue.'

How appropriate is this language to our state government whose Constitution provides for the election by the people of the judges of our Supreme Court.

In the case of State v. Frew and Hart, 24 W.Va. 416, 49 Am. Rep. 257, the court said:

'We are well aware that the trust reposed in us to protect the people's court from degradation is a delicate as well as a sacred trust. The power claimed, it is said, is arbitrary and liable to abuse. That is no reason why the power should not exist and be reposed somewhere. The few instances in which this power has been used during the last century shows that it was wisely placed, and may be safely left in the hands of the courts. It is well established by the authorities that the power is inherent in courts of justice to summarily punish constructive as well as direct contempts. And in this country, where the courts are, in the divisions of power by the Constitutions of the several states, constituted a separate and distinct department of government, clothed with jurisdiction, and not expressly limited by the Constitution in their powers to punish for contempt, the inherent power that is thus necessarily granted them cannot be taken away by the legislative department of the government.'

For 71 years this state has enjoyed the advantages and benefits of statehood in the government of the United States, and as pointed out herein this is the first time in its history that this court has felt the necessity for the exercise of the power to bring any one before it and punish him for seeking through the public press to destroy its efficiency by shaking the confidence of the people in its integrity. There has been no disposition, and there is none now on the part of this court to seek opportunities to exercise this power. It has passed unnoticed some ill-advised criticisms and untrue statements regarding its decisions, deeming them to have originated in the disappointment and poignancy of defeat which calm deliberation and sober thought would rectify in the minds of our people, but this is the first time that it has met a deliberate and meditated insult from the editor and reporter of a newspaper who published an article charging this court with hostility toward counsel, stubbornness, partiality, and partisanship in a cause then pending in and being heard and considered by the court. In the conclusion at which we have arrived, we have not forgotten that we have no right in this manner to avenge individual wrongs, although the best years of the lives of some of the judges of our Supreme Court have been given conscientiously to an honorable discharge of the duties devolving upon them; a fair and just consideration of all causes brought before us, and into whose hearts the unkind and malicious thrust of this contemptuous article has sunk with bitter cruelty we remember only the studied injurty to the people's court, for as Judge Okey Johnson, of West Virginia, said:

'It is a matter of stern and inflexible duty from the performance of which under our official oaths we dare not shrink; for we well know that as the ermine was spotless when we put it on, the people expect us to leave it as untarnished for our successors.'

The profession of journalism is a great profession. It has enrolled in its membership some of the brightest minds in the history of our country. It has claimed men of the highest standard of integrity, indefatigable workers for the upbuilding of our common country and the establishment of our splendid...

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14 cases
  • Lieberman v. Marshall
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • May 28, 1970
    ...(Fla.1961); State v. Ucciferri, 61 So.2d 374 (Fla.1952); Tampa Times Co. et al. v. City of Tampa, 29 So.2d 368 (Fla.1947); In re Hayes, 72 Fla. 558, 73 So. 362 (1916); Nixon v. State, 178 So.2d 620 (Fla.App.3, 1965). Liberty of speech also must be balanced against other state constitutional......
  • State v. Mayhew, 43575
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • December 19, 1973
    ...(Fla.1961); State v. Ucciferri, 61 So.2d 374 (Fla.1952); Tampa Times Co. et al. v. City of Tampa, 29 So.2d 368 (Fla.1947); In re Hayes, 72 Fla. 558, 73 So. 362 (1916); Nixon v. State, 178 So.2d 620 (Fla.App. 3, 1965). Liberty of speech also must be balanced against other state constitutiona......
  • Walker v. Bentley
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    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • August 30, 1995
    ...to the execution and maintenance of judicial authority. Ducksworth v. Boyer, 125 So.2d 844, 845 (Fla.1960); see also In re Hayes, 72 Fla. 558, 568, 73 So. 362, 365 (1916) (recognizing inherent power of supreme court, independent of statutory authority, to punish for contempt of court). The ......
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    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • June 30, 1976
    ...dignity of the judiciary and obedience of the law. State ex rel. Giblin v. Sullivan, 157 Fla. 496, 26 So.2d 509 (1946); In Re Hayes, 72 Fla. 558, 73 So. 362 (1916); Ex parte Beville, 58 Fla. 170, 50 So. 685 (1909). 'Contempt' is generally classified, to delineate the procedures which may be......
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