In re Heinz

• Docket Number: 1231 C.D. 2022
• Decision Date: 20 May 2024
• Parties: In re: Appeal of: Tristram Heinz From a Decision of City of Philadelphia Bureau of Administrative Adjudication Appeal of: Tristram Heinz
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

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In re: Appeal of: Tristram Heinz From a Decision of City of Philadelphia Bureau of Administrative Adjudication Appeal of: Tristram Heinz

No. 1231 C.D. 2022

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

May 20, 2024

Argued: April 11, 2024

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER Senior Judge

OPINION

ANNE E. COVEY, JUDGE

Tristram Heinz, Esquire(Heinz), representing himself, appeals from the Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court's (trial court)October 24, 2022 order denying his appeal from the City of Philadelphia's (City)Office of Administrative Review's (OAR)December 23, 2021 Notice of Determination that found Heinz liable for a $100.00 fine pursuant to Section 3370 of the Vehicle Code(Section 3370).^[1] The issue before this Court is whether Section 3370 is unconstitutional as written and as applied where it permits the imposition of a civil fine without offering a fine recipient attendant due process protections.After review, this Court affirms.

Heinz is the registered owner of a motor vehicle bearing Pennsylvania Registration PlateJZX8034.At 3:45 p.m. on October 6, 2020, the City's automated speed enforcement system (Speed Camera Program) photographed Heinz's vehicle traveling 61 miles per hour in the northbound lane of the 9900 block of Roosevelt Boulevard, which was in excess of the posted 45 mile per hour speed limit.On October 14, 2020, the City issued a Notice of Violation (Violation Notice) and an accompanying $100.00 fine pursuant to Section 3370,Section 3362 of the Vehicle Code,^[2] and Chapter 12-3400 of Title 12 of The Philadelphia Code^[3](Traffic Code).^[4]

Heinz timely appealed from the Violation Notice to the OAR, a local agency within the City's Office of the Director of Finance, which provides administrative hearings for, inter alia, the adjudication of Speed Camera Program Violation Notice appeals.Heinz requested a hearing pursuant to Section 12-3409 of the Traffic Code.^[5] On November 13, 2020, OAR granted Heinz's hearing request.

On December 23, 2021, an OAR Hearing Officer conducted, and Heinz participated in, a telephonic hearing pursuant to the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. §§ 551-555,751-754.At the hearing, Heinz argued, inter alia, that: the Violation Notice was not timely issued; the evidence did not establish he was the vehicle's driver; he was denied the constitutional right to confront his accuser; he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial; and, although characterized as a civil violation, because the fine was a criminal penalty, criminal procedures should apply.SeeReproduced Record (R.R.)at 3a.That same day, the Hearing Officer concluded that Heinz was liable for the violation (Decision).

On January 18, 2022, Heinz appealed from the Decision to the trial court.On October 24, 2022, following oral argument, the trial court denied Heinz's appeal.On November 1, 2022, Heinz appealed to this Court.^[6] On November 8, 2022, the trial court ordered Heinz to file a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure(Rule)1925(b)(Rule 1925(b) Statement).Heinz filed his Rule 1925(b) Statement on November 30, 2022.On July 7, 2023, the trial court issued its opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a)(Rule 1925(a) Opinion).

Heinz argues that Section 3370(and the Traffic Code Section based thereon) imposes a criminal penalty,^[7] and lacks due process protections necessary for criminal penalties.Heinz further asserts that the trial court failed to properly apply the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court-mandated two-pronged analysis in United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242(1980), when it determined that Section 3370 imposed a civil penalty.Heinz contends that the trial court's error implicated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution(respectively, Fifth AmendmentandSixth Amendment).^[8]

Initially, this Court has explained:

Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory construction.Helvering [v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,] 399 . . .[(1938)].A court must first ask whether the legislature, "in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other."Ward, 448 U.S. at 248 . . . .Even in those cases where the legislature"has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect,"id.[] at 248-249, as to "transform] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty[.]"Rex Trailer Co. v.[U.S.],350 U.S. 148, 154 . . .(1956).

Commonwealth v. CSX Transp.,708 A.2d 138, 140(Pa. Cmwlth. 1998)(quotingHudson v. U.S.,522 U.S. 93, 99(1997)).The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has observed:

[The U.S. Supreme] Court's traditional two-pronged test. . . first inquires whether the legislature's intent was to impose punishment, and, if not, whether the statutory scheme is nonetheless so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the legislature's non-punitive intent.SeeAllen v. Illinois,478 U.S. 364, 368-69 . . .(1986)(analyzing state legislation); []Ward,448 U.S. [at] 248-49 . . . (analyzing federal legislation).To make this latter determination, the [U.S.]Supreme Court has used a multi-factored balancing analysis, seeWard,448 U.S. at 249 . . ., involving several considerations that were first enumerated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,372 U.S. 144 . . .(1963)(the []Mendoza-Martinez[F]actors[]).

Commonwealth v. Williams,832 A.2d 962, 971(Pa.2003)(superseded by statute).The Williams Court explained:

Although "neither exhaustive nor dispositive," this list of [Mendoza-Martinez F]actors has proved helpful in considering whether a civil, remedial mechanism "nevertheless provides for sanctions so punitive as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."[]Ward,448 U.S. at 249 . . . (internal quotation marks omitted);seeSmith [v. Doe], [538] U.S. [84,] 92 . . .[(2003)]; Commonwealth v. McGee, . . . 744 A.2d 754, 757([Pa.]2000)(stating that the Mendoza-Martinez[F]actors are "useful guideposts" in determining whether prison disciplinary confinement constitutes criminal punishment);Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, . . . 690 A.2d 222, 226([Pa.]1997)(applyingMendoza-Martinez[F]actors in deeming civil forfeitures non-punitive).The Mendoza-Martinez Court identified the following considerations: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.Seeid. at 168-69.

Williams,832 A.2d at 972-73.

The Williams Court expounded:

In applying these [Mendoza-Martinez F]actors, the [U.S.]Supreme Court has stated that only the "clearest proof that a law is punitive in effect may overcome a legislative categorization to the contrary.See, e.g., Seling v. Young,531 U.S. 250, 261 . . .(2001); Hudson[,] . . .522 U.S. [at] 100 . . .;Kansas v. Hendricks,521 U.S. 346, 361 . . .(1997); accord Wingait Farms, . . . 690 A.2d at 226 n.5.While a precise definition of what constitutes the "clearest proof is rarely articulated, such requirement mirrors the general presumption of validity enjoyed in Pennsylvania by all lawfully enacted legislation.See Commonwealth v. Stern, . . . 701 A.2d 568, 571([Pa.]1997).Thus, for present purposes we understand the "clearest proof standard to indicate that the Mendoza-Martinez[F]actors must weigh heavily in favor of a finding of punitive purpose or effect in order to negate the General Assembly's intention that [a statute] be deemed civil and remedial.

Williams, 832 A.2d at 973.

Here, the trial court distinguished Ward based on the factual differences between Section 311(b)(6) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6), referenced in Ward,andSection 3362 of the Vehicle Code.Specifically, the trial court reasoned:

The instant case is easily distinguishable from Ward and its progeny, as [Heinz] was charged with the single traffic offense of speeding.Moreover, it has been widely accepted that speed enforcement cameras had been installed along the Roosevelt Boulevard in response to its correct designation as one of the most dangerous roads to travel particularly due to excess speeding.The intent behind camera installation was to prevent accidents and the resulting injuries and deaths that have routinely occurred along the [Roosevelt] Boulevard.To date, there has been zero evidence of any punitive effect of imposition of the minor $100.00 fine.Moreover, zero points or driving restrictions are attached to the issuance of the subject violation.

At present, there are no criminal penalties attached to the referenced [S]ection 3362 . . . of the . . . Vehicle Code.If[,] on the other hand[,][Heinz] had been charged with reckless driving or driving under the influence of alcohol or narcotics, then constitutional protections would have applied.Gratefully, [Heinz's] conduct had not risen to those levels and charges such as those do not apply.

Rule 1925(a)Op.at 6-7(R.R.at 49a-50a).

Given Heinz's challenge to Section 3370's characterization of the fine as a civil penalty, this Court does not agree...