In re Hickson

• Decision Date: 25 April 2003
• Citation: 573 Pa. 127,821 A.2d 1238
• Parties: In re Isaac HICKSON, Appeal of Leon A. Williams, Esquire. In re Robert MARTINEZ, Appeal of Leon A. Williams, Esquire.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

821 A.2d 1238

573 Pa. 127

In re Isaac HICKSON,

Appeal of Leon A. Williams, Esquire.

In re Robert MARTINEZ,

Appeal of Leon A. Williams, Esquire.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued April 9, 2003.

Decided April 25, 2003.

Leon Williams, Philadelphia, for Leon Williams.

Hugh J. Burns, Catherine Lynn Marshall, Richard A. Sprague, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Before ZAPPALA, C.J., and CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR and EAKIN, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice CAPPY.

At issue in these appeals is who has standing to seek judicial review of a district attorney's disapproval of his private criminal complaint. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the orders of the Superior Court.

On September 26, 1997, state parole agents Isaac Hickson ("Hickson") and Robert Martinez ("Martinez") shot and killed Kenneth Griffin ("Griffin") while attempting to arrest him. Griffin was wanted for absconding from a halfway house and was a suspect in an armed robbery that occurred earlier that month.

The Philadelphia District Attorney ("District Attorney") presented the matter of Griffin's death to an investigating grand jury. The grand jury ultimately concluded that criminal charges against Martinez and Hickson were unwarranted.

Subsequently, Leon Williams, Esquire ("Appellant") filed two private criminal complaints against Hickson and Martinez, charging them with murder, manslaughter and related crimes. Appellant, who is an attorney practicing in Philadelphia, is not related to the Griffin family and did not act on their behalf in filing the complaints. Noting that the grand jury had concluded that no charges should be brought against Hickson and Martinez, the District Attorney declined to approve Appellant's private criminal complaints.

Pursuant to Rule 106 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure,¹ Appellant sought review of the District Attorney's decision. The District Attorney argued that Appellant lacked standing to seek review of the District Attorney's refusal of the criminal complaints as Appellant was not a relative of Griffin and was not otherwise involved in the shooting. Also, the District Attorney claimed that her disapproval of the private criminal complaints was a policy decision that was entitled to deference by the trial court.

The trial court rejected the District Attorney's standing argument as Rule 106 did not place any limitation on who may seek review of a denial of a private criminal complaint. Furthermore, the trial court held that the District Attorney committed an abuse of discretion when she did not detail her reasons for disapproving the private criminal complaints. Finding that the evidence established that there was a prima facie case for charges of third degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and other related offenses, the trial court directed the District Attorney to approve Appellant's complaints and file charges against Hickson and Martinez.

The District Attorney filed an appeal. Soon thereafter, the District Attorney filed a "Petition to Vacate Current Briefing Schedule and Remand for After-Discovered Evidence" with the Superior Court. She argued that she had recently learned that Appellant intended to run for the office of district attorney of Philadelphia at the next election, and was pursuing the complaints against Hickson and Martinez in order to advance his own political career. Also, the District Attorney alleged that Appellant had a personal financial interest in the matter as he had entered into a contingent fee agreement with members of Griffin's family with regard to any recovery the Griffin family received in a civil lawsuit.² The District Attorney alleged that such motivations were inherently improper, and militated that the complaints should be disapproved. She requested a remand and a hearing on this matter. The Superior Court granted the District Attorney relief, and remanded this matter with the direction that the trial court hold an evidentiary hearing.

The trial court, after holding a hearing, concluded that the new evidence that the District Attorney allegedly uncovered did not constitute after-discovered evidence. Thus, the trial court "reaffirmed" its earlier order directing the District Attorney to file the complaints against Hickson and Martinez.

On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, finding that Appellant lacked standing. Utilizing the common law test for determining whether a party had standing, it reasoned that only "victims, their named representative or, in the event of a victim's death, a family member" have a substantial, direct and immediate interest in seeking judicial review of the disapproval of a private criminal complaint, and thus only they would have standing. In re Hickson, 765 A.2d 372, 382 (Pa.Super.Ct.2000). As Appellant was not related to Griffin and was not a named representative of the Griffin family, the Superior Court concluded that Appellant lacked standing.

Judge Johnson dissented. He reasoned Appellant was not compelled to establish standing as Rule 106 contains no such requirement. In the alternative, Judge Johnson posited that even if standing were a requirement, the individual who sought judicial review of a district attorney's decision to disapprove a private criminal complaint filed by that individual would indeed have standing. Judge Johnson reasoned that "the complainant's interest in seeking review of his or her disapproved complaint `surpasses the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law' because the private criminal complainant was the individual who filed the complaint." Id. at 385-86 (citation omitted). Throughout his dissent, Judge Johnson indicated his concern over the majority's recognition that the victim, the victim's family, or personal representative have a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in seeing the alleged perpetrators brought to trial, an interest distinct from and more significant than that held by a member of the general public. In his opinion, such a holding was grossly misguided as "a victim has no greater interest in the prosecution of a criminal than does any other member of the public." Id. at 385.

Appellant then filed a petition for allowance of appeal with this court, and we granted allocatur.

The sole issue before this court is whether a person who is not the victim, a member of the victim's family, or a named representative of the victim or victim's family has standing to seek judicial review of a district attorney's disapproval of private criminal complaints filed pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 106.³ As this is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo. Furthermore, our scope of review in this matter is plenary as we may examine the entire contents of the record. See Phillips v. A-Best Products Co., 542 Pa. 124, 665 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1995)

.

Appellant asserts that this court has never dictated that a party must have standing in order to seek judicial review of the disapproval of a Rule 106 private criminal complaint. Appellant views this silence as a negation of such a standing requirement. Appellant is correct in stating that we have never affirmatively required that a party seeking review of a disapproval of a private criminal complaint must have standing. Yet, the converse of this proposition is also true: we have never stated that standing is irrelevant in the Rule 106 private criminal complaint context. Thus, this argument merely establishes that we are confronted with an issue of first impression for this court.

Rule 106 is also silent on the issue of standing.⁴ Again, Appellant believes that this silence speaks volumes, and implies that since the rule makes no reference to a standing requirement, no such requirement exists. While the express terms of the rule do not enunciate a standing requirement, the conclusion that no such a requirement therefore exists is not that statement's logical corollary. A single rule cannot reiterate all statutory, rule-based, or judicially-created doctrines that govern the inception and course of the litigation. Thus, we do not believe that silence in Rule 106 marks the end of our inquiry on the standing issue.

We believe the most prudent approach to this issue is to examine the theoretical supports for the traditional standing approach, and determine whether they have any applicability to a situation such as the matter sub judice. We have stated as a general policy that "[a] party seeking judicial resolution of a controversy in this Commonwealth must, as a prerequisite, establish that he has standing to maintain the action." Bergdoll v. Kane, 557 Pa. 72, 731 A.2d 1261, 1268 (1999) (citation omitted). Our Commonwealth's standing doctrine is not a senseless restriction on the utilization of judicial resources; rather, it is a prudential, judicially-created tool meant to winnow out those matters in which the litigants have no direct interest in pursuing the matter.⁵ Such a requirement is critical because only when "parties have sufficient interest in a matter [is it] ensure[d] that there is a legitimate controversy before the court." In re T.J., 559 Pa. 118, 739 A.2d 478, 481 (1999).

In practical terms, we are assured that there is a legitimate controversy if the proponent of a legal action has somehow been "aggrieved" by the matter he seeks to challenge. Independent State Store Union v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 495 Pa. 145, 432 A.2d 1375 (1981). A litigant can establish that he has been "aggrieved" if he can show that he has a substantial, direct and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation in order to be deemed to have standing. Bergdoll v. Kane, 557 Pa. 72, 731 A.2d 1261, 1268 (1999). "A `substantial' interest is an interest in the outcome of the litigation which surpasses the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law. A `direct' interest requires a showing that the matter complained of caused harm to the party's interest. An `immediate'...