In re Hickson

• Decision Date: 21 December 2000
• Parties: In re Isaac HICKSON. Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In re Robert Martinez. Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

765 A.2d 372

In re Isaac HICKSON.

Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

In re Robert Martinez.

Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued June 6, 2000.

Filed December 21, 2000.

Richard A. Sprague, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for Com., appellant.

Leon Williams, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before JOHNSON, STEVENS and BECK, JJ.

BECK, J.:

¶ 1 The single question addressed in this opinion is whether an individual has standing to seek judicial review of the district attorney's disapproval of his private criminal complaint where he has no relationship or connection to the incident at issue other than that of citizen, taxpayer and attorney of this Commonwealth. We conclude that such an individual does not have standing and so reverse the order of the trial court.

¶ 2 State parole agents Isaac Hickson and Robert Martinez shot and killed Kenneth Griffin while attempting to arrest him.¹ As a result of Griffin's death, the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office presented the matter to an investigating grand jury. The grand jury ultimately concluded that criminal charges against the agents were unwarranted. Thereafter, Leon A. Willams, an attorney practicing in Philadelphia, filed a private criminal complaint against the agents, charging murder, manslaughter and related charges. He did not assert that he was appearing on behalf of Mr. Griffin, or was related to the Griffin family or acting as its representative. Mr. Williams received a letter from the district attorney's office informing him that his private criminal complaint was refused because the grand jury had concluded that no charges should be brought against Hickson and Martinez.

¶ 3 Mr. Williams then sought review of the district attorney's decision in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. The district attorney's response was two-fold. First, she argued that Mr. Williams had no standing in the case because he was not involved in the incident or related to Mr. Griffin. Second, the district attorney claimed that her disapproval of the private complaint was a policy decision which, in the absence of fraud or bad faith, was entitled to deference by the court.

¶ 4 The trial court, at an evidentiary hearing on the matter, summarily rejected the district attorney's standing argument. The court reasoned that the rule setting out the procedure for filing private criminal complaints, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 106, contained "no limiting nature ... as to the issue of standing." Hearing Transcript, 1/8/99, at 15. The trial court went on to address the substantive issues of the case and found that the evidence established a prima facie case for charges of third degree murder, voluntary manslaughter and related offenses. It further found that the district attorney "committed an abuse of discretion in failing to articulate reasons for disapproving the ... complaint." Trial Court Opinion, 6/17/99, at 15. As a result, the trial court directed the district attorney to approve Mr. Williams's complaint and file charges against the agents.

¶ 5 The district attorney filed an appeal of the trial court's order with this court. While briefs were pending, the district attorney filed a "Petition to Vacate Current Briefing Schedule and Remand for After-Discovered Evidence." The thrust of the district attorney's petition was that she recently learned of relevant evidence regarding Mr. Williams's involvement in the case. The district attorney claimed that an assessment of this evidence was crucial for proper resolution of the case.

¶ 6 Among the items raised by the district attorney in her petition was the fact that Mr. Williams had entered into an agreement with members of Mr. Griffin's family. The agreement named Mr. Williams as liaison between the family members and the attorneys representing the family in a federal civil action against the agents. It also granted Mr. Williams a fee equal to 3% of the amount of any judgment ultimately awarded in that civil case.

¶ 7 The district attorney further asserted that Mr. Williams's intention to run for the office of district attorney in the next election militated in favor of a remand. According to the district attorney, Mr. Williams was attempting to "utilize the criminal justice system for private purposes." Because such an attempt is improper and in itself constitutes a valid reason for disapproving a private complaint, a remand was warranted. This court granted the petition and remanded the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing.

¶ 8 On remand, after a full evidentiary hearing, the trial judge rejected each of the district attorney's claims regarding Mr. Williams's alleged motives. It found the evidence presented by the district attorney "did not go to the heart of the issue presented." Trial Court Opinion, 12/20/99, at 15. The court then reiterated its finding that the district attorney "failed to come forward with a clear statement as to the particular policy" upon which its disapproval was based. Calling into question the district attorney's reliance on the grand jury's recommendation, the trial court reaffirmed its order directing that charges be filed against the parole agents. This timely appeal by the Commonwealth followed.

¶ 9 The district attorney presents two issues for our review. First, we are asked to consider whether Mr. Williams has standing to appear in the trial court requesting review of his private criminal complaint. Second, in the event we find that Mr. Williams has standing, we are asked to consider whether the trial court properly found that the district attorney abused her discretion in disapproving the private complaint. Our analysis must begin with an assessment of the standing issue, for if Mr. Williams lacks standing, the merits of his complaint are rendered moot.

¶ 10 We begin by setting out the legal authority upon which Mr. Williams relied in filing his private criminal complaint and seeking review of its disapproval in the court of common pleas. Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure 103 through 108 establish the framework of the criminal complaint system in this Commonwealth and set forth the procedures by which complaints must be filed. This case concerns an interpretation and analysis of Pa.R.Crim.P. 106, which addresses the filing of private complaints. Rule 106 provides:

Approval of Private Complaints

(a) When the affiant is not a law enforcement officer, the complaint shall be submitted to an attorney for the Commonwealth, who shall approve or disapprove it without reasonable delay.

(b) If the attorney for the Commonwealth:

(1) approves the complaint, the attorney shall indicate this decision on the complaint form and transmit it to the issuing authority;

(2) disapproves the complaint, the attorney shall state the reasons on the complaint form and return it to the affiant. Thereafter, the affiant may petition the court of common pleas for review of the decision.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 106.

¶ 11 The case law interpreting Rule 106 has had an uncertain evolution. This court and our supreme court have addressed a variety of issues with respect to the Rule, including the different reasons a district attorney may give as the basis for her disapproval and the judicial standard of review applicable to each reason. Although the primary case law has been marked by a plurality opinion of this court en banc and an affirmance based on an evenly divided supreme court, the current state of the law on these issues appears clear.² What is not so certain is who is entitled to seek judicial review of a private criminal complaint where it has been disapproved by the district attorney. This novel issue is the one we decide today.

¶ 12 Standing may be had through a variety of ways. The legislature may grant it explicitly to an agency or individual by statute; the legislature may grant it implicitly to an agency by investing it with certain "functions, duties and responsibilities"; or it may be permitted under common law where the status of the petitioner is that of an "aggrieved" party. In Re T.J., 559 Pa. 118, 739 A.2d 478, 480-81 (1999). In this case we have neither an explicit or implicit grant of standing and so must rely on the common law definition. An individual is "aggrieved" where he has a "direct, immediate and substantial interest" in the matter sought to be litigated. Ken R. on Behalf of C.R. v. Arthur Z., 546 Pa. 49, 682 A.2d 1267, 1270 (1996). Common law standing is not accorded those who merely share in the "common interest of all citizens in ensuring obedience to our laws." J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 453 Pa.Super. 78, 682 A.2d 1314, 1318 (1996). On appeal, our standard of review on the issue of standing is whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. T.J., supra, at 123, 739 A.2d at 480.

¶ 13 Mr. Williams appears to concede that under traditional notions of standing, he falls short of meeting the definition upon which we typically rely. He states plainly that he was not "personally harmed or threatened with harm by the parole agents nor [does he] represent anyone so aggrieved." Appellee's Brief at 23, n. 1. However, he asserts that in the context of private criminal complaints, every citizen of the Commonwealth has standing to seek judicial review:

[A] private criminal complainant has a legitimate interest in seeing a violator of the law brought to justice by Commonwealth [sic] and punished for his misdeeds where he like Appellee asserts an interest that every member of the general public share [sic] in common, e.g., citizen and taxpayer.

Appellee's Brief at 16.

¶ 14 In sum, Mr. Williams argues that no standing analysis is required in the case of a private criminal complaint as every private complainant is entitled to judicial review. Because the "wrong" in a private criminal complaint case is one against the Commonwealth, he reasons, standing exists for every Commonwealth resident.

¶ 15 The...