In re Hill

Decision Date28 September 2015
Docket NumberNo. 2–14–0345.,2–14–0345.
Citation48 N.E.3d 1100
PartiesIn re MARRIAGE OF Jennifer HILL, Petitioner–Appellee, and Ronald M. Hill, Jr., Respondent–Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Jerome W. Pinderski, Jr., and Paul C. Pinderski, both of Pinderski & Pinderski, Ltd., of Palatine, and Stuart A. Petersen, of Ruddy & King, LLC, of Aurora, for appellant.

Laura L. Malinowski, Robert J. Baron, and R. Peter Grometer, all of Mahoney, Silverman & Cross, LLC, of Joliet, for appellee.

OPINION

Presiding Justice SCHOSTOK

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The respondent, Ronald M. Hill, Jr., appeals from the December 30, 2013, order of the circuit court of Kendall County, which set child support retroactive to June 17, 2012, and awarded a contribution to the attorney fees incurred by the petitioner, Jennifer Hill. We affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The parties were married in 1994 and divorced in 2004. They had three children together. Jennifer was designated as the children's primary residential custodian. The judgment reserved Ronald's child support obligation and instead provided that he was to pay $4,250 per month for unallocated family support until September 2008. Then, Ronald's child support obligation would be established based on Ronald's income and the statutory guidelines. Despite the above language in the judgment, Ronald's child support obligation was not recalculated after September 2008. Instead, he continued to pay $4,250 per month.

¶ 4 On July 17, 2012, Jennifer filed a petition to reset child support. On August 13 and 14, 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing on Jennifer's petition.

¶ 5 Ronald testified that his father and his father's business partner, Lee Larson, owned J.B. Industries. J.B. Industries creates tools for use in air conditioner repair. Ronald's father and Larson also owned a building complex on Farnsworth Avenue in Aurora that J.B. Industries used (the Farnsworth property). In 2005, Ronald and a friend, Jeffrey Cherif, purchased 100% of the stock in J.B. Industries for $7 million and the Farnsworth property for an additional $7 million. The deal was financed by Ronald's father and Larson. The loans were to be repaid by 2016. Ronald and Cherif did not put any money down to buy the property.

¶ 6 Each month, Ronald and Cherif paid approximately $140,000 to Ronald's father and Larson to repay the loans. Ronald and Cherif were able to pay down the loans from $14 million to $5 million in 6 years. Ronald and Cherif have the ability to modify the loan agreement and prepay the remainder of the loans without penalty. In 2011, the terms of the loans were modified to allow Ronald to be paid an annual salary of $500,000.

¶ 7 In 2008, Ronald and Cherif borrowed funds and purchased, for $1.2 million, a home on Grand Bahama Lane in Riviera Beach, Florida. Ronald and Cherif stated on their corporation's tax returns that the Florida residence was a corporate asset.

¶ 8 Ronald acknowledged that he owned a home in Naperville and a vacation home in Ingleside. In 2011, he purchased an additional home in Naperville for his mother-in-law to live in. She paid him $1,000 a month, which was insufficient to cover the mortgage and property taxes. Ronald also acknowledged that he owns seven cars.

¶ 9 Both parties retained experts to determine Ronald's annual income for child support purposes. Howard Ellison, Jennifer's expert, testified that Ronald's income was $653,878. Ellison arrived at that amount, in part, by giving Ronald a credit for the interest he paid on his business loans. Ellison's report indicated that the average amount of interest that Ronald paid to purchase J.B. Industries and the Farnsworth property from 2009 to 2011 was $78,959. John Coffey, Ronald's expert, testified that Ronald's income was $189,531. He arrived at that amount, in part, by giving Ronald a credit against his income for both the principal and the interest he paid on his business loans. Coffey's report indicated that the average amount of principal and interest that Ronald paid from 2009 to 2011 on his business loans was $434,039.

¶ 10 Jennifer testified that she earned $35,000 per year up until recently when her job was eliminated and she became unemployed. She still lived in the former marital residence, which was in a state of disrepair because she was not able to afford maintenance and upkeep. She did not have a working computer in the home. The only vacations she had taken with the children had been paid for by her parents or her old boyfriends.

¶ 11 On December 30, 2013, the trial court entered its ruling, finding that, based on Ronald's increased income and the children's increased needs, there had been a substantial change in circumstances that warranted an increase in child support. The trial court found that Ellison's determination of Ronald's income was reasonable. However, the trial court found that Ellison should not have granted Ronald deductions against his income for certain depreciation expenses as well as the expenses associated with the Florida residence and the residence Ronald was renting to his mother-in-law. As such, the trial court concluded that Ronald's net income was $826,478. The trial court rejected Ronald's arguments that he should be allowed to deduct additional money for his repayment of business loans, finding that the “ astronomical money amounts Ronald was paying annually towards his purchase of both the stock in J.B. Industries, LLC as well as the Farnsworth property” were not necessary and therefore not reasonable. The trial court further found that “the apparent accelerated payment schedule leaves very little money for the payment of Ronald's child support obligations.”

¶ 12 After determining Ronald's income, the court set Ronald's child support obligation at 28% of his net income pursuant to the statutory guidelines: $231,413.84 per year ($19,284.48 per month). The trial court found that a downward deviation from that amount was not appropriate, because (1) the children were not living the lifestyle they would have had if the parties had stayed married and (2) Ronald would still have approximately $600,000 per year in income to spend after paying child support. The child support obligation was retroactive to June 17, 2012, the date Jennifer filed her petition.

¶ 13 Further, the trial court found that Jennifer did not have the financial resources to pay her attorney fees and that Ronald did. The trial court additionally found that the fees Jennifer had alleged in her petition for payment of fees were reasonable. The trial court therefore ordered that Ronald pay Jennifer's fees of $49,025.04.

¶ 14 Following the trial court's ruling, Ronald filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 15 ANALYSIS

¶ 16 Ronald's first contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in calculating his net income by not deducting the loan payments that he necessarily and reasonably incurred in order to purchase J.B. Industries and the Farnsworth property.

¶ 17 At the outset, we note that the parties dispute the appropriate standard of review for Ronald's first contention. Ronald contends that our review is de novo while Jennifer insists that the proper standard of review for a child support award is abuse of discretion. We agree with Jennifer. See In re Marriage of Davis, 287 Ill.App.3d 846, 852, 223 Ill.Dec. 166, 679 N.E.2d 110 (1997)

(the trial court enjoys broad discretion in determining the modification of child support, and we will not overturn its decision unless it results from an abuse of discretion). The cases Ronald relies on are distinguishable as they address what constitutes income under section 505(a)(3) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3) (West 2012)) and not whether repayment of a loan is reasonable and necessary. See In re Marriage of McGrath, 2012 IL 112792, 361 Ill.Dec. 12, 970 N.E.2d 12 (addressing whether funds regularly withdrawn from payor's savings account are considered income for child support purposes); In re Marriage of Lindman, 356 Ill.App.3d 462, 291 Ill.Dec. 969, 824 N.E.2d 1219 (2005) (addressing whether disbursements from petitioner's IRA were “income” for purposes of calculating net income under section 505 of the Dissolution Act). As we will discuss further below, a trial court's determination as to what constitutes a reasonable and necessary expense necessarily requires the trial court to exercise some discretion.

¶ 18 Turning to the merits of Ronald's first contention, we first note that the statutory definition of “net income” for child support purposes is the total of the noncustodial parent's income from all sources, less certain specified deductions. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3)

(West 2012). Relevant here is the deduction for the repayment of loans for “reasonable and necessary expenses for the production of income.” 750 ILCS 5/505(h) (West 2012). “Necessary” describes “those expenses outlaid by a parent with a good-faith belief his or her income would increase as a result, and which actually did act to increase income, or would have done so absent some extenuating circumstance.” Gay v. Dunlap, 279 Ill.App.3d 140, 149, 215 Ill.Dec. 691, 664 N.E.2d 88 (1996). “Reasonable” means not extreme or excessive. Davis, 287 Ill.App.3d at 853, 223 Ill.Dec. 166, 679 N.E.2d 110. In order to determine what is reasonable, one must consider the relationship between the amount of the expense and the amount by which income is in good faith expected to increase as a result. Id. The definition of reasonable implies that the same expense could be reasonable in one context and not in another. Id.

¶ 19 In determining what expenses are reasonable and necessary, a court may properly conclude that such expenses are only partially deductible from one's income. Roper v. Johns, 345 Ill.App.3d 1127, 281 Ill.Dec. 655, 804 N.E.2d 620 (2004)

. In Roper, the father (Jeff) had incurred $180,000 in student loans to attend college and law school. He...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Vance v. Joyner
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 5 Diciembre 2019
    ... ... 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3.4) (West 2018) ("The court may deviate from the child support guidelines if the application would be inequitable, unjust, or inappropriate."); see also In re Marriage of Hill , 2015 IL App (2d) 140345, 28, 400 Ill.Dec. 660, 48 N.E.3d 1100 (noting a trial court's decision to deviate from the child support guidelines "will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion"). However, in order to deviate from the guidelines, the trial court must give "written findings * * * ... ...
  • In re Gabriel
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 31 Marzo 2020
    ... ... Vance v. Joyner , 2019 IL App (4th) 190136, 66, 438 Ill.Dec. 531, 146 N.E.3d 285. The same is true when the trial court decides to deviate from the statutory guidelines. See In re Marriage of Hill , 2015 IL App (2d) 140345, 28, 400 Ill.Dec. 660, 48 N.E.3d 1100 ("[A] trial court's decision whether to deviate from the statutory guidelines in setting child support will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."). Whether the court applied the correct statutory formula in determining the ... ...
  • Evan M.W. v. Emily B. (In re Tate Oliver B.)
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 16 Marzo 2016
    ... ... 4 41 D. Child Support 42 A trial court must exercise its discretion in determining the appropriate amount of child support, and we will not overturn its decision unless it has abused that discretion. In re Marriage of Hill, 2015 IL App (2d) 140345, 17, 400 Ill.Dec. 660, 48 N.E.3d 1100. Emily argues that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the amount of Evan's child support obligation at $40 per week, because the statutory guidelines called for a higher amount and the trial court gave no reason for its ... ...
  • Benink v.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 2 Febrero 2018
    ... ... We agree. 32 A trial court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether to modify child support, and we will not overturn its decision unless it results from an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Hill , 2015 IL App (2d) 140345, 17, 400 Ill.Dec. 660, 48 N.E.3d 1100. A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court, or its ruling rests on an error of law. People v. Olsen , 2015 IL ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT