In re Hillegass' Estate
| Decision Date | 06 August 1968 |
| Citation | 244 A.2d 672,431 Pa. 144 |
| Parties | In re ESTATE of LeRoy A. HILLEGASS, Deceased. Appeal of Esther V. HILLEGASS. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
C. William Freed, Jr., Quakertown, for appellant.
Harry L. Lees, Jr., Quakertown, for appellees, Good Shepherd Home and others.
H Ober Hess, Philadelphia, for appellee, David N Hillegass.
Edward J. Hardiman, Pearlstine, Salkin & Hardiman, Lansdale, Matthew M. Strickler, Philadelphia, for appellees. Ballard, Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, Philadelphia, of counsel.
Before BELL, C.J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.
This is an appeal by Esther V. Hillegass, decedent's widow, from the Decree of the Orphans' Court which granted a petition to strike off Esther's election to take against her husband's will.
LeRoy A Hillegass died August 12, 1965, at the age of 76, leaving an estate inventoried at $265,876. He was survived by his widow Esther V. Hillegass, who was 60 years old and whom he had married five months before his death. David Hillegass, decedent's son by a former marriage, and Bradford LeRoy Hillegass, a grandson, and Alda M. Holtzman, a sister, also survived Hillegass.
LeRoy A. Hillegass and Esther Cassel, a widow, were married on April 2, 1965. Hillegass left a will dated March 19, 1964, and a codicil dated April 15, 1965. In his will, which was executed over a year before his marriage to Esther, he bequeathed a legacy to his son and to his sister conditioned upon their surviving him, then made a number of small charitable bequests, then created a trust of $40,000 for the benefit of his grandson, and then gave his residuary estate in trust to pay the net income to his son for life with the remainder to certain charities. Hillegass, On April 15, 1965, thirteen days after his marriage to Esther, executed a codicil giving Esther $15,000 and his residence in Bucks County, together with all of the tangible personal property contained therein, if she survived him. This property and the furniture were appraised at approximately $15,000, so that the codicil gave Esther approximately $30,000.
LeRoy A. Hillegass and Esther V. Cassel, his intended wife, entered into an Antenuptial Agreement, under seal, which raises the most important question in this case. It recites:
'Whereas, it is the purpose of this agreement to give each of the parties hereto the free and absolute control and disposal of his or her separate property or estate; and
'Whereas it is the intention of the intended wife to waive, relinquish and bar all her inchoate intestate and other rights or interests, either as wife or widow of the First Party, in and to any property now owned or hereafter acquired by the First Party, Including her right of election to take against the Will of the First Party; [1] and * * *
'Whereas, the First Party, being the intended husband, is seized in fee simple of certain real property located in Quakertown Borough, Bucks County, Pennsylvania, as well as certain personal property, The value of which has been fully disclosed to the intended wife or Second Party; and * * *
'Now Therefore, in consideration of the said marriage and the covenants of the Second Party, the First Party agrees to pay the Second Party the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) immediately after April 1, 1965; and in consideration of the said marriage and the covenants of the First Party, the Second Party agrees to pay the First Party the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) immediately after April 1, 1965, it being the intention of the parties that this Agreement shall be binding upon themselves, their heirs, executors and administrators.
'* * *
'This Agreement is executed With the full realization and understanding that the separate estates of the parties are not equal in amount, * * *
'Nothing herein contained shall prevent either of the parties hereto from voluntarily making gifts of any nature and type whatsoever to each other, or one to the other, either during their respective lifetimes or by their respective last Wills and Testaments.
'This writing contains the entire agreement between the parties and it cannot be altered, supplemented or amended by parol.'
LeRoy A. Hillegass released all his rights in and to the property of his intended wife in provisions identical with those provisions for the wife hereinabove quoted.
It is difficult to conceive of a clearer or fuller or more complete release by an intended wife of all her present and future rights and interests in her intended husband's estate.
In compliance with the Antenuptial Agreement, Hillegass paid Esther the sum of $10,000 on April 15, 1965, thirteen days after they were married. Moreover, although not controlling or relevant to the issue of reasonableness or of full and fair disclosure, he gave Esther, we repeat, codicillary gifts which totaled approximately $30,000.
In spite of all the aforesaid covenants, admissions, waivers, releases, facts and codicillary gifts, Esther filed an election to take against her husband's will. The executor of the will of LeRoy A. Hillegass, joined in by several legatees, filed a petition to set aside Esther's election, and the lower Court, we repeat, granted the petition and struck off Esther's election to take against her husband's will. This Decree we affirm.
Appellant bases her contentions and her appeal upon the allegation that LeRoy did not live like a man who had $250,000 and therefore (1) in spite of the recitals of disclosure she did not know until after LeRoy's death the exact value of his estate, and the burden was upon Hillegass's Estate to prove a full and fair disclosure, and (2) even though the Agreement provided that 'both parties, for themselves, their heirs, and personal representatives Hereby irrevocably waive any future assertion or defense of adequacy of consideration * * *', the property given to her by her prospective husband in the Antenuptial Agreement was inadequate under the law.
In the field of Antenuptial Agreements, the pertinent law has been differently and varyingly expressed in a number of cases, [2] with the result that in several respects the law is not as clear, definite and certain as it should be. We shall therefore eliminate the confusion and conflicts resulting from different expressions of the applicable standards and principles by stating clearly and more definitely the applicable standards and principles in this field. [3]
Parties to an Antenuptial Agreement providing for the disposition of their respective estates do not deal at arm's length, but stand in a relation of mutual confidence and trust that calls for the highest degree of good faith and a reasonable provision for the surviving spouse, Or in the absence of such a provision a full and fair disclosure of all pertinent facts and circumstances. Gelb's Estate, 425 Pa. 117, 123, 228 A.2d 367; Kaufmann's Estate, 404 Pa. 131, 136, 171 A.2d 48; McClellan's Estate, 365 Pa. 401, 407, 75 A.2d 595; Whitmer's Estate, 224 Pa. 413, 73 A. 551.
However, it is too often forgotten that one of the two principle purposes of an Antenuptial Agreement is to change the provisions which the statutory law of Pennsylvania makes for a surviving spouse. Emery's Estate, 362 Pa. 142, 147, 66 A.2d 262.
(1) An Antenuptial Agreement is presumptively valid and binding upon the parties thereto.
(2) The person seeking to nullify or avoid or circumvent the Agreement has the burden of proving the invalidity of the Agreement by clear and convincing evidence that the deceased spouse at the time of the Agreement made Neither (a) A reasonable provision for the intended spouse, nor (b) A full and fair disclosure of his (or her) worth. Gelb's Estate 425 Pa. page 123, 228 A.2d 367, supra; Kaufmann's Estate, 404 Pa. page 136, 171 A.2d 48, supra; McClellan's Estate, 365 Pa. page 407, 75 A.2d 595, supra;...
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