In re Hooper

• Decision Date: 09 June 1881
• Citation: 52 Wis. 699,58 N.W. 741
• Parties: IN RE HOOPER.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

52 Wis. 699

58 N.W. 741

IN RE HOOPER.¹

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 9, 1881.

Petition by one Hooper for a writ of habeas corpus. Writ denied.Henry N. Setzer, for petitioner.

H. W. Chynoweth, for respondent.

COLE, C. J.

The question arising on the demurrer to the return is, does the warrant of the governor, set up in the return, show a sufficient justification for holding the petitioner in custody? It is objected that the warrant fails to show upon its face that he is charged with the commission of a crime in the state of Kansas. The warrant of the governor of this state recites that it has been represented to him by the governor of the state of Kansas that the petitioner “stands charged with the crime of obtaining illicit connection with a female of good repute, under the age of twenty-one years, under a promise of marriage, committed in the county of Labette, in said state, and that he has fled from justice in that state, and has taken refuge in the state of Wisconsin; and the said governor of Kansas having, in pursuance of the constitution and laws of United States, demanded,” etc., the petitioner. Now it is objected that the rendition warrant is insufficient in law, because it does not show that the petitioner is charged with the commission of a crime for which the executive is authorized to cause him to be arrested, and delivered up to the agent of the state of Kansas. The language of the constitution of the United States is that the alleged fugitive from justice must be charged “with treason, felony or other crime.” Const. U. S. art. 4, § 2, subd. 2. The weight of judicial opinion is that these words embrace any act forbidden and made punishable by the laws of the state making the demand. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66;Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366; Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 16, note 1; Brown's Case, 112 Mass. 409; Clark's Case, 9 Wend. 212;People v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182; People v. Pinkerton, 17 Hun, 199; Hurd, Hab. Corp. 597. “Felonies and misdemeanors, offenses by statute and at common law, are alike within the constitutional provision; and the obligation to surrender the fugitive for an act which is made criminal by the law of the demanding state, but which is not criminal in the state upon which the demand is made, is the same as if the alleged act were a crime by the law of both.” People v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 188. Prima facie, the warrant shows that the act charged was a crime by the laws of Kansas. Besides, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption is that the laws of the state are the same as our own. Our statute makes the seduction of an unmarried female of previous chaste character, under a promise of marriage, an offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison (section 4581, Rev. St.); and that is, substantially, the offense charged in the warrant.

But, again, it is said there is no proper evidence that the petitioner is charged with the commission of a crime in the state of Kansas. The rendition warrant recites that the representation and demand of the governor of Kansas are accompanied by a copy of an information charging the petitioner with having committed the crime of, etc., which copy of said information is certified to be authentic. The law of congress, in substance,...