In re Horan, Case No. 02-35443 (Bankr. Conn. 1/22/2004)
Decision Date | 22 January 2004 |
Docket Number | DOC. I.D. NOS. 25, 32.,Case No. 02-35443. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Connecticut |
Parties | IN RE: DOUGLAS K. HORAN and TAMMY E. HORAN, CHAPTER 7, DEBTORS. |
Patricia Beary, Esq., Holley L. Claiborn, Esq., New Haven, CT, Attorney for Movant United States Trustee.
Anthony J. Salzarulo, Esq., Rocky Hill, CT, Attorney for Debtors.
Before the court is the United States Trustee's Motion To Dismiss Chapter 7 Case Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 707(a) (Doc. I.D. No. 25, the "Motion"). In the Motion, the United States Trustee (the "UST") seeks dismissal of this chapter 7 case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) for "cause" as a "bad faith" filing.1 The above-captioned debtors (the "Debtors") have filed an objection to the Motion. (See Doc. I.D. No. 32, the "Objection"). This is a "core proceeding" within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).
Certain preliminary proceedings have taken place in this contested matter, and the court has determined that an evidentiary hearing will be required to adjudicate the Motion and the Objection. In order better to facilitate that hearing, the court has deemed it appropriate to issue this memorandum ruling on two preliminary issues already raised in these proceedings:2
• Is a debtors's "bad faith" in filing a chapter 7 petition per se grounds for dismissing the chapter 7 case?
• If the answer to the first is "yes," who bears the burden of proof on the issue of "bad faith"?
In "straight" liquidation proceedings under the prior Bankruptcy Act, it was settled law that if the bankrupt, however solvent, or however impure its motive may have been, or whatever may have been the actuating purpose, saw fit to surrender its assets into the custody and jurisdiction of the court for the benefit of its creditors, the creditors as a matter of law have no cause for complaint.
State of Alabama v. Montevallo Mining Co. (In re Montevallo Mining Co.), 278 F. 989, 990 (M.D. Ala. 1922). "Good faith," although a consideration in reorganization proceedings under the prior Act, generally was not a consideration in liquidation proceedings under that Act. See Terrace Lawn Memorial Gardens v. A.H. Doty & Assocs. (In re Terrace Lawn Memorial Gardens), 256 F.2d 398, 402-03 (9th Cir. 1958) (). However, certain circumstances (prepetition in whole or in part) nevertheless would constitute grounds for dismissal. See, e.g., id. ( ); Zeitinger v. Hargadine — McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 244 F. 719, 722 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 667 (1917) ( ).
When Congress enacted Section 707(a) of the liquidation chapter of the current Bankruptcy Code, Congress introduced the term "cause" which term did not have a precise ancestor under either statute or rule. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 95 (repealed); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 120 (rescinded). Moreover, although three examples of "cause" are set forth in Section 707(a), the enumerated grounds for a "for cause" dismissal are nonexclusive. Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F.3d 1184, 1191 (9th Cir. 2000); see also 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) ( ). Other than to state that the "ability of the debtor to repay his debts in whole or in part [does not] constitute[] adequate cause for dismissal," H.R. Rep. 95-595, at 380 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6336, Congress provided little guidance as to what might constitute "cause" for dismissal pursuant to Section 707(a) besides the enumerated examples. All of the foregoing have produced apparent discord among the circuits concerning whether the debtor's "bad faith" in filing the chapter 7 petition per se constitutes "cause" for dismissal under Section 707(a). The Second Circuit has not spoken on that issue.
Both Industrial Insurance Services, Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124 (6th Cir. 1991), and Tamecki v. Frank (In re Tamecki), 229 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2000), hold that "bad faith" in filing the chapter 7 petition per se constitutes "cause" for dismissal under Section 707(a). Both Zick and Tamecki have been read as framing the question of "bad faith" as a "jurisdictional" issue. See Buchbinder, D.L., Implicit Good Faith Implicit Requirement in Chapter 7 Cases, 18 No. 2 Bankr. Strategist 1, 7 (December, 2000) ("[T]he Third Circuit in Tamecki . . . ha[s] adopted the view of Zick that good faith is an implicit jurisdictional prerequisite to filing for Chapter 7 relief."). On the other hand, both In re Huckfeldt, 39 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 1994), and In re Padilla, supra, reject dismissal under a "bad faith" label as unhelpful, electing instead to proceed under the statutory term "cause." It has been suggested that "[t]he different approaches among the circuits . . . are merely differences in degree and not in kind . . . ." Buchbinder, supra at 6.3
Both the Eighth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have rejected the "bad faith" label based (in part) upon the following concerns:
Padilla, 222 F.3d at 1192 (citing Huckfeldt, 39 F.3d at 832). In other words, Section 707(a) "cause" is Section 707(a) "cause," and the "bad faith" label does not advance (and perhaps hinders) the Section 707(a) analysis. This court shares that view.4 If this court were writing on a cleaner slate, the court similarly would reject the "bad faith" label. However, the court believes that to take such a step at this point would give a false impression of the importance of what is, after all, only a label. Accordingly, the court will accept the "bad faith" label as a term of art for a certain class (or classes) of circumstances (prepetition in whole or in part) which, when analyzed under Section 707(a), constitute "cause" for dismissal.5 What might constitute such "bad faith" will be determined on a case-by-case basis giving consideration to all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. Cf. C-TC 9th Avenue Partnership v. Norton Co. (In re C-TC 9th Avenue Partnership), 113 F.3d 1304, 1312 (2d Cir. 1997) ().
The Debtors argue that the enumerated examples of Section 707(a) "cause" (all of which refer to the debtor's postpetition conduct) make it plain that Congress intended to limit "cause" to apply only to the debtor's postpetition conduct. That argument proves too much because it would mean that, in enacting Section 707(a), Congress intended to eliminate the court's power to dismiss cases based on prepetition events even in situations where that power was well established under prior law. Cf. Terrace Lawn Memorial Gardens, supra; Zeitinger, supra. This court declines so to hold. Rather, this court joins those courts which hold that, in appropriate circumstances, prepetition events (or some mix of prepetition and postpetition events) can constitute Section 707(a) "cause."
In her Supplemental Memorandum (Doc. I.D. No. 35), the UST argues that "[o]nce a debtor's good faith is put at issue, the debtor has the burden of establishing good faith." (Supplemental Memorandum at 3-4.)6 As explained below, the court rejects that formulation of the burden of proof on a motion to dismiss a chapter 7 case for "bad faith." Rather, the court holds that the burden of producing a prima facie case of "bad faith," as well as the ultimate risk of non-persuasion on that issue, is on the movant.
Dionne v. Simmons (In re Simmons), 200 F.3d 738, 743 (11th Cir. 2000). "Dismissal for cause cannot mean that a debtor must show an absence of cause; it can only mean that the party moving for dismissal must demonstrate cause." In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1355 (7th Cir. 1992) ( ). There is no support on the face of Section 707(a) for distinguishing "bad faith" from any other Section 707(a) "cause" for purposes of allocation of the burden of proof. Cf. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287-88 (1991) ( ). Moreover, it is only when "good faith" is an explicit statutory requirement that the burden is on the debtor with respect to that issue. See Love, supra ( ); In re Edwards, No. 03-10018, 2003 WL 22016324 (Bankr. D. Vt. Aug. 26, 2003).7 Cf. Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78 (1942) ( ). The allocation of the burden of proof with...
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