In re Horstman
| Decision Date | 16 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-09599-8-JRL.,01-09599-8-JRL. |
| Citation | 276 B.R. 80 |
| Parties | In re Christopher D. HORSTMAN and Kimberly H. Horstman, Debtors. |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
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J. Allen Murphy, New Bern, NC, for debtor.
J. RICH LEONARD, Bankruptcy Judge.
Pending before the court is the objection of the chapter 7 trustee, Algernon Butler, Jr., to Mrs. Horstman's attempt to apply her statutory "wild card" exemption to a vehicle titled in her husband's name. A hearing on the objection was held in Wilson, North Carolina on March 20, 2002. For the reasons that follow, the objection will be allowed.
The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(a), and the General Order of Reference entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina on August 3, 1984. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (B).
The debtors, Christopher and Kimberly Horstman, filed a bankruptcy petition under chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code on December 12, 2001. Pursuant to the exemption scheme outlined in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1C-1601 (1999), Mr. Horstman used his statutory automobile exemption of $1,500 and his "wild card" exemption of $3,500 to exempt $5,000 of the value of his unencumbered 1997 Jeep. The vehicle is titled in his name, and its assigned petition value is $9,225. Mrs. Horstman applied her $1,500 statutory automobile exemption to exempt the full value of her vehicle, a 1993 Ford Taurus. She also attempted to use her wild card exemption to exempt $3,500 of the remaining balance of non-exempt equity in the Jeep. The trustee objected.
The State of North Carolina opted out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1), and instead directs in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1C-1601(f) that its state exemptions apply to North Carolina residents, like the Horstmans, in bankruptcy actions. These exemptions include the following:
(2) The debtor's aggregate interest in any property, not to exceed three thousand five hundred dollars ($3,500) in value less any amount of the exemption used under subdivision (1), [and]
(3) The debtor's interest, not to exceed one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) in value, in one motor vehicle.
Id. § 1C-1601(a)(2) and (3). Subsection (2) is the "wild card" exemption. The trustee objects to Mrs. Horstman's wild card exemption on grounds that the 1997 Jeep is titled in Mr. Horstman's name and belongs to him only. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 20-72(b) (2001) (equating transfer of title
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with transfer of ownership); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 276 N.C. 620, 630, 174 S.E.2d 511, 517 (1970) (holding that "title," as used in § 20-72(b), is synonymous with "ownership"); accord State v. Morris, 103 N.C.App. 246, 251, 405 S.E.2d 351, 354 (N.C.App.1991) (same). For that reason, he argues, Mrs. Horstman does not have a property interest in the Jeep, and cannot apply her wild card exemption to it.
The court agrees, and concludes that Mrs. Horstman cannot apply her wild card exemption to property that is not part of her estate. The Jeep is titled in Mr. Horstman's name only, and also is identified as his property rather than community or jointly owned property on the debtors' own schedule of personal property. See ScheduleB — Personal Property. The Horstmans' schedule described the Taurus as Mrs. Horstman's property. Id. It seems evident to the court that for practical purposes, as well as for legal ones, the Jeep belongs to Mr. Horstman and the Taurus belongs to Mrs. Horstman.
The facts and issues presented in this case are remarkably similar to those present in In re Thorpe, 251 B.R. 723 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.2000). In Thorpe, the trustee objected to the female debtor's attempt to apply her $375 state wild card exemption toward a Harley Davidson Softtail...
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In re Tankersley
...Bob Tankersley has no property interest in the J & J Stock to claim as exempt in this bankruptcy proceeding. In re Horstman, 276 B.R. 80, 82 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2002) (holding exemptions may not be claimed in property that is not part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate).Similarly, the Court fin......
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In re Gillenwater
...debtor could not assert an exemption under North Carolina law to a motor vehicle owned by her co-debtor husband. In re Horstman, 276 B.R. 80, 82–83 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.2002). Accord, In re Cohen, 263 B.R. 724, 727 (Bankr.D.N.J.2001)(New Jersey law). 3.But see In re McCollum, 287 B.R. 750 (Bankr.......
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