In re Howard
Decision Date | 02 August 1983 |
Docket Number | Adv. No. 83-0314A.,Bankruptcy No. 82-1-1994 |
Citation | 43 BR 135 |
Parties | In re Alma Jean HOWARD, Debtor. Alma Jean HOWARD, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Maryland |
Richard Gins, Washington, D.C., for debtor.
Charles Stein, Towson, Md., Stephen Keeffe, Washington, D.C., for defendant.
Alma Jean Howard, plaintiff, filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. On April 7, 1983, she filed the instant Complaint to Set Aside Lien as Voidable Preference against the Washington Hospital Center ("Center"). Defendant responded with a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted.
Plaintiff seeks to avoid the hospital lien granted the Center under District of Columbia law for services rendered by it to her from October 3, 1981, through October 30, 1981, for injuries sustained by her in a head-on motor vehicle collision. She was billed $35,375.96 for her treatment. On September 23, 1982, the Center filed a hospital lien in the District of Columbia pursuant to D.C.Code, § 38-301 (1981)1 to attach any damages or settlement proceeds she might receive as a result of the accident. On December 20, 1982, less than ninety days later, Ms. Howard filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The record does not reflect the amount of the recovery from an alleged tort-feasor.
1. Did the filing of the D.C. hospital lien constitute a preference under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)? This issue is raised by the plaintiff's contention that she is entitled to the proceeds of her personal injury suit free from the defendant's lien. Although the plaintiff claimed the proceeds exempt pursuant to MD CTS. & JUD.PROC.CODE ANN., 11-504(b)(2) (1980),2 she must next prove that the defendant's lien may be avoided. Liens which have not been avoided continue to attach to exempt property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(A) which provides in part:
2. If the defendant's lien is a preference, then there must then be a determination as to whether or not the defendant's lien is exempt from the § 547 avoidance power. This issue is raised by the defendant's contention that its lien is a statutory lien which may not be avoided under § 545, and, therefore, pursuant to § 547(c)(6), may not be avoided under § 547. This latter issue requires determination of two sub-issues: (A) If defendant's lien is a statutory lien; and (B) if so, whether or not its lien may be avoided under § 545.
For the convenience of the parties, the court will set out extracts of portions of §§ 547, 545, and 101, as the statutes will be considered in that order.
As pointed out in the case of In re Cox, 10 B.R. 268 (BC Md.1981), the debtor may avoid transfer of property to the extent the debtor could have exempted such property if such transfer was avoidable by the trustee, and the trustee does not attempt to avoid the transfer.
A reading of the Code establishes beyond doubt that the defendant's hospital lien meets the requirements for a preference under § 547(b). The creation of the hospital lien against the plaintiff's proceeds from her personal injury suit was a transfer of property of the debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) includes involuntary as well as voluntary dispositions of an interest in property in the definition of "transfer." Therefore, the hospital lien transferred an interest of the plaintiff/debtor in the proceeds to the hospital. Furthermore, under 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) "`creditor' means—(A) entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose . . . before the order for relief concerning the debtor." Clearly, the defendant's claim arose before the order for relief.
The hospital lien was a transfer for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made. The debt was incurred on or about October, 1981, when the defendant treated the plaintiff for her injuries. The hospital lien was not filed until September, 1982.
The creation of the hospital lien took place while the debtor was insolvent and within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition. Pursuant to § 547(f), ". . . the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition," and the hospital lien was filed 88 days before the filing of the plaintiff's bankruptcy petition.
Finally, the creation of the hospital lien enables the defendant to receive more than it would if the transfer had not been made. If the hospital lien were not created, the defendant would have been a general, unsecured creditor entitled to only one fund for satisfaction of its debt, that is, a pro rata share from the estate of the debtor along with all other general, unsecured creditors. The hospital lien provides the defendant with two funds for satisfaction of its debt: 1) plaintiff's proceeds from her personal injury suit, and 2) a pro rata share from the estate of the debtor.
The hospital lien herein is a statutory lien. 11 U.S.C. § 101(38) defines `statutory lien': ". . . a lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions. . . ." The legislative history for § 101(38) provides in part:
A statutory lien is only one that arises automatically, and is not based on an agreement to give a lien or on judicial action. Mechanics\', materialmen\'s, and warehousemen\'s liens are examples. Tax liens are also included in the definition of a statutory lien.3
While the legislative history does not specifically provide a hospital lien is a statutory lien, the passage quoted reflects that the examples cited are not exhaustive of types of statutory liens.
The hospital lien herein arose solely by force of D.C. Code, Title 38, § 38-301 (1981 ed.) which grants a hospital in the District of Columbia a lien upon any recovery or sum collected by a patient injured in an accident for charges incurred by such hospital for the treatment, care, and maintenance of the patient. Therefore, this hospital lien is a `statutory lien' within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(38). Under § 547(c)(6), statutory liens not avoidable under § 545 may not be avoided.
To ascertain whether this statutory lien may be avoided under § 545, one need only read the section and check each pigeon hole. Plaintiff is unable to fit this lien into any of the safe havens. Section 545(1)(A), (B), and (C) are inapplicable because the defendant's lien became effective on September 23, 1982, prior to the commencement of this bankruptcy case or any other insolvency proceeding, and no custodian has been appointed to take possession of the property in question. This hospital lien is unavoidable under § 545(1)(D) because the D.C.Code, Title 38, § 38-301 (1981 Ed.), provides for creation of the hospital lien irrespective of the debtor's insolvency. The trustee may utilize the avoidance power contained in §...
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