In Re Hurowitz, 55093.

Decision Date20 February 1935
Docket NumberNo. 55093.,55093.
Citation14 F. Supp. 71
PartiesIn re HUROWITZ.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Samuel Pearl, of Peabody, Mass., for bankrupt.

Edward Ankeles, of Peabody, Mass., for objecting creditor.

BREWSTER, District Judge.

Bankrupt's petition for a discharge having been objected to and specifications of objections having been filed, the petition was referred to a referee in bankruptcy, who heard the parties and who has reported the facts to this court.

Before the hearing, but after the petition had been referred to the referee, the objecting creditor filed an amendment by way of substituted specifications which set forth new grounds of objections wholly distinct from those originally specified.

The bankrupt moved, before the referee, that the amendment be denied and that the same be stricken from the record. Bankrupt's motions were dismissed by the referee who proceeded to take evidence offered in support of the additional grounds and found that two of the grounds specified in the amendment, but not in the original specification, were sustained.

I do not find it to be a matter of record that the referee formally allowed the motion to amend, and I am assuming that he was following the practice, which has heretofore prevailed, of receiving the amendment and sending it up with his report for approval or disapproval by the judge. It seems to be settled that the referee has no power to grant amendments to specifications of objections. Collier on Bankruptcy (13th Ed.) p. 505.

Before the amendment of April 24, 1933, to General Order in Bankruptcy 32, 11 U.S.C.A. following section 53, the prevailing authority was to the effect that amendments could not be allowed after the time fixed for filing specifications if the amendments set up new issues or new matter constituted additional or separate objections to the discharge. Collier on Bankruptcy, supra; In re Johnson (D.C.) 192 F. 356.

In the case of In re Mercur (D.C.) 116 F. 655, 657, the court stated: "The right to amend can go no further than to bring forward and make effective that which is in some shape already there."

Under the amended rules, it has been held that the court is without authority to permit a creditor opposing an application for a discharge to file his specification after the return day of the notice of the filing of the application. Lerner v. First Wis. Nat. Bank of Milwaukee, 294 U.S. 116, 55 S.Ct. 360, 79 L.Ed. 796.

In view of the rule and of the decision upon it, it would...

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5 cases
  • In re Shepherd
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Oregon
    • 31 Julio 1945
    ...Collier on Bankruptcy, 14th Ed., Section 14.07, Page 1276; In re Johnson, D.C.S.D., 192 F. 356, 27 A.B. R. 644; In re Hurowitz, D.C.Mass., 14 F. Supp. 71, 28 A.B.R.,N.S., 479; In re Gagliardi, D.C.N.Y., 36 A.B.R.,N.S., 326; Northeastern Real Estate Corporation v. Goldstein, 2 Cir., 91 F.2d ......
  • Northeastern Real Estate S. Corp. v. Goldstein, 469.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • 19 Julio 1937
    ...be amended at all (In re Karp D.C. 11 F. Supp. 129); Judge Brewster that a new objection, plainly such, is not permissible (In re Hurowitz D.C. 14 F.Supp. 71); Judge Byers allowed the name of a new creditor to be added to those alleged to have been left out of the schedules (In re Schwartz ......
  • In re De Cillis
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • 29 Marzo 1949
    ...the discharge on this unalleged specification. Northeastern Real Estate Securities Corp. v. Goldstein, 2 Cir., 91 F.2d 942; In re Hurowitz, D.C., 14 F.Supp. 71: Collier on Bankruptcy, Vol. I, p. Furthermore, a hearing with respect to an application for a discharge is restricted to the speci......
  • In re Schwartz, 29827.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • 12 Noviembre 1936
    ...This amendment perhaps expanded but did not otherwise change the issue originally tendered. In that respect, it differs from In re Hurowitz (D.C.) 14 F.Supp. 71, in the First Circuit. As General Order No. 32 is presently understood, in the light of Lerner v. First Wisconsin Nat. Bank, 294 U......
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