In re IJ Knight Realty Corporation
Decision Date | 09 June 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 27540.,27540. |
Citation | 242 F. Supp. 337 |
Parties | In the Matter of I. J. KNIGHT REALTY CORPORATION, Bankrupt. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Thomas Raeburn White, Jr., and Michael H. Malin, Philadelphia, Pa., for petitioner, The Reading Co.
Owen B. Rhoads and Samuel Marx, Philadelphia, Pa., for trustee in bankruptcy.
Drew J. T. O'Keefe, U. S. Atty., Sidney Salkin, Asst. U. S. Atty., Arnold Miller, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for the Government.
This case is before the court upon the petition of the Reading Company to review an order of the Referee in Bankruptcy, expunging a claim filed by the Reading Company asking for damages allegedly caused by the negligence of the Receiver in carrying on the business of the bankrupt (pp. 34 and 35 of Document 8). Petitioner seeks to have its claim, based on losses suffered in a fire which started on the bankrupt's property, allowed as a priority claim for administrative expenses under § 64, sub. a (1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104. Petitioner is but one of over a hundred claimants who have filed proofs, but it has been agreed that the instant case is a test case which will decide the right of all claimants to prove their claims as administrative expenses.
The CASE STATED, as filed with the Referee and signed by counsel for the Trustee and counsel for the claimant, is as follows:
There are two questions presented by the facts of the case at bar:
The claim of the Reading Company does not fall within the above-quoted language of § 64, sub. a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended to December 1962, for these reasons:
1. The claim does not fall within the language of the Act, strictly construed
Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended in 1962, provides in pertinent part as follows:
Where statutes involving priorities are in issue, a strict construction must be placed thereon and the burden falls upon those asserting the priority to establish that their claim falls within the class of those intended to be preferred. In re American Anthracite and Bituminous Coal Corp., 171 F.Supp. 377, 381-382 (S.D.N.Y.1959), aff'd. 280 F.2d 119 (2nd Cir. 1960).
Since this claim is not "an actual and necessary cost and expense of preserving the estate," there is no specific authority for paying this claim. Where no explicit authority exists in the Bankruptcy Act for allowance of expenses out of the bankrupt's estate, such an allowance is appropriate only in exceptional cases. In re Friedman, 232 F.2d 151 (2nd Cir. 1956); Guerin v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, 205 F.2d 302 (2nd Cir. 1953).
2. The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act requires that § 64, sub. a(1) may not be construed to apply to this claim.
uses specific language where it intends to prefer negligence claims and have them paid as operating expenses and, by its failure to include such language in § 62 or 64 of the Bankruptcy Act in any of the several revisions of these sections since 1933, that there is a Congressional intent not to treat such tort claims as operating expenses and not to give them a preference, § 64, sub. a(1) does not cover this claim by Reading Company:
"In proceedings under this section, and in equity receiverships of railroad corporations now or hereafter pending in any court of the United States, claims for personal injuries to employees of a railroad corporation, claims of personal representatives of deceased employees * * * brought against such railroad corporation * * * shall be preferred and paid out of the assets of such railroad corporation as operating expenses of such railroad."
Authorities have recognized generally the significance of the special provision in § 77, sub. n applying to railroads. In 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, § 77.21, at page 568, the following statement appears:
See, also, In Re Hudson & Manhattan Railroad Company, 178 F.Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y.1955); aff'd. Augus v. Stichman, 273 F.2d 707 (2nd Cir. 1960).3
In the 1952 Congressional Reports concerning the part of § 64, sub. a(1) relating to priorities to be given to administration expenses in ensuing bankruptcies, Congress made clear that administration expenses to be given priorities were those that would prevent "a breakdown of administration."4 A similar Congressional Report in 1962 accompanying the bill which adopted § 64, sub. a(1), as quoted at page 4 above, makes clear that the enumerated expenses in the section as worded in 1962 are the type of "costs and expenses of administration" contemplated.5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has emphasized that the legislative history of this section requires that these "costs and expenses" must be related to "development, preservation or distribution of the bankrupt's assets," using this language in In Re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96, 102 (3rd Cir. 1964):
(Emphasis supplied.)
Allowance of claims such as petitioner's will not "develop, preserve or distribute this estate" but in cases such as this would decimate it with $3,500,000. of claims. The undersigned agrees that the repairing of these pipes in the Fretz Building is an activity related to the preservation of the bankrupt's assets and the cost of such activity would be an expense of administration. However, damage caused by any fire resulting from the negligent...
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In re IJ Knight Realty Corp.
...District Court concluded that the claim was not entitled to priority as an administration expense under Section 64, sub. a(1).3 242 F.Supp. 337 (E.D.Pa.1965). We are of the opinion that the Order of the District Court should be affirmed. The right of a claim to priority status in a Chapter ......
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Brown v. Presbyterian Ministers Fund
...reversed, thus setting up the possibility of substantial liability of the estate to the Reading Company. See, In re I. J. Knight Realty Corporation, 242 F.Supp. 337 (E.D.Pa.1965), 370 F.2d 624 (3 Cir. Court en banc, 1967); Reading Company v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 88 S.Ct. 1759, 20 L.Ed.2d 75......
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Nosek v. Saipan Sea Ventures, Inc.
...cause. In re I.J. Knight Realty Corporation concerned a Chapter 11 reorganization of a business, not a Chapter 7 liquidation. 242 F. Supp. 337, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1965). The court expressly authorized the receiver to operate Knight Realty. Id. Likewise Thompson v. Texas Mexican Railway Company i......
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In re Good Taste, Inc.
...22 Sec. 64a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) repealed. 23 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A). 24 In re I.J. Knight Realty Corp., 242 F.Supp. 337 (E.D.Pa.1965). 25 In re I.J. Knight Realty Corp., 370 F.2d 624 (3rd Cir. 1967). 26 Reading Company v. Brown, 391 U.S. at 479, 88 S.Ct. 1759......