In re Improvement of Rockwood Blvd., 23779.

• Citation: 170 Wash. 64,15 P.2d 652
• Decision Date: 25 October 1932
• Docket Number: 23779.
• Parties: In re IMPROVEMENT OF ROCKWOOD BOULEVARD, etc. v. CITY OF SPOKANE. SPERRY et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

15 P.2d 652

170 Wash. 64

In re IMPROVEMENT OF ROCKWOOD BOULEVARD, etc.

SPERRY et al. v. CITY OF SPOKANE.

No. 23779.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 25, 1932

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Joseph B. Lindsley Judge.

Proceedings by the City of Spokane for the improvement of Rockwood Boulevard and other streets, in which A. H. Sperry and others, property owners, filed objections to the assessment roll. The assessment roll was confirmed, and the interested property owners appealed to the superior court, where judgment was rendered against the City, and the City appeals.

Affirmed without prejudice to proceedings for reassessment.

J. M Geraghty and Alex. M. Winston, both of Spokane, for appellant.

Kimball & Blake, of Spokane, for respondents.

HOLCOMB J.

In 1928 the city council of Spokane, upon petition of the requisite number of property owners affected, created a local improvement district for the purpose of installing and maintaining water pipes throughout the district and watering and improving parking spaces between the sidewalk and the curb in front of many pieces of property, as well as central parking strips located within the street lines of several of the streets. This district was to be so maintained for a period of three years. It extended from Seventeenth avenue on the north to Twenty-Seventh avenue on the south, being about ten blocks in length, some of which blocks were of very great length and extended one irregular block on each side of Rockwood boulevard and Garfield road, and another short poublic way called Upper Terrace road in the northern and of the district. As shown by the map in the record, the streets and highways in the improvement district do not run in regular lines, but are curved and of different widths, which is also true of the lots and blocks of land in the district.

Upon the expiration of the three-year period under the ordinance originally establishing the improvement district, the city council, without any petition on behalf of the property owners affected, by a resolution initiated by itself attempted to establish a local improvement district to continue the service originally inaugurated and installed, for five years. When the assessment roll for this improvement under the new ordinance was prepared, objections were filed by property owners to the confirmation thereof. These objections were overruled by the city council and the assessment roll was confirmed by ordinance.

From the confirmation of the assessment roll a number of interested property holders appealed to the superior court. The grounds of the appeal were numerous, but so far as is material here the only questions to be determined on that appeal were: First, whether the city council had jurisdiction to order the improvement; and, second, whether the assessments were legally and equitably spread.

After a trial to the court, the trial court, among other things, found: (1) That the city council was without jurisdiction to levy the assessments and to create the assessment district for the local improvement by reason of the fact that the improvement was initiated by resolution of the council, and the assessment district, contrary to the provisions of section 9365, Rem. Comp. Stat., includes a number of disconnected streets; (2) that the assessments were made and levied by the city council, as shown by the assessment roll, arbitrarily and upon a fundamentally wrong basis, in that every foot of property within the district was assessed at the same amount without regard to the area of parking in front of the lot; that in many instances, as appears from the assessment roll, a lot having an area of several thousand square feet of parking space in front of it has been assessed in the same amount as a lot having only a few hundred square feet of parking in front of it; (3) that the assessments were levied without any regard to the relative benefits sustained by the various pieces of property within the district; and (4) that the property of appellants has not been benefited to the amount assessed against such property.

Conforming to its findings the trial court granted conclusions of law and judgment in favor of appellants in that court, respondents here, to the effect that the assessments made and against their property, as particularly described in the findings, conclusions, and judgment, should be canceled, annulled, and held for naught.

On appeal, appellant stoutly insists that the city council had jurisdiction to initiate the improvement in question by resolution, citing several sections of our statutes commencing with section 8966, Rem. Comp. Stat., empowering cities and towns to order the improvement of boulevards, park drives, parkways, public squares, and places within such city or town, to be graded or regarded, or otherwise improved, and to order the planting, setting out, cultivating, maintaining, and...