In re Insull Utility Investments
Citation | 6 F. Supp. 653 |
Decision Date | 22 December 1933 |
Docket Number | No. 49943.,49943. |
Parties | In re INSULL UTILITY INVESTMENTS, Inc. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
White & Hawxhurst and Jacobson, Merrick, Nierman & Silbert, all of Chicago, Ill., for petitioning creditors.
Rosenthal, Hamill & Wormser, of Chicago, Ill., for trustee.
William L. Latimer, of Chicago, Ill., for bankrupt.
Samuel A. & Leonard B. Ettelson, of Chicago, Ill., for Amy B. Ettelson.
Cassels, Potter & Bentley, of Chicago, Ill., and Allen & Dalbey, of Danville, Ill., for Calvin Fentress.
The questions which are here presented grow out of the petition of Calvin Fentress for compensation for services rendered as receiver and compensation to Allen & Dalbey and Cassels, Potter & Bentley for legal services rendered.
Fentress was appointed receiver of the Insull Utility Investments, Inc. upon motion of plaintiff Cherry, who filed a suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against said company. After his appointment as receiver in the main suit brought in the Northern District of Illinois, he was appointed ancillary receiver in New York and was later appointed receiver in the bankruptcy proceedings instituted in the Northern District of Illinois against the same company. He asks for compensation for himself and for the attorneys who acted as his counsel. Although his request for compensation is for services rendered by him and his attorneys in the bankruptcy matter, the court is required, under the rule laid down in Gross v. Irving Trust Co., 289 U. S. 342, 53 S. Ct. 605, 77 L. Ed. 1243, to finally pass upon the reasonableness of the compensation allowed in the equity receivership matters and, to do so, must determine the value and the necessity of the services rendered by the receiver and his attorneys.
One Ettelson, an unsecured creditor, objects to the allowance of any fees either to the receiver or his attorneys, Allen & Dalbey, on the ground that the suits were collusively instituted to secure, through the practice of fraud on the court, the appointment of receiver and counsel who would not, and could not, adequately represent those not parties to the fraudulent agreement. No objection is made to the allowance of fees to Cassels, Potter & Bentley, who were employed some weeks after the receiver was appointed, and who are admittedly outside the scope of the alleged collusive agreement; nor is there any objection to the reasonableness of the sums sought, if the court be of the opinion that fees should be allowed.
All of the receiverships above mentioned have been terminated, and the receiver Fentress has turned over all of the assets, which he received or collected as receiver, to his successor, the trustee of the bankrupt estate of Insull Utility Investments, Inc.
The application for the appointment of a receiver of Insull Utility Investments, Inc. was made April 16, 1932. The receiver Fentress was appointed April 16, 1932. He was named ancillary receiver in New York on the 19th day of May, 1932. He was named receiver in the matter of the bankrupt estate of Insull Utility Investments, Inc. on the 22nd day of September, 1932. The trustee of the bankrupt estate was appointed March 9, 1933.
There are two specific questions which the court must determine: (a) Was there such collusion in the institution of the original suit wherein Fentress was appointed receiver, or in the ancillary proceedings wherein he was appointed ancillary receiver, or in the proceedings leading to his appointment as receiver in the bankruptcy matter, as to justify the refusal of any compensation to him and to his attorneys? (b) If not, what sum would compensate him for work performed and what sum should be allowed his counsel for services rendered?
In order that we may apply the rule, it is necessary first to ascertain what constitutes collusion. It has been frequently defined by various courts, including the Supreme Court.
In Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., 176 U. S. 181, 20 S. Ct. 311, 314, 44 L. Ed. 423, the court said:
In Re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U. S. 90, 28 S. Ct. 219, 224, 52 L. Ed. 403, the court said:
Other decisions dealing with the same subject are to be found in: Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36, 48 S. Ct. 268, 72 L. Ed. 457; Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Co., 276 U. S. 518, 48 S. Ct. 404, 72 L. Ed. 681, 57 A. L. R. 426; Street v. Maryland Central Ry. Co. (C. C.) 58 F. 47; Burton v. R. G. Peters Salt & Lumber Co. (C. C.) 190 F. 262; May Hosiery Mills, Inc., v. F. & W. Grand 5-10-25 Cent Stores, Inc. (D. C.) 59 F.(2d) 218; Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U. S. 209, 26 L. Ed. 719; Lake County Commissioners v. Dudley, 173 U. S. 243, 19 S. Ct. 398, 43 L. Ed. 684.
A general statement of what constitutes collusion appears in Corpus Juris, volume 11, page 1220, section 2, from which the following quotation is taken:
A few illustrations of collusion which clearly fall within the condemnation of the courts may be helpfully stated.
A sues B on a debt when there is no debt, and B by his answer admits the indebtedness pursuant to an agreement between A and B to defraud other creditors of B. Here we have a clear case of collusion. Again, A is indebted to B in a sum less than $3,000 and through agreement with B raises the sum to an amount in excess of $3,000 so that the jurisdiction of the Federal court may be invoked; and B, in his answer, admits indebtedness in excess of $3,000. Here we have...
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