In re Int. of: L.S.D.R.-C.
| Docket Number | 357 MDA 2023 |
| Decision Date | 01 August 2023 |
| Parties | IN THE INT. OF: L.S.D.R.-C., A MINOR APPEAL OF: R.S.R., FATHER |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
Appeal from the Decree Entered January 26, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans' Court at No(s) A-9378.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Christopher Harrison, Esquire, Children & Youth Services of Luzerne County.
Thomas W. Sharkey, Esquire Counsel for Father.
Joseph J. Mashinski, Esquire Guardian Ad Litem.
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI J.[*]
R.S.R. (Father) appeals from the order granting the petition filed by the Luzerne County Children and Youth Services (CYS) to involuntarily terminate Father's parental rights to L.S.D.R.-C. (Child). We affirm.
We adopt the orphans' court's summary of the facts in this case. See Orphans' Ct. Op., 3/28/23, at 1-11, 14-16. Briefly, Child was born in August of 2021. At the hospital on August 13, 2021, Father dropped Child during an argument with N.M.C. (Mother). That same day, a shelter care hearing was held and the Child was placed with CYS. Following a dependency hearing, Child was adjudicated dependent on August 25, 2021. At that time, the dependency court ordered Father to participate in parenting education and to obtain and maintain safe and stable housing. Father subsequently relocated to New Jersey and did not participate in any parenting classes.
Father returned to Luzerne County around May of 2022. After a May 10, 2022 permanency review hearing, the dependency court ordered Father to participate in mental health services and drug and alcohol services. Father made appointments with organizations in Luzerne County that provide mental health and drug and alcohol services, but Father did not begin any treatment. Father again relocated to New Jersey and did not obtain any court-ordered treatment in New Jersey. Father had approximately five supervised visits with Child, and he has not seen Child since June 6, 2022. Child has been placed with the same foster parents for almost her entire life and the foster parents intend to adopt Child.
CYS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights on September 6, 2022. The orphans' court held a termination hearing on January 23, 2023. Father appeared at the hearing with counsel.[1] Child was represented by Joseph Mashinski, Esq. who served both as Child's guardian ad litem (GAL) and as Child's legal counsel.[2] On January 26, 2023, the orphans' court issued a decree concluding that CYS had presented clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of Father's parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938. Decree, 1/26/23.
Father subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Father and the orphans' court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Father raises the following issue:
Whether the [orphans'] court abused its discretion, committed an error of law and/or there was insufficient, evidentiary support for its finding that [Father's] parental rights should be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. Section 2511(a)(2), (5) and (8)?
Father's Brief at 4 (unpaginated) (formatting altered).[3]
Father challenges the orphans' court's decree involuntarily terminating his parental rights. Id. at 9 (unpaginated). Father argues that the orphans' court erred in concluding that the conditions that led to the removal or placement of Child continued to exist because CYS did not present evidence establishing that "any specific concerns which would support continued placement or necessity of services." Id. Father contends that "the record does not contain sufficient evidence to determine what the concerns and/or reasons for placement were other than an isolated argument that occurred at the hospital . . . ." Id. Father asserts that multiple witnesses testified to "receiving referrals [for Father to be evaluated for services] but not one testified to what the concerns were that necessitated the referrals[,]" and that Jaime Stuart, the CYS caseworker, testified to "[Father's] failure to complete services but not to any current concerns that would necessitate continued placement [of Child]." Id.
Initially, before addressing the merits of this issue, we must determine whether Father has adequately developed his claim for review. This Court may raise this issue of waiver sua sponte. See Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 939 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. Super. 2007). "The issue of waiver presents a question of law, and, as such, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary." Trigg v. Children's Hosp. of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 229 A.3d 260, 269 (Pa. 2020) (citation omitted).
"It is well-settled that this Court will not review a claim unless it is developed in the argument section of an appellant's brief, and supported by citations to relevant authority." In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (). "Where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived." M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at 465-66 (citation omitted and formatting altered).
Here, Father baldly asserts that CYS did not present any evidence establishing why Father was referred to services for mental health, drug and alcohol, or parenting education. Additionally, Father cites generally to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and case law discussing the standard for termination of parental rights. See Father's Brief at 5-6 (unpaginated). However, Father does not discuss the requirements for termination of parental rights under subsections 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8); Father also has not cited any case law interpreting those subsections. Because Father has failed to provide any support or relevant authority supporting his sole claim of error, we conclude that he has waived that claim. See M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at 465-66.
Further, to the extent that Father challenges the adjudication of dependency and the orders directing Father to obtain services for parenting education, mental health, and drug and alcohol to remedy the conditions that led to Child's placement, we note that Father did not raise those claims before the orphans' court. Therefore, those claims are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (); see also Interest of N.N., 1631 EDA 2022, 2023 WL 2379250, at *2 (Pa. Super. filed Mar. 7, 2023) (unpublished mem.) (concluding that the father waived his claims that his plan objectives were irrelevant to his ability to parent the child where he did not raise that argument before the orphans' court).[4] Additionally because Father has only appealed from the decree terminating his parental rights, he cannot challenge any of the prior dependency orders. See Interest of H.B., Nos. 1726 MDA 2019, 1727 MDA 2019, 1728 MDA 2019, 1729 MDA 2019, 2020 WL 2554613, at *9 (Pa. Super. filed May 20, 2020) (unpublished mem.) (concluding that in an appeal from a decree terminating the father's parental rights, the father waived any arguments related to the adjudication of dependency because the father did not appeal adjudication of dependency).
However, even if we did not find waiver, Father would not be entitled to relief on the merits.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (). "[T]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence." In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
The burden is on the petitioner, instantly, CYS, "to prove by clear and convincing evidence that [the] asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid." In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). This Court has explained that "[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the...
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