In re Integration of the Bar

• Decision Date: 18 December 1946
• Citation: 25 N.W.2d 500,249 Wis. 523
• Parties: In re INTEGRATION OF THE BAR.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

249 Wis. 523

25 N.W.2d 500

In re INTEGRATION OF THE BAR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Dec. 18, 1946.

Upon the motion of Quincy H. Hale, President of the State Bar Association of Wisconsin, requesting that the court proceed with the matter of the integration of the bar, an order was entered on the 15th day of April, 1946, designating the 5th day of June, 1946, as the time when the court would hear interested persons as to when the matter should be heard upon the merits and to prescribe a method of procedure.

The matter having been brought on for a hearing on June 5th, and the court having heard Messrs. William B. Rubin, of Milwaukee, William H. Spohn, of Madison, Daniel H. Grady, of Portage, J. Henry Bennett, of Virogua, Quincy H. Hale, of La Crosse, and Ronold Drechsler, of Milwaukee, it was ordered that the court would on the 9th day of September, 1946, at ten o'clock in the forenoon, hear oral arguments and receive briefs from all persons interested upon certain designated subjects set forth in the following opinion of the court.

It was further ordered that notice of the time and place of the hearing be given by publication thereof in the official state paper.

On September 9, 1946, in response to the invitation extended in the order, briefs were filed as follows, for integration: W. T. Doar, of New Richmond, Ronold A. Drechsler, of Milwaukee, Quincy H. Hale, of La Crosse, Marcus A. Jacobson, of Waukesha, Robert D. Jones, of Milwaukee, Walter F. Kaye, of Rhinelander, George Y. King of Eau Claire, Robert B. L. Murphy, of Madison, Samuel P. Myers, of Racine, Otto A. Oestreich, of Janesville, Andrew W. Parnell, of Appelton, Robert M. Rieser, of Madison, Edmund B. Shea, of Milwaukee, John S. Sprowls, of Superior, and Van B. Wake, of Milwaukee, on behalf of the State Bar Association of Wisconsin; David Keyser, Chairman of the Junior Bar Association of Milwaukee County Committee for Integration.

Opposed to integration: Daniel H. Grady, of Portage, William B. Rubin, of Milwaukee, William H. Spohn, of Madison, J. G. Hardgrove, of Milwaukee, G. M. Sheldon, of Tomahawk, Samuil Nissenbaum, of Milwaukee, and Vernon County Bar Association, J. Henry Bennett, Secretary, of Viroqua.

The matter was argued orally for integration by John S. Sprowls, President of the State Bar Association, of Superior, Edmund B. Shea, of Milwaukee, Quincy H. Hale, of La Crosse, Robert B. L. Murphy, of Madison, Robert Jones, President of the Milwaukee Junior Bar Association, Otto A. Oestreich, of Janesville, Marcus A. Jacobson, of Waukesha, David Keyser, Chairman, Junior Bar Association of Milwaukee County Committee on Integration, Ronold A. Drechsler, of Milwaukee. Opposed to integration by Daniel H. Grady, of Portage, William Ryan, of Madison, William B. Rubin, of Milwaukee, William H. Spohn, of Madison, Samuil Nissenbaum, of Milwaukee, and by William H. Markham, of Horicon, as amicus curiae.

PER CURIAM.

The matter of the Integration of the Bar of Wisconsin pursuant to Ch. 315, Laws of 1943, and the opinion of the court in Re Integration of the Bar, 244 Wis. 8, 11 N.W.2d 604,12 N.W.2d 699,151 A.L.R. 586, on motion of Messrs. Quincy H. Hale and John S. Sprowls, next previous and current presidents, respectively, of the existing voluntary Wisconsin State Bar Association and others particularly mentioned in the statement preceding this opinion is before the court. The questions referred to in the statement preceding this opinion on which the court invited briefs and argument by members of the bar are here particularly set forth:

1. Should the bar of the State of Wisconsin be integrated?

2. Is Ch. 315, Laws of 1943, invalid by reason of the provisions contained therein that membership in the Association to be known as the ‘State Bar of Wisconsin,’ should be a condition precedent to the right of one admitted to the bar to practice law in the state of Wisconsin?

3. May the court by an order of integration validly impose the payment of a reasonable fee annually as a condition of membership in the Association to be organized and known as the State Bar of Wisconsin?

4. Is the admission of a lawyer to the practice of the law a final judgment which cannot be impaired or its benefits withdrawn except for loss of character or incompetency?

5. Should a master or referee or a panel of lawyers or jurists be appointed to take testimony on the merits of the proposal to integrate the members of the bar of the State of Wisconsin and to make findings based on the evidence received and submit the same to this court with recommendations?

6. Assuming solely for the purpose of consideration of the matter that an order of integration will be entered--

(a) Are any of the provisions of the proposed order invalid?

(b) Do the provisions of the proposed order

(1) Present a workable plan?

(2) Promote the best interests of the profession and the public interest and aid in the efficient administration of justice?

7. If any provision of the proposed order is considered objectionable, please state reasons and propose a substitute.

Assuming, but not deciding, that questions 2 and 4 should be answered ‘No’ and that the court for reasons which in its judgment are sufficient may integrate the bar, we hold that question 1 should be answered ‘No’ for the reasons hereinafter stated.

As to question 5 we will only say that we perceive no occasion to take testimony and report as to the advisability of integration. It could hardly result in more than obtaining the opinion of the individual members of the bar and of the public and a report upon the comparative numbers of those desiring and those opposing integration. We are informed from the briefs and arguments presented at the hearing of the motion, that individual opinions are contradictory and it is not material which opinion predominates or how much. The responsibility for deciding the motion is ours. Assuming that integration would be constitutional, decision for it must rest on whether in our judgment it would be in the public interest.

Questions 1 and 3 are closely related. In the original opinion we expressly reserved the question whether this court could require members of the bar to pay dues in support of an integrated bar. A consideration of this question is necessarily inseparable from a consideration of the question whether the court should integrate the bar, because the fees are the life blood of the integrated bar and to integrate the bar without fees would be useless. Such cases as we have examined, passing upon this point, hold that the court may require payment of dues. A. C. Brydonjack v. State Bar of California, 208 Cal. 439, 281 P. 1018, 66 A.L.R. 1507;In re Gibson, 35 N.M. 550, 4 P.2d 643, 645;State Bar of Oklahoma v. McGhee, 148 Okl. 219, 298 P. 580, 587;Kelley v. State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okl. 282, 298 P. 623;Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N.W.2d 515;In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291. All of them very briefly justify...