In re Intel Corp. CPU Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., Case No. 3:18-md-2828-SI

CourtUnited States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Oregon)
Writing for the CourtMichael H. Simon, District Judge.
Citation582 F.Supp.3d 771
Docket NumberCase No. 3:18-md-2828-SI
Decision Date26 January 2022

582 F.Supp.3d 771


This Document Relates to All Actions.

Case No. 3:18-md-2828-SI

United States District Court, D. Oregon.

Signed January 26, 2022

582 F.Supp.3d 776

Christopher A. Seeger, Seeger Weiss llp, 55 Challenger Road, Ridgefield Park, NJ 07660; Rosemary M. Rivas, Gibbs Law Group llp, 505 14th Street, Suite 1110, Oakland, CA 94612; Steve D. Larson and Jennifer S. Wagner, Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter pc, 209 SW Oak Street, Suite 500, Portland, OR 97204; Gayle M. Blatt, Casey Gerry Schenk Francavilla Blatt & Penfield llp, 110 Laurel Street, San Diego, CA 92101; Stuart A. Davidson, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd llp, 120 East Palmetto Park Road, Suite 500 Boca Raton, FL 33432; Melissa R. Emert, Stull, Stull, & Brody, 6 East 45th Street, New York City, NY 10017; Richard M. Hagstrom, Hellmuth & Johnson pllc, 8050 West 78th Street, Edina, MN 55439; Jennifer L. Joost, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check llp, One Sansome Street, Suite 1850, San Francisco, CA 94104; Adam J. Levitt, Dicello Levitt Gutzler, Ten North Dearborn Street, 11th Floor, Chicago, IL 60602; and Charles E. Schaffer, Levin Sedran & Berman llp, 510 Walnut Street, Suite 500, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Of Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

Daniel F. Katz, David S. Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, David Krinsky, and Samuel Bryant Davidoff, Williams & Connolly llp, 725 Twelfth Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20005; and Steven T. Lovett and Rachel C. Lee, Stoel Rives llp, 760 SW Ninth Avenue, Suite 3000, Portland, OR 97205. Of Attorneys for Defendant.


Michael H. Simon, District Judge.

In this multidistrict proceeding, Plaintiffs bring a putative nationwide class action

582 F.Supp.3d 777

against Defendant Intel Corporation (Intel) relating to certain security vulnerabilities in Intel's microprocessors. Plaintiffs allege that Intel knew for decades about alleged design defects in its microprocessors that created security vulnerabilities and that Intel failed to disclose or mitigate these vulnerabilities. Plaintiffs also allege that the ways in which these security vulnerabilities could be exploited became publicly known beginning in January 2018, with new ways continuing to be discovered and publicized. These forms of exploit have become generally known as "Spectre," "Meltdown," "Foreshadow," "ZombieLoad," "SwapGS," "RIDL," "LazyFP," "CacheOut," and "Vector Register Sampling," among others. Plaintiffs contend that until Intel fixes the alleged defects at the hardware level, additional ways to exploit these security vulnerabilities will likely continue to be discovered.

Plaintiffs allege that Intel's processors have two primary design defects. First, the design of the processors heightens the risk of unauthorized access to protected memory secrets. Second, the design does not completely delete, or undo, the memory's recent retrieval of those secrets, also increasing the risk of unauthorized access. Plaintiffs contend that these design defects create security vulnerabilities that could lead to a breach of confidential data. Plaintiffs also allege that Intel cannot fix these defects after-the-fact, and that the software patches created or distributed by Intel to mitigate these defects substantially diminish the speed of Intel's processors.

Intel has twice previously moved to dismiss this action. The Court granted the first motion with leave to amend. See In re Intel Corp. CPU Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig. (Intel I ), 2020 WL 1495304 (D. Or. Mar. 27, 2020). Plaintiffs then filed an Amended Consolidated Class Action Allegation Complaint (Amended Complaint). That complaint asserted the following nationwide class claims: (1) fraud by concealment or omission; (2) breach of California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et seq. ; (3) breach of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. ; (4) breach of California's False Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et seq. ; and (5) unjust enrichment, or quasi-contract. Plaintiffs also asserted separate state subclass claims for each state except California, Kentucky, and Massachusetts, plus the District of Columbia, under each jurisdiction's deceptive or unfair trade practices act or consumer protection law. Plaintiffs sought both money damages and injunctive relief.

The Court granted Intel's second motion to dismiss. See In re Intel Corp. CPU Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig. (Intel II ), 2021 WL 1198299 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 2021). The Court gave Plaintiffs leave to amend their nationwide claim under California's UCL alleging unfair conduct, their nationwide claim for unjust enrichment, and their state subclass claims. The Court dismissed all other claims with prejudice.

Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Allegation Complaint (Second Amended Complaint). It asserts the two nationwide claims for which the Court granted leave to replead—breach of California's UCL for unfair conduct and unjust enrichment. It also alleges the same states’ subclass claims under each jurisdiction's deceptive or unfair trade practices act or consumer protection law. Intel moves to dismiss, with prejudice, all of Plaintiffs’ claims.

Against the Second Amended Complaint, Intel challenges Plaintiffs’ nationwide class claims, which Intel argues under

582 F.Supp.3d 778

California law.1 Intel argues that Plaintiffs’ unfair conduct claim is coextensive with Plaintiffs’ fraud claim under the UCL and thus should be dismissed, and that Plaintiffs fail to allege a material omission or otherwise allege how Intel's conduct was unfair under the UCL. Intel also argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for unjust enrichment. Intel further argues that Plaintiffs may not pursue these equitable claims because Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law. Finally, Intel challenges Plaintiffs’ state subclass claims. Intel argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for any of the six bellwether state counts that the parties agreed to litigate in the pending motion.2 For the reasons explained below, the Court grants in part Intel's motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, dismissing with prejudice all claims based on Intel's alleged conduct before September 1, 2017. The Court denies Intel's motion for Plaintiffs who purchased devices with Intel processors after September 1, 2017.


A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted only when there is no cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc. , 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co. , 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) ; Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n , 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). To be entitled to a presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint "may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr v. Baca , 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The court must draw all reasonable inferences from the factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff. Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Off. Sol. , 513 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). The court need not, however, credit the plaintiff's legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

A complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to "plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation." Starr , 652 F.3d at 1216. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."

582 F.Supp.3d 779

Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell , 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted).


A. General Background

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is 487 pages long and contains 1,699 separately numbered paragraphs.3 The Second Amended Complaint contains much technical detail on the many so-called exploits (or ways in which the security vulnerabilities can be exploited) that have been discovered and become publicly known during the past four years. The Second Amended Complaint explains how these security...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Park v. Haw. Med. Serv. Ass'n, CIV. NO. 21-00039 JMS-WRP
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Hawaii)
    • January 27, 2022 allegations concerning competitive harm, and for that reason, Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their unfair-competition claim.7 582 F.Supp.3d 771 Accordingly, HMSA's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings against the unfair-competition claim in Count VIII of the FAC is GRANTED. T......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT