In re Interest of Z.N., No. 19-0590

• Court: Supreme Court of Texas
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: 602 S.W.3d 541
• Docket Number: No. 19-0590
• Decision Date: 15 May 2020
• Parties: In the INTEREST OF Z.N., a Child

602 S.W.3d 541

In the INTEREST OF Z.N., a Child

No. 19-0590

Supreme Court of Texas.

OPINION DELIVERED: May 15, 2020

Dale A. Rabe Jr., for Respondent V.C.

Dallas E. McKibben, Amarillo, for Respondent S.N.

Dianna Lee McCoy, for Other Interested Party Z.N.

Leslie J. Capace, Melinda Ann Powell, for Petitioner Texas Department of Family and Protective Services.

Joel Ben Jackson, for Real Party in Interest Billy Sims.

Jeffrey Todd Henderson, for Real Party in Interest Edith Sims.

PER CURIAM

Under section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code, a trial court may terminate a parent's rights to a child if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest and that one or more statutory predicate grounds have been satisfied. One of those grounds is that the parent has been convicted "for being criminally responsible for the death or serious injury of a child under" one of several sections of the Texas Penal Code, including section 21.11 (indecency with a child). TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(L). We are asked to determine whether a conviction for indecency with a child, by itself, can support an inference that the child has suffered serious injury as a result of the offense and can thus constitute legally sufficient evidence supporting a finding under predicate ground (L). The court of appeals concluded that such a conviction could not do so. We disagree. Because we hold that a conviction for indecency with a child can support a reasonable inference of serious injury to the child, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment in part and remand to that court for further proceedings.

Z.N. was born on March 8, 2008. Approximately five months before Z.N. was born, Z.N.'s father, S.N. (Father), committed

602 S.W.3d 544

acts of indecency with three children. The victims were four-, ten-, and eleven-years old on the date of the offenses. Father was indicted on three counts of indecency with a child pursuant to section 21.11(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code. All three indictments accused Father of the same crime with each child, stating that the defendant:

did then and there, with intent to arouse and gratify the sexual desire of the defendant, intentionally and knowingly engage in sexual contact with [Child], by touching the genitals of [Child], a child younger than 17 years of age and not the spouse of the defendant.

On December 19, 2008, Father was convicted of all three counts of indecency with a child. Each offense constituted a second-degree felony, and Father was sentenced to ten years for each conviction, to be served concurrently.

On July 10, 2017, while Father was still incarcerated, the Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition to terminate his parental rights to Z.N.¹ Father's prison sentence ended approximately two months before the termination trial.

Father did not personally appear at trial but was represented by counsel. During the trial, the Department introduced into evidence the indictments and judgments from Father's three convictions. Additionally, the Department presented testimony from Z.N.'s caseworker, who stated that the Department had "concerns with placing" Z.N. with Father because of Father's "previous convictions." On cross-examination, Father's counsel asked the caseworker, "Besides what's contained in the indictment, and in the judgment, do you know anything about the ... circumstances of [Father's] offenses themselves?" The caseworker replied, "No." Father's counsel then asked, "So you don't know any of the details?" The caseworker replied, "No, ma'am." No other evidence was presented by either party at trial regarding Father's convictions or the actions underlying those convictions.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights based on section 161.001(b)(1)(L) of the Texas Family Code, finding specifically that Father committed acts that would constitute a violation of section 21.11 of the Penal Code (indecency with a child).² The trial court also found that termination was in Z.N.'s best interest.

Father appealed, asserting that the trial court's finding as to predicate ground (L) was not supported by legally or factually sufficient evidence. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the evidence "was legally insufficient to allow the factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that [Father] caused at least one of his victims to suffer serious injury as required by" section 161.001(b)(1)(L). 579 S.W.3d 140, 151 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019).³ The court emphasized that, although the factfinder is permitted to draw reasonable inferences

602 S.W.3d 545

from the evidence, the Department failed to prove "serious injury merely by proving a conviction for indecency with a child." Id. at 150. Because the Department relied only on those convictions, the court of appeals concluded that "the Department here produced no evidence of injury, physical or emotional, sustained by any of the three victims of [Father's] criminally indecent acts." Id.

The Department filed a petition for review. In its sole issue, the Department contends that the court of appeals erred in its analysis regarding section 161.001(b)(1)(L).

Termination of a parent's rights to a child requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). Under the Family Code, " ‘[c]lear and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." Id. § 101.007. "This heightened standard of review is mandated not only by the Family Code ... but also the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution." In re E.N.C. , 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012). In accordance with this heightened standard, we "strictly construe involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent." Id. ; see also In re E.R. , 385 S.W.3d 552, 563 (Tex. 2012) ; Holick v. Smith , 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985).

We have further held that the heightened burden of proof in parental termination cases gives rise to a concomitantly heightened standard of appellate review. In re N.G. , 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019). Under the legal sufficiency standard of review for a finding based on clear and convincing evidence, "a court should look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true." In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). Although "the trier of fact may draw inferences," those inferences must be "reasonable and logical ones." In re E.N.C. , 384 S.W.3d at 804. Under this standard of review, "looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so." In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d at 266. To that end, a reviewing court "should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible." Id. Of course, that "does not mean that a court must disregard all evidence that does not support the finding," as doing so "could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing evidence." Id. If, after conducting this review, an appellate court "determines that no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, then that court must conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient." Id.

Under the Family Code, "[f]or a trial court to terminate a parent's right to his [child], the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence both that: (1) the parent committed an act prohibited...