In re Interest of J.M.
| Decision Date | 13 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 262 EDA 2019,No. 260 EDA 2019,No. 264 EDA 2019,260 EDA 2019,262 EDA 2019,264 EDA 2019 |
| Citation | 219 A.3d 645 |
| Parties | In the INTEREST OF: J.M., a Minor Appeal of: L.M.-M., Mother In the Interest of: D.M., a Minor Appeal of: L.M.-M., Mother In the Interest of: A.M., a Minor Appeal of: L.M.-M., Mother |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Sean E. Cullen, Norristown, for appellant.
Lisa K. Brown, Norristown, Guardian Ad Litem, and Melissa S. Hensinger, King of Prussia, Guardian Ad Litem, for appellees.
Alisa R. Levine Barbash, Norristown, for Montgomery County Children and Youth, participating party.
L.M.-M. (Mother) appeals from the December 27, 2018 orders the juvenile court entered in the dependency matters of Mother's minor children: J.M., A.M., and D.M. (collectively, Children; born in July 2003, April 2002, and February 2001, respectively).1 Mother's counsel has filed a petition to withdraw and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago , 602 Pa. 159, 978 A.2d 349 (2009). Because the December 27, 2018 orders are not appealable orders, we quash Mother's appeals and deny counsel's petition as moot.
We provide an overview of the procedural history only, as the substantive factual history is not relevant to our determination. On June 20, 2017, Children were adjudicated dependent pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1) and (6) of the Juvenile Act. Initially, Mother retained legal and physical custody of Children. On December 13, 2017, the juvenile court removed Children from Mother's care and transferred legal and physical custody to the Montgomery County Office of Children and Youth (the Agency).2 The juvenile court set Children's permanency goal as reunification. In furtherance of that goal, the juvenile court permitted Mother to visit with Children at their placements and occasionally at her home.
On December 27, 2018, the case was scheduled for a permanency review hearing before the juvenile court. There were also two pending motions: one filed by the Agency to modify J.M.'s placement from Bethany Children's Home Residential Program to George Junior Republic and two filed by Mother, which sought return of Children and a home pass during Children's holiday break. Because there was not sufficient time to hear all of the Agency's evidence, the juvenile court continued the hearing to another date. The parties agreed that in the meantime, Children could visit Mother in her home for several days around the New Year holiday, provided that Mother and Children all submitted to a drug screen and tested negative for any illegal substances. N.T., 12/27/2018, at 2-4 ().
After an off-the-record sidebar discussion, the juvenile court announced that Mother and two Children tested positive for THC. Id. at 5. The juvenile court ruled that home passes would only be permitted if all four screens were negative. Id. at 5. The juvenile court judge then informed the parties that Id. at 7. The juvenile court continued the permanency review hearing for approximately one month to January 23, 2019. Id. Following the hearing, the juvenile court entered a written order prohibiting visits at Mother's home if Mother or Children tested positive for drugs. Order, 12/27/2018, at 1 ().
It is from this order that Mother appeals. Both Mother and the juvenile court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. In this Court, Appellant's counsel filed both an Anders brief and a petition to withdraw as counsel. In the Anders brief, the issue of arguable merit set forth by counsel is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by conditioning home passes for Children on a negative drug screen by Appellant. Anders Brief at 6.
Before we may address counsel's petition to withdraw and any substantive issues, we must determine whether the orders from which Mother appealed are appealable, because appealability implicates our jurisdiction.3 In Interest of N.M. , 186 A.3d 998, 1006 (Pa. Super. 2018) (). "Jurisdiction is purely a question of law; the appellate standard of review is de novo and the scope of review plenary." Barak v. Karolizki , 196 A.3d 208, 215 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
In order to be appealable, the order must be: (1) a final order, Pa.R.A.P. 341 - 42 ; (2) an interlocutory order appealable by right or permission, 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(a) - (b) ; Pa.R.A.P. 311 - 12 ;4 or (3) a collateral order, Pa.R.A.P. 313.
We begin our analysis with the first category: final orders. "Pennsylvania's Rules of Appellate Procedure place great importance on the concept of ‘final orders’ to establish jurisdiction to hear an appeal." Commonwealth v. Culsoir , 209 A.3d 433, 435 (Pa. Super. 2019). The purpose of the rule regarding final orders is to avoid "piecemeal appeals" and "protracted litigation." Commonwealth v. Bowers , 185 A.3d 358, 362 (Pa. Super. 2018). It "maintains distinctions between trial and appellate review, respects the traditional role of the trial judge, and promotes formality, completeness, and efficiency." Shearer v. Hafer , 644 Pa. 571, 177 A.3d 850, 855-56 (2018). It also represents a determination that "the cost of a wrong decision by a trial judge is typically outweighed by either the benefit of uninterrupted trial proceedings or the assurance that the issue is adequately reviewable through alternatives to an immediate appeal." Id. (citing Michael E. Harriss, Rebutting the Roberts Court: Reinventing the Collateral Order Doctrine Through Judicial Decision-Making , 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 721, 725 (2014) ).
Generally, a final order is any order that disposes of all claims and all parties. Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). Based upon the two-step procedure contemplated by the Juvenile Act for declaring a child dependent (i.e. , an adjudication followed by a disposition, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c) ), this Court has held that it is the dispositional order following a dependency adjudication that is a final appealable order. In Interest of C.A.M. , 264 Pa.Super. 300, 399 A.2d 786 (1979).
Unlike other types of cases, dependency matters do not end following a child's disposition. See In re Tameka M. , 368 Pa.Super. 525, 534 A.2d 782, 784 (1987) (en banc ) (), aff'd , 525 Pa. 348, 580 A.2d 750, 752 (1990) (). The juvenile court is statutorily required to review the case periodically5 and issue orders relating to a variety of issues.6 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(e)(3), (f) - (g). The purpose of the periodic review hearings is to "determin[e] or review[ ] the permanency plan of the child, the date by which the goal of permanency for the child might be achieved[,] and whether placement continues to be best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child." 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(e)(1). In many cases, it may be months or years after the dependency disposition before the Juvenile Court has occasion to enter an order that truly disposes of all claims and all parties, such as by return to parents and the cessation of dependency, termination of parental rights and adoption of the child, transfer of custody to family or kin, or a child's aging out of the system.
Therefore, due to dependency's unique nature, the fact that further proceedings are contemplated is not dispositive of the finality of the order. In the Interest of J.L. , 216 A.3d 233, 2019 WL 3295100, at 3 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2019). In the dependency context, the court "must examine the practical consequences of the order to determine if the party challenging it has effectively been put out of court." In re Interest of M.B. , 388 Pa.Super. 381, 565 A.2d 804, 806 (1989). Thus, "this court acknowledges certain crucial points of finality when review is appropriate despite the fact that such determinations may later be modified by the trial court after further statutorily[-]mandated review hearings are held." Id. at 808. Specifically, our Supreme Court has held that an "order granting or denying a status change, as well as an order terminating or preserving parental rights,[7 ] shall be deemed final when entered." In re H.S.W.C.-B. , 575 Pa. 473, 836 A.2d 908, 911 (2003). This helps ensure that orders that improperly prolong the status quo and harm children's needs and welfare are not shielded from independent review permanently. Id.
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