In re Interest of M.W.
| Citation | 194 A.3d 1094 |
| Decision Date | 27 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 1784 EDA 2017,1784 EDA 2017 |
| Parties | IN the INTEREST OF: M.W., a Minor Appeal of: M.W. |
| Court | Superior Court of Pennsylvania |
Karl Baker, Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Lawrence J. Goode, Assistant District Attorney, Alison J. Guest, Assistant District Attorney, and Benjamin J. Halle, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
STEVENS, P.J.E.
Appellant M.W. appeals from the dispositional order entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division. Appellant asserts that the lower court erred in denying his suppression motion. After careful review, we affirm.
On April 5, 2017, at approximately 1:40 p.m., Philadelphia Police Officer Thomas Seymour and his partner, Officer Harris, were on patrol in the 14th District when they observed a 2004 Chevrolet Impala drive through a stop sign at the intersection of Walnut Lane and McCallum Street. The driver continued to travel above the posted speed limit on Walnut Lane and made a quick turn onto Green Street. After the officers followed the vehicle and were unable to search the license number, the officers initiated a traffic stop.
Once Officer Seymour and Officer Harris exited the patrol car, Officer Seymour approached the driver's side of the vehicle with his hand on his weapon and Officer Harris approached the passenger side with her weapon drawn. The driver of the vehicle, seventeen-year old Appellant, complied with the officers' direction to stick his hands out of the window. The officers described Appellant as being cooperative with their requests.
Upon further investigation, Appellant admitted he did not have a driver's license and did not produce registration for the vehicle. Thereafter, the officers asked Appellant to exit the vehicle and patted him down; the frisk did not reveal any weapons. While Officer Harris searched the vehicle's information on the computer database, Officer Seymour restrained Appellant in handcuffs and placed him in the back of the patrol car. Officer Seymour asserted that he told Appellant that he was being detained so the officers could determine the ownership of the car.
Thereafter, the officers learned through a computer database search that the license plate on the 2004 Impala had been last issued to a 1992 Chevrolet; they also noticed that the VIN number on the dashboard of the Impala did not match the VIN number on the inside driver's door. Appellant gave Officer Harris a false name and a false birthdate, and denied having any identification on his person. Appellant informed Officer Harris that the vehicle's documentation was in the glove compartment of the vehicle.
Officer Seymour subsequently opened the glove compartment, in which he discovered a Ziploc bag containing fourteen plastic jars of marijuana. The officers also determined that the vehicle was not registered but the title was in the name of Ms. Evelyn Jackson who lived in the 14th District. Appellant stated that he was not related to Ms. Jackson and did not provide any explanation as to why he was driving this vehicle. At that point, the officers informed Appellant that he was under arrest.
As a result, Appellant was charged with intentionally possessing a controlled substance and driving without a license. Appellant sought to suppress the marijuana seized from the vehicle as he asserted it was fruit of an unlawful detention unsupported the requisite suspicion. After a hearing on April 17, 2017, the lower court denied Appellant's suppression motion. The trial court stated its factual findings on the record, essentially accepting the testimony of the officers; however, the trial court offered no legal analysis on the issues raised in the suppression motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the lower court adjudicated Appellant delinquent, entered a dispositional order for Appellant to remain in secure detention at the Philadelphia Juvenile Justice Center, and directed that Appellant be placed in residential facility best suited to his treatment, supervision, rehabilitation, and welfare.
After Appellant filed a timely appeal, the trial court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), but instead filed a short opinion in which it suggested it should have granted Appellant's suppression motion and asked this Court to remand the case accordingly.1 The trial court did not give any explanation as to why it believed its prior decision was in error.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to suppress the marijuana that the officers seized from the vehicle that Appellant was driving. Our standard of review is as follows:
This Court is bound by those of the suppression court's factual findings which find support in the record, but we are not bound by the court's conclusions of law. When the suppression court's specific factual findings are unannounced, or there is a gap in the findings, the appellate court should consider only the evidence of the prevailing suppression party ... and the evidence of the other party ... that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted.
Commonwealth v. Millner , 585 Pa. 237, 246, 888 A.2d 680, 685 (2005) (citations omitted).
Appellant does not contest the legality of the stop of his vehicle, but argues that the marijuana obtained from the vehicle must be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal search and seizure. Specifically, Appellant challenges the officers' protective frisk of his person and their decision to place him in handcuffs in the back of the patrol vehicle once they discovered he was driving without a license in an unregistered vehicle. Appellant asserts that the officers did not have the authority to place him under arrest for the conduct of driving without a license, which is a summary offense.
The Commonwealth argues that Appellant cannot successfully challenge the search of the vehicle as he failed to show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Alternatively, the Commonwealth contends that the officers had probable cause to seize the vehicle after initiating a lawful stop, learning that Appellant had no driver's license, and discovering that the vehicle was unregistered and had a mismatched license plate and differing VIN numbers on the driver's door and dashboard. Thus, the Commonwealth argues that the officers had probable cause to seize the vehicle and to conduct a reasonable inventory search, which included opening the vehicle's glove compartment to find documents that could help the officers determine who owned the vehicle.
In his reply brief, Appellant argues that he was not required to demonstrate a reasonably cognizable expectation of privacy in the vehicle as the officer's discovery of marijuana in the vehicle constituted the fruit of an illegal seizure of his person. Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Shabezz , 641 Pa. 92, 166 A.3d 278, 287 (2017), in which our Supreme Court held that "evidence derived from an illegal automobile search constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree as a result of the illegal seizure (unless the taint is removed), and that no further demonstration of a privacy interest in the area from which the evidence was seized is required by the Fourth Amendment." Appellant asserts the marijuana seized from the vehicle in this case was a direct product or exploitation of an illegal seizure of his person and must be suppressed.
Even assuming, arguendo , that Appellant was not required to demonstrate an expectation of privacy in the vehicle, we cannot find Appellant was entitled to the suppression of the marijuana found in the glove compartment as Appellant failed to show that he was subjected to an illegal search or seizure.
Appellant concedes that the officers were justified in stopping his vehicle as they observed Appellant drive through a stop sign, which is a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. Appellant also admits that that he told the officers that he did not have a driver's license and could not produce any personal identification or registration for the vehicle. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(a) ().
Moreover, Appellant does not dispute that the officers had the authority to ask Appellant to get out of the vehicle and to detain him to continue to investigate the ownership of the vehicle. "As a matter of precaution, a police officer is entitled to ask occupants of a vehicle to step from the vehicle during a traffic stop." Commonwealth v. Van Winkle , 880 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Freeman , 563 Pa. 82, 757 A.2d 903 (2000) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) ) ). See also Commonwealth v. Moser , 757 A.2d 377, 379 (Pa.Super. 2000) ().
In claiming that he was subsequently subjected to an illegal search and seizure when he was frisked, handcuffed, and placed in the back of the police cruiser, Appellant suggests that there is a bright line rule that an individual has been arrested at the moment he is placed in handcuffs or any restraint. However, Appellant does not address our precedent that suggests otherwise.
This Court has held that an officer's use of handcuffs to detain an individual during an investigative detention for his or her safety...
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