In re Interest of K.G.

• Decision Date: 07 July 2022
• Docket Number: 1784 EDA 2021
• Citation: 278 A.3d 934
• Parties: In the INTEREST OF: K.G. Appeal of: K.G.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

278 A.3d 934

In the INTEREST OF: K.G.

Appeal of: K.G.

No. 1784 EDA 2021

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted June 7, 2022

Filed July 7, 2022

Aaron Joshua Marcus, Defender Association of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Lawrence Jonathan Goode, District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY OLSON, J.:

Appellant, K.G., a juvenile, appeals from the dispositional order¹ entered on July 1, 2021, adjudicating him delinquent of unauthorized use of automobiles (UUA), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3928(a), and ordering the payment of court costs and restitution to the owner of the vehicle. Upon careful consideration, we vacate the July 1, 2021 order of disposition.

We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history, as gleaned from the certified record. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with the aforementioned crime, as well as theft by unlawful taking – moveable property and receiving stolen property,² following an incident that occurred on July 29, 2020. The trial court held an adjudicatory hearing on July 1, 2021. At that hearing, the car owner testified that she parked her 2014 silver Nissan Versa in front of her house on Girard Avenue in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on July 24, 2020. N.T., 7/1/2021, at 14. The following day, the car owner reported to the police that the car had been stolen. Id. Four days later, on July 29, 2020, at approximately 7:56 a.m., Officer Christopher Smith of the Philadelphia Police Department "observed a silver Nissan Versa that was in the parking lane [on the 1700 block of North 23^rd Street] enter the travel lanes in front of [him] and [the driver] did not use a turn signal." Id. at 5. After verifying that the vehicle had been reported stolen, Officer Smith initiated a traffic stop. Id. Officer Smith detained Appellant, the driver and lone occupant of the car. Id. Officer Smith then contacted the car owner who confirmed ownership of the car and signed a form stating that she did not give Appellant permission to drive the vehicle. Id. The police subsequently released the automobile to the car owner. Id. Officer Smith also testified that, at the time of Appellant's arrest, there was no damage to the vehicle. More specifically, the ignition system, dashboard, and steering column were not broken or damaged, the vehicle identification number was intact, and there were no signs of forced entry. Id. at 8-10. In fact, Appellant was operating the vehicle with keys. Id. at 10. Moreover, Appellant was cooperative with police, pulled over immediately upon command, and did not attempt to flee. Id. at 8-9.

At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case and upon defense counsel's oral motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court dismissed the charges of theft by unlawful taking and receiving stolen property. Id. at 19. The parties stipulated to character evidence that Appellant "has a reputation for being law abiding, honest[,] and peaceful[.]" Id. The trial court ultimately adjudicated Appellant delinquent for UUA. Id. at 22. On July 9, 2021, Appellant filed a motion to reconsider the adjudication which was denied by operation of law on September 7, 2021. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/17/2021, at *1 (unpaginated). This timely appeal resulted.³

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

A. Was [ ] the evidence insufficient to sustain a finding that [Appellant] committed the offense of unauthorized use of an automobile where the [Commonwealth] failed to prove that he acted with the requisite mens rea ?

B. Did [ ] the juvenile court err and abuse its discretion in adjudicating [Appellant] delinquent where it found he was in need of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation based solely on the fact that [Appellant] had committed delinquent acts and as such, the adjudication of delinquency was based on insufficient evidence?

Appellant's Brief at 4.

Appellant summarizes both issues as follows:

The evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding that [Appellant] committed UUA because the Commonwealth failed to prove that [Appellant] acted recklessly with respect to the owner's lack of consent. The evidence showed only that he was driving the car with keys [four] days after it had been stolen. The surrounding circumstances, together with evidence of [Appellant's] good character, did not support a finding of [delinquency].

After finding [that Appellant committed] UUA, the juvenile court adjudicated him delinquent upon hearing that he had admitted to a misdemeanor in another case and had unknown pending charges in another county. The mere fact that a juvenile has committed delinquent acts cannot support a finding that he is in need of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation. The juvenile court knew nothing else about [Appellant]. It was an abuse of discretion to adjudicate him delinquent.

Id. at 8-9.

The Commonwealth agrees and concedes that Appellant is entitled to relief on both appellate issues:

The Commonwealth does not contest that, on the specific record and circumstances of this case, [Appellant's] adjudication of delinquency for unauthorized use of an automobile was not supported by the facts. Insufficient evidence existed to support an inference that [Appellant] possessed the requisite mens rea , that he was at least reckless with regard to the stolen status of the car. Additionally, the juvenile court abused its discretion in adjudicating [Appellant] delinquent without first conducting a hearing to determine [Appellant's] need for treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation.

Commonwealth's Brief at 5.

When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an adjudication of delinquency, this Court employs a well-settled standard of review:

When a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, the Commonwealth must establish the elements of the crime by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence following an adjudication of delinquency, we must review the entire record and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. In determining whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof, the test to be applied is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, there is sufficient evidence to find every element of the crime charged. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by wholly circumstantial evidence.

The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not be absolutely incompatible with a defendant's innocence. Questions of doubt are for the hearing judge, unless the evidence is so weak that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances established by the Commonwealth. The finder of fact is free to believe some, all, or none of the evidence presented.

In Interest of J.G. , 145 A.3d 1179, 1188 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal citations omitted).

"A person is guilty of [UUA,] a misdemeanor of the second[-]degree[,] if he operates the automobile, airplane, motorcycle, motorboat, or other motor-propelled vehicle of another without consent of the owner." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3928(a). "In order to establish the mens rea element of the crime of unauthorized use of automobiles, the Commonwealth must prove that the accused was at least reckless with respect to the owner's lack of consent to the accused's operation of the vehicle." Commonwealth v. Dunlap , 351 Pa.Super. 43, 505 A.2d 255, 257 (1985) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Carson , 405 Pa.Super. 492, 592 A.2d 1318, 1321 (1991) ("[A] conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle must be predicated on proof that the defendant operated the vehicle without the owner's consent and that the defendant knew or had reason to know that he lacked the owner's permission to operate the vehicle."); see also Commonwealth v. Matthews , 429 Pa.Super. 291, 632 A.2d 570, 572 (1993) (The Commonwealth may establish the necessary mens rea by showing whether the person in possession of the automobile "knew or had reason to believe the property was stolen"). "[T]he mere possession of stolen property is insufficient to permit an inference of guilty knowledge; there must be additional evidence, circumstantial or direct, which would indicate that the defendant knew or had reason to know that the property was stolen." Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held:

It is difficult to enumerate every circumstance that would warrant a conclusion that the appellant had reason to know the property was stolen. Some of the significant circumstances can be the appellant's conduct; the appellant's relationship to the victim; the elapsed time between the appellant's possession and the theft; the situs of the theft and the situs of the possession; the kind of property; the quantity of the property; and the identifying characteristics of the property.

* * *

The possession of an automobile which does not belong to the driver is not so strange, unusual, or unique that it points to guilty knowledge as more likely than innocent knowledge on the part of the driver. The borrowing or leasing of an automobile for temporary use is not an uncommon occurrence. If every person possessing an automobile which they did not own would be held accountable as having knowledge that the automobile was stolen, every person who borrowed a car would be in peril of [ ] conviction[.]

Commonwealth v. Henderson , 451 Pa. 452, 304 A.2d 154, 156-157 (1973).

Moreover, our Supreme Court has previously determined "the Juvenile Act requires a juvenile court to find that a child has committed a delinquent act and that the child is in need of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation, before the court may enter an adjudication of delinquency." Commonwealth v. M.W. , 614 Pa. 633, 39 A.3d...