In re Ironclad Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 09 December 1912 |
| Docket Number | 91,81,102. |
| Citation | 201 F. 66 |
| Parties | In re IRONCLAD MFG. CO. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
This cause comes here upon petitions to revise three orders of the District Court, Eastern District of New York. The first of these orders, made and entered May 14, 1912, required the Barrel Company and Mrs. Seaman as an officer thereof, and also Mrs. Seaman individually, to produce before and deliver to the special master certain books and papers. Mrs. Seaman only filed petition to review this order. The second order filed June 14, 1912, found the Barrel Company to be in contempt of court for disobeying the first order and fined it $2,500. That company and Mrs. Seaman each filed a petition to revise said order. The third order filed July 3, 1912, found Mrs. Seaman to be in contempt of court for disobedience of the first order, fined her $3,000, and committed her to the custody of the marshal for 20 days and for an additional 20 days in case of default in payment of the fine. She filed petition to revise this order.
Olcott Gruber, Bonynge & McManus, of New York City (D. W. Kahn and Irving L. Ernst, both of New York City, of counsel), for petitioners.
E. T Rice, of New York City, for respondent.
Before LACOMBE, WARD, and NOYES, Circuit Judges.
LACOMBE Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).
Petition for involuntary bankruptcy was filed against the Ironclad Company on May 23, 1911. It has since been adjudicated a bankrupt. Receiver was appointed May 23, 1911, and was succeeded by trustee January 9, 1912. It being contended by certain of the creditors that the Steel Barrel Company was in fact and substance the Ironclad Company under another name and that all its property was the property of the Ironclad Company, orders to show cause why the receivership should not be extended over the property of the Barrel Company were made. These orders (dated June 13, and June 16, 1911) are not before us, but apparently they contained provisions enjoining these petitioners from removing or permitting to be removed or transferring or disposing of any of the books or property of the Barrel Company. Upon the hearing of these orders to show cause the District Judge expressed a doubt as to whether he had jurisdiction to decide summarily whether the claim of ownership made by the Barrel Company was bona fide or not and for that reason denied the motions. Upon his decision being brought here for review we held that the receiver and creditors were entitled to have the bankruptcy court make a preliminary investigation summarily to decide whether or not such claim of adverse ownership was merely colorable.
Upon the remand the District Court undertook such investigation. It was manifest that the books and records of the Barrel Company might be expected to contain important evidence bearing upon the question in controversy. Therefore after some preliminary investigation as to the whereabouts of the books, and after hearing both of these petitioners, the court made the order of May 14, 1912. It required the Barrel Company and Mrs. Seaman as an officer thereof and also Mrs. Seaman individually to 'produce before and deliver to the special master on or before May 15, 1912, the ledgers, journals, cashbooks, vouchers, and passbooks of the Steel Barrel Company from the period beginning at the time of its incorporation in February, 1905, up to September 1st, 1910. ' Apparently the books and papers not covered by this specific designation had already been produced.
The petitioners contend that the court was without jurisdiction to make such an order, apparently construing it as a determination that the books of the Barrel Company were the property of the trustee of the Ironclad. This is a misconception of the order. It did not direct that the books should be turned over to the trustee. It merely required them to be produced before and delivered to the special master who, by designation of the District Court, was sitting as a court to take testimony upon that very issue. It was merely the equivalent of a subpoena duces tecum; the delivery to the special master contemplates merely a delivery for examination at the hearing. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United States v. Birrell
...(where the impounding order was by the District Judge and not the Referee): In re Fox, 96 F.2d 20, 21 (3d Cir. 1938); In re Ironclad Mfg. Co., 201 F. 66, 68 (2d Cir. 1912). (While totally irrelevant to the present discussion, an interesting, but not inspiring, description of the Fox litigat......
-
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum
...has jurisdiction of the corporation. The test is control—not location of the records. In re Harris, D.C., 27 F.Supp. 480; In re Iron Clad Mfg. Co., 2 Cir., 201 F. 66. Canadian's motion to quash the service of the subpoena is accordingly denied. Settle order on Sales Presence Here. Sales con......
-
In re Landquist, 5133
...consideration as would promote justice, and protect the interests of all parties concerned, so far as reasonably possible. In re Ironclad Mfg. Co. (C. C. A.) 201 F. 66; In re Hark (D. C.) 136 F. 986. The materiality as evidence of the documents produced should be left to the court and not t......
-
United States v. Howard
...or under the control of the person summoned. Dean v. Superior Court, 84 Ariz. 104, 324 P.2d 764, 73 A.L.R.2d 1 (1958); In re Ironclad Mfg. Co., 201 F. 66 (2 Cir. 1912). Cf. First National City Bank of New York v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616 (2 Cir. 1959). We conclude that the sum......