In re Itron, Inc.
Decision Date | 21 February 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 17-60733,17-60733 |
Parties | IN RE: ITRON, INCORPORATED, Petitioner |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Gordie Donald Puckett, Brent N. Bumgardner, Clifford Chad Henson, Nelson Bumgardner, P.C., Fort Worth, TX, Donna Marie Meehan, Cosmich, Simmons & Brown, P.L.L.C., Jackson, MS, for Petitioner.
Robert David Kaufman, Joseph Anthony Sclafani, Esq., Brunini, Grantham, Grower & Hewes, P.L.L.C., Jackson, MS, for Respondent STEPHEN D. JOHNSTON.
James Joseph Crongeyer, Jr., Esq., John Burley Howell, III, Michael W. Ulmer, Esq., Watkins & Eager, P.L.L.C., Jackson, MS, for Respondent AJIT HABBU.
Oliver Stephen Montagnet, III, Esq., McCraney, Montagnet, Quin & Noble, P.L.L.C., Ridgeland, MS, for Respondent GARY KESSLER.
Before DENNIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
This mandamus petition calls on us to correct a significant misapplication of attorney-client privilege law. The underlying lawsuit springs from a disputed corporate merger. Plaintiff–Petitioner Itron acquired a company called SmartSynch. According to Itron, misrepresentations by three of SmartSynch's corporate officers ("Defendants") caused it unknowingly to assume an unwanted $60 million contractual obligation to a third company, Consert. After years of litigation, Itron settled Consert's claims against it for $18 million. Itron now sues Defendants for negligent misrepresentation, seeking as compensatory damages the cost of the Consert litigation and settlement. Discovery is nearly complete.
On Defendants' motion, the presiding magistrate judge ordered Itron to produce, without qualification:
Itron objected that many if not all of these materials are shielded from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. But the magistrate judge disagreed, concluding that Itron waived its privilege by filing a lawsuit to which the attorney-client communications would be relevant. That was error.
We hold that the mere act of filing this lawsuit effected no waiver of any attorney-client privilege. We further hold that the magistrate judge's contrary ruling amounted to clear error warranting mandamus relief. We therefore GRANT Itron's petition for mandamus, VACATE the magistrate judge's order, and REMAND the case with instructions to re-evaluate Defendants' motion in a manner consistent with this opinion.1
Itron agreed to acquire SmartSynch for approximately $100 million. Six days before the closing date, however, SmartSynch entered a new agreement with third-party company Consert. Itron then assumed SmartSynch's obligations under the agreement as SmartSynch's successor-in-interest. Itron alleges that SmartSynch's CEO, CFO, and VP of Product Marketing (Defendants) negligently failed to disclose the Consert agreement; that the Consert agreement was adverse to Itron's financial interest; and that the Consert agreement committed Itron to unwanted expenditures exceeding $60 million. Itron allegedly discovered the agreement when Consert sent its first invoice. At that point, Itron filed a declaratory judgment action against Consert seeking to void or reform the agreement. See Itron, Inc. v. Consert Inc. , 109 A.3d 583, 584–85 (Del. Ch. 2015). Consert asserted counterclaims including breach of contract. After more than two-and-a-half years of litigation, Itron and Consert settled their dispute the weekend before trial. As part of the settlement agreement, Itron paid Consert $18 million.
Itron now sues all three Defendants for negligent misrepresentation under Mississippi law. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1652. It alleges that Defendants' misrepresentations caused it to "unwittingly assume[ ] liability for the Consert Agreement," "result[ing] in substantial losses to Itron[ ] due to the Consert Litigation and the resulting settlement."
During the voluminous pretrial proceedings, Defendants moved to compel Itron to produce, among other things, the documents listed above. They argued that Itron "waived its attorney-client privilege as to all communications with counsel concerning potential exposure and settlement [with Consert]," because "whether Itron's settlement of Consert's counterclaims was compulsory and reasonable are disputed material issues" and "the most relevant evidence of whether the settlement was reasonable will be the opinions of counsel for Itron." Itron opposed the motion on the grounds that these documents reside at the "core" of the attorney-client privilege, and that Itron never affirmatively relied on, used, or disclosed privileged communications, as required for this type of waiver under Mississippi law. See Jackson Med. Clinic for Women, P.A. v. Moore , 836 So.2d 767, 773 (Miss. 2003) ; see also In re Cty. of Erie , 546 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2008) ; Rhone–Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co. , 32 F.3d 851, 864 (3d Cir. 1994). In fact, Itron said, it had stipulated that "so long as the Court does not find a privilege waiver, Itron will not affirmatively use any privileged information against Defendants in this case." Finally, Itron observed that Defendants were free to dispute the objective reasonableness of Itron's settlement by examining the underlying facts and calling expert witnesses, whom both sides had designated to address that very issue.
The magistrate judge granted Defendants' motion to compel in substantial part, ordering Itron to produce the documents listed above. The magistrate judge's order rejected Itron's argument regarding the proper legal standard under Mississippi law. But the order did not cite Jackson Medical (, nor did it address how, under )Defendants' proposed standard, the privileged materials were "vital" to the case. The order instead asserted that, "since Itron seeks in the present lawsuit to recover its Consert litigation losses from Defendants, the law in this Circuit will not permit Itron to withhold under claim of privilege the documents regarding the Consert litigation." Order [ECF No. 202] at 2–3, Itron, Inc. v. Johnston , No. 3:15-cv-330 (S.D. Miss. June 30, 2017) ( ).
Itron has been challenging that order ever since. It first lodged objections with the district court, but the district court overruled them on the ground that the magistrate judge's ruling was "not clearly erroneous." Itron then moved the district court for reconsideration, or, in the alternative, to certify the magistrate judge's order for interlocutory appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Both motions were denied. Running up against the production deadline, Itron petitioned us for review.
In evaluating a claim of attorney-client privilege, we review factual findings for clear error and "the application of the controlling law de novo." In re Avantel, S.A. , 343 F.3d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotation mark omitted). The controlling law to be applied here is that of Mississippi, which governs Itron's causes of action and, by extension, any assertion of attorney-client privilege or putative waiver thereof. Id. at 323 ; see Fed. R. Evid. 501. Our task is to apply the law as would the Mississippi Supreme Court. Guilbeau v. Hess Corp. , 854 F.3d 310, 311 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2017).
Mississippi law gives clients the "privilege to refuse to disclose ... any confidential communication[s] made to facilitate professional legal services," if those communications were made "between the client ... and [its] lawyer" or "among lawyers ... representing the same client." Miss. R. Evid. 502(b). Like the magistrate judge, we assume (but do not decide) that the documents sought here—communications to or from Itron's attorneys relating to the merits of Consert's claims against it—meet this definition. The parties are free to contest this premise on remand with respect to particular documents. We decide today only whether Itron impliedly waived its attorney-client privilege by the mere act of filing this lawsuit. It did not.
Ordinary waiver principles resolve the present dispute. By definition, the attorney-client privilege protects only confidential communications. Miss. R. Evid. 502(b). By disclosing such communications to third partie...
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