In re Ivylynn Y.
Decision Date | 30 September 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 1 CA-MH 14-0014,1 CA-MH 14-0014 |
Parties | IN THE MATTER OF IVYLYNN Y. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
The Honorable Lee F. Jantzen, Judge
AFFIRMED
Mohave County Legal Defender's Office, Kingman
By Diane S. McCoy
Counsel for Appellant.
Mohave County Attorney's Office, Kingman
By Dolores H. Milkie
Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.
¶1 Ivylynn Y. (Ivylynn) appeals the court's order granting the petition for continued court-ordered treatment. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 In 2012, Dr. Zegarra filed a petition for a court-ordered evaluation of Ivylynn on the ground that Ivylynn had a history of mental illness, refused to take her medication, and engaged in disruptive behavior. The petition also alleged that Ivylynn had not complied with out-patient psychiatric treatment, exhibited paranoid delusions, and threatened to harm the staff of Mohave Mental Health Clinic, Inc. (Mohave Clinic). After the court granted the petition, Dr. Seltzer, deputy medical director at Mohave Clinic, filed a petition for court-ordered treatment of Ivylynn, indicating Ivylynn was persistently or acutely disabled, and recommending in-patient and out-patient treatment.
¶3 At the hearing on the petition for court-ordered treatment, Ivylynn requested an Independent Medical Examination (IME) by her physician, Dr. Epstein. The court continued the hearing on two occasions to allow for the IME's completion. Dr. Epstein concluded that Ivylynn suffered from bipolar disorder and was currently disabled, but she recommended voluntary out-patient treatment rather than court-ordered involuntary treatment. Ivylynn's counsel subsequently admitted Dr. Epstein's affidavit into evidence at the hearing on January 17, 2013. After considering the exhibits and testimony at the hearing, including that of Ivylynn, Ivylynn's husband, and Dr. Seltzer, the court found clear and convincing evidence that Ivylynn was persistently or acutely disabled, needed psychiatric treatment, and would not accept voluntary treatment. Accordingly, the court ordered Ivylynn to undergo combined in-patient and out-patient treatment for a period not to exceed 365 days, with inpatient treatment not to exceed 180 days. This Court subsequently affirmed that order. See In The Matter of Ivy Y., 1 CA-MH 13-0009 (Ariz. App. July 18, 2013) (mem. decision).
¶4 Dr. Ramadan, medical director of Mohave Clinic, conducted the required annual examination on November 13, 2013, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 36-543(E)-(F) (Supp. 2013), and on December 6, 2013, Mohave Clinic filed a petition for continued court-ordered treatment. In thepetition, Mohave Clinic stated that a continuation of court-ordered treatment was necessary because, after completing the annual examination, Dr. Ramadan concluded that Ivylynn continued to be persistently and acutely disabled; voluntary treatment was not appropriate given Ivylynn's history of discontinuing treatment; and Ivylynn was in need of continued in-patient and out-patient court-ordered treatment.
¶5 At the January 7, 2014 hearing on the petition for continued treatment, Ivylynn requested that her court appointed counsel be released in order to retain private counsel, or that she be allowed to represent herself. Ivylynn also informed the court that she would like an IME by Dr. Epstein and Dr. Schiff, but that her counsel would not make the request on her behalf. The court questioned Ivylynn's counsel as to whether Ivylynn had a right to an IME, to which Ivylynn's counsel responded, Ivylynn informed the court that she did not have private counsel ready to appear at the hearing. Accordingly, the court ordered a one week continuance in order for Ivylynn to retain private counsel.
¶6 At the hearing, Ivylynn informed the court that she was unable to retain private counsel, and again requested to represent herself. The court denied Ivylynn's request. Thereafter, Dr. Ramadan testified that throughout the previous year, Ivylynn often failed to follow up on her treatment plan, she was inconsistent in taking her medication, and she demonstrated resistance and poor insight into her illness. According to Dr. Ramadan, this resulted in Ivylynn's disorganized thoughts and behavior reoccurring, thereby requiring Ivylynn to return from out-patient treatment to in-patient treatment. As of the date of the hearing, Ivylynn continued to receive in-patient treatment. A human service worker with Mohave Clinic also testified as to Ivylynn's behavior during treatment, stating that Ivylynn had delusions, she was unwilling to take her medication, and she believed that she was not ill.
¶7 Ivylynn's counsel cross-examined both witnesses, and Ivylynn testified on her own behalf. Ivylynn testified that she discontinued her medication during out-patient treatment because the high dosage of medication caused severe negative side-effects and interfered with her ability to care for her family. She further stated that she functions very well when taking a lower dosage of medication, that she willingly and regularly takes her medication, and that she believes she can successfully manage her bipolar disorder by receiving voluntary psychiatric treatment. The courtfound clear and convincing evidence that Ivylynn continued to be persistently or acutely disabled and in need of treatment, that there were no suitable alternatives to court-ordered treatment, and that voluntary treatment would not be appropriate. Accordingly, the court ordered treatment to continue for an additional 365 days.
¶8 Ivylynn timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 36-546.01 (2014) and 12-2101(A)(1) (2014).
¶9 Ivylynn argues that she had a statutory and due process right to request an IME at the hearing on the petition for continued treatment. Ivylynn asserts that the court erred in permitting her attorney to waive her right to obtain an IME; and therefore, the court's order continuing involuntary treatment should be vacated. We will not disturb an order for continued treatment unless it is "clearly erroneous or unsupported by any credible evidence," Mental Health Case No. MH 94-00592, 182 Ariz. 440, 443, 897 P.2d 742, 745 (App. 1995) (citation omitted), but we review questions of law, such as statutory interpretation or constitutional claims, de novo. In re MH 2010-002637, 228 Ariz. 74, 78, ¶ 13, 263 P.3d 82, 86 (App. 2011) (citation omitted).
¶10 "[C]ivil commitment constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty." In re MH 2008-000867, 222 Ariz. 287, 291, ¶ 17, 213 P.3d 1014, 1018 (App. 2009) (citation omitted). This liberty interest necessitates due process at mental review hearings,2 id., and requires us to strictly construe civil commitment statutes. In re MH 2007-001236, 220 Ariz. 160, 165, ¶ 15, 204 P.3d 418, 423 (App. 2008); see also MH 2001-001139, 203 Ariz. 351, 353, ¶ 12, 54 P.3d 380, 382 (App. 2002) ( ). In order to preserve a patient's rights and liberty interest, A.R.S. §§ 36-543(D) and -538 (Supp. 2013) explicitly grant a patient the right to obtain an analysis of their medical condition by an IME for use at a hearing on continued court-ordered treatment. See In re MH2010-002348, 228 Ariz. 441, 444-45, ¶¶ 10-11, 268 P.3d 392, 395-96 (App. 2011). Although we agree that Ivylynn had the right to obtain an IMEpursuant to A.R.S. §§ 36-543(D) and -538, we do not agree that the court erred in relying on her counsel's waiver of that right.
¶11 Arizona law has long recognized that an individual may be bound by his or her trial counsel's strategic decision to waive certain rights, including statutory and constitutional rights. See State v. Levato, 186 Ariz. 441, 444, 924 P.2d 445, 448 (1996); State v. West, 176 Ariz. 432, 447, 862 P.2d 192, 207 (1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, 961 P.2d 1006 (1998). "Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client,[3] the lawyer has—and must have—full authority to manage the conduct of the trial." Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988) (footnote omitted); see State v. Rodriguez, 126 Ariz. 28, 33, 612 P.2d 484, 489 (1980) () (citation omitted). Typically, whether and how to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses is a tactical, strategic decision that is controlled by counsel. State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 215, 689 P.2d 153, 158 (1984) () ; see also State v. Workman, 123 Ariz. 501, 503, 600 P.2d 1133, 1135 (App. 1979) ( ); see, e.g., State v. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181, 186, ¶¶ 28-29, 119 P.3d 448, 453 (2005) (...
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