In re J.B.

• Docket Number: CAAP-22-0000729
• Decision Date: 06 June 2025
• Citation: In re J.B., CAAP-22-0000729 (Haw. App. Jun 06, 2025)
• Parties: IN THE INTEREST OF J.B.
• Court: Hawaii Court of Appeals

1

IN THE INTEREST OF J.B.

No. CAAP-22-0000729

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii

June 6, 2025

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT(FC-JNO. 0115174)

On the briefs:

Randal I. Shintani

for Minor-Appellant

Donn Fudo,

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

City & County of Honolulu,

for Plaintiff-Appellee

Katherine G. Leonard Acting Chief Judge, Clyde J. Wadsworth Associate Judge, Karen T. Nakasone Associate Judge

OPINION

WADSWORTH, J.

This appeal stems from the Family Court of the First Circuit's adjudication of Minor-Appellant J.B. (Minor) as a law violator for assaulting another minor, the complaining witness (CW).^[1] Minor appeals from the following decree and orders entered by the family court: (1) the September 26, 2022"Decree Re: Law Violation Petition(s)"(Decree); (2) the November 22, 2022"Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration Filed October 4, 2022"; and (3) the November 22, 2022"Order Re Disposition Hearing."Following a bench trial, the family court adjudicated Minor a law violator as to one count of Assault in the Third Degree under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-712(1)(a).^[2]

On appeal, Minor contends that: (1) the family court erred in denying his June 13, 2022 Motion to Dismiss Petition Based Upon Defective Charge (Motion to Dismiss) where Petitioner-Appellee State of Hawaii's (State) petition against Minor (Petition) failed to define or specify the alleged "bodily injury" caused by Minor; and (2)"there was insufficient evidence to sustain the adjudication of the petition of assault in the third degree."(Formatting altered.)Minor also summarily challenges multiple findings of fact (FOFs) and conclusions of law in the family court's January 17, 2023 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

We hold that the term "bodily injury" in HRS § 707-712(1)(a) is a generic term, as defined by the Hawai'i Supreme Court in State v. Jardine, 151 Hawai'i 96, 99, 508 P.3d 1182, 1185(2022).A charging document must therefore identify the "species" of the alleged "bodily injury" and, as appropriate, provide a defendant"with particulars."Id. at 98, 508 P.3d at 1184.Here, the Petition failed to meet the Jardine standard.In addition, the record does not establish that discovery materials given to Minor before he filed the Motion to Dismiss provided him with sufficient notice of the CWs bodily injury.The family court therefore erred in denying the Motion to Dismiss.

Before remanding the case for dismissal based on the defective Petition, we must also address, for double jeopardy purposes, Minor's express claim of insufficiency of the evidence.SeeState v. Davis, 133 Hawai'i 102, 120, 324 P.3d 912, 930(2014).As to that claim, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the State, we hold there was sufficient evidence to support the family court's adjudication of Minor as a law violator on the count of Assault in the Third Degree.

Accordingly, we vacate the challenged Decree and orders with instructions to dismiss the Petition without prejudice.

I.Background

On April 29, 2020, the State filed the Petition pursuant to HRS § 571-11(1),^[3] alleging the following:

On or about November 8, 2019, in the City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawai'i, [Minor] did intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause bodily injury to [CW], thereby committing the offense of Assault in the Third Degree, in violation of [HRS §]707-712(1)(a) . . . .

On June 13, 2022, Minor filed the Motion to Dismiss.Relying on Jardine, he argued that the term "bodily injury" is a generic term, such that the State was required to include the term's statutory definition in "the charging document," and "[to] state the species . . . and descen[d] to particulars."(QuotingJardine, 151 Hawai'i at 100, 508 P.3d at 1186(original brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).)

On July 11, 2022, the State filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.The State did not address Minor's argument based on Jardine, contending instead that "all of the information supplied to the accused prior to the filing of their motion must be considered when determining whether they have been given fair notice of the charge against them[.]"The State further argued: "[Minor] was provided with discovery in this case on March 2, 2022.That discovery contained the specific injury that formed the basis of the bodily injury supporting the charge.Therefore, Minor has been given fair notice of the charge against him . . . ."

On August 15, 2022, the family court heard and orally denied the Motion to Dismiss.The court reasoned:

[I]n Jardine, there was a list of classes or levels of harm that needed to be identified.We do not have that situation in this case.Assault Third is any bodily injury, which . . . is not a generic term.Court finds the petition does state the charge with reasonable clarity.

Trial began the same day and continued on September 26, 2022.The testifying witnesses included CW and RB, a passerby who witnessed the alleged assault.CW identified Minor as one of the boys who hit and physically hurt him.

Following the trial testimony, the family court ruled as follows:

After full consideration of the evidence and/or representations presented, the Court finds that the State's witnesses to be [sic] credible.The State has met their burden of proving the material allegations of the case beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically with regards to referral of Assault in the Third Degree.

The Court finds that the minor is adjudged a law violator pursuant to [HRS]Chapter 571.

The Decree similarly stated: "[T]he Court finds that the material allegations of the [Petition[] have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and that the [M]inor is a law violator within the purview of HRS Section 571-11(1)."

On November 22, 2022, the family court denied Minor's Motion for Reconsideration, filed on October 4, 2022, and placed Minor on probation with rules and conditions.

II.Standards of Review

A.Sufficiency of the Charge

"The question of whether a charge sets forth all the essential elements of a charged offense is a question of law that this court reviews de novo under the right/wrong standard."Jardine, 151 Hawai'i at 99, 508 P.3d at 1185(citingState v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai'i 383, 390, 219 P.3d 1170, 1177(2009)).

B.Sufficiency of the Evidence

We review the sufficiency of evidence on appeal as follows:

Evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction.The test on appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact.Indeed, even if it could be said in a bench trial that the conviction is against the weight of the evidence, as long as there is substantial evidence to support the requisite findings for conviction, the trial court will be affirmed.Substantial evidence is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion.

In re GH, 152 Hawai'i 8, 14, 518 P.3d 1158, 1164(2022)(quotingState v. Xiao, 123 Hawai'i 251, 257, 231 P.3d 968, 974(2010)).

III.Discussion

A.Sufficiency of the Charge

Minor contends that the family court erred in denying the Motion to Dismiss, where the Petition was deficient under the standard applied in Jardine, 151 Hawai'i at 100-01, 508 P.3d at 1186-87.In Jardine, the supreme court held that the term "substantial bodily injury" in HRS § 707-711(1)(a) and (d) is "generic," such that "[a] charging document must . . . identify the species of 'substantial bodily injury' alleged, and provide a defendant with particulars."Id. at 98, 508 P.3d at 1184.Minor argues that the term "bodily injury" in HRS § 707-712(1)(a) is similarly generic, such that the State was required to include the statutory definition of the term and other relevant specifics in the Petition.

The State does not address Minor's contention regarding the deficiency of the Petition under Jardine.Instead, as it did below, the State argues that other information provided to Minor before he filed the Motion to Dismiss gave Minor "actual knowledge that physical pain was the nature of the bodily injury[,]" such that Minor was not deprived of the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation" against him.

In Jardine, the supreme court reiterated: "[W]here the definition of an offense includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that the [charging document] shall charge the offense in the same generic terms as in the definition; but it must state the species and descend to particulars."Id. at 100, 508 P.3d at 1186(ellipses and original brackets omitted)(quotingState v. Israel, 78 Hawai'i 66, 73, 890 P.2d 303, 310(1995)).The court defined "generic" as follows: "A term is 'generic' if it 'relates to or is characteristic of a whole group or class.'"Id.(brackets omitted)(quoting Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 348 (1965)).Applying this definition, the court determined that "[a]s statutorily defined, 'substantial bodily injury' is a generic term that covers five 'classes' of injuries[.]"^[4]Id.

The term "bodily injury" in HRS § 707-712(1)(a) is similarly generic.As statutorily defined, it covers three classes of injuries: "physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition."HRS § 707-700."Thus, it is incumbent upon the State to "state the species" and, as appropriate, to "descend to particulars."Id. at 101, 508 P.3d at 1187(quotingIsrael, 78 Hawai'i at 73, 890 P.2d at 310).

Here this standard required the...