In re J.B.

• Decision Date: 29 December 2014
• Docket Number: Nos. 87 MAP 2013,s. 87 MAP 2013
• Citation: 107 A.3d 1
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: In the Interest of J.B., a Minor. Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In the Interest of D.L., Jr., a minor. Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In the Interest of D.E., a minor. Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In the Interest of K.O.H., a minor. Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In the Interest of A.E.M., a minor. Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In the Interest of J.A.T., a minor. Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In the Interest of D.G.T., a Minor. Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

107 A.3d 1

In the Interest of J.B., a Minor.

Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

In the Interest of D.L., Jr., a minor.

Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

In the Interest of D.E., a minor.

Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

In the Interest of K.O.H., a minor.

Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

In the Interest of A.E.M., a minor.

Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

In the Interest of J.A.T., a minor.

Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

In the Interest of D.G.T., a Minor.

Appeal of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Nos. 87 MAP 2013

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 6, 2014.

Decided Dec. 29, 2014.

Caleb Curtis Enerson, Esq., Thomas L. Kearney III, Esq., James Edward Zamkotowicz, York County District Attorney's Office, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Bruce Piersoll Blocher, Esq., Catherine Elizabeth Feeley, Esq., Marsha Levick, Esq., Riya Saha Shah, Esq., Juvenile Law Center, Abigail Esther Horn, Esq., Aaron Joshua Marcus, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, Anthony J. Tambourino, Esq., York County Public Defender's Office, for J.B., D.E., A.E.M. and D.G.T.

Bruce Piersoll Blocher, Esq., Catherine Elizabeth Feeley, Esq., Marsha Levick, Esq., Riya Saha Shah, Esq., Juvenile Law Center, Abigail Esther Horn, Esq., Aaron Joshua Marcus, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, Thomas Korey Leslie, Esq., Korey Leslie, L.L.C., Anthony J. Tambourino, Esq., York County Public Defender's Office, for D.L.

Bruce Piersoll Blocher, Esq., Catherine Elizabeth Feeley, Esq., Marsha Levick, Esq., Riya Saha Shah, Esq., Juvenile Law Center, Abigail Esther Horn, Esq., Aaron Joshua Marcus, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, Traci Leigh McPate, Esq., Griest, Himes, Herrold, Schaumann, Reynosa, L.L.P., Anthony J. Tambourino, Esq., York County Public Defender's Office, for K.O.H.

Kurt A. Blake, Esq., Blake & Gross, L.L.C., Bruce Piersoll Blocher, Esq., Catherine Elizabeth Feeley, Esq., Marsha Levick, Esq., Riya Saha Shah, Esq., Juvenile Law Center, Abigail Esther Horn, Esq., Aaron Joshua Marcus, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, Anthony J. Tambourino, Esq., York County Public Defender's Office, for J.A.T.

CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, STEVENS, JJ.

OPINION

Justice BAER.

In this case, we consider the constitutionality of provisions of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) as applied to juveniles. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10 –9799.41. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 722(7), we review this case directly from the order of the York County Court of Common Pleas holding the statute unconstitutional as violative of the ex post facto clause, protections against cruel and unusual punishment, and due process rights through the use of an irrebuttable presumption. In the Interest of J.B. et al., No. CP–67–JV–726–2010 (CP York Nov. 1, 2013) (“Tr. Ct. Op.”).¹ After review, we affirm the determination that SORNA violates juvenile offenders' due process rights through the use of an irrebuttable presumption.

As detailed in the trial court's decision, the seven juveniles in this case (“the Juveniles”) were previously adjudicated delinquent in regard to specific sexual crimes and were subject to juvenile court supervision on SORNA's effective date.² Accordingly, the Juveniles became subject to lifetime registration under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(a)(4), see infra at 5–6. The Juveniles filed motions for nunc pro tunc relief asserting SORNA's unconstitutionality, which were consolidated by the trial court, following the passage of SORNA and its attachment to them.

I. SORNA—History and Provisions

Prior to considering the legal issues at hand, we review the history and details of Pennsylvania's SORNA. Relevantly, SORNA arose from the Federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Public Law 109–248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006), which, in part, mandated that states impose registration requirements on juvenile sexual offenders or be subject to a penalty. The penalty is calculated as ten percent of grants allocated to states pursuant to the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3750 et seq., which in Pennsylvania constitutes approximately $1.6 million annually. 42 U.S.C. § 16925(a) ; Tr. Ct. Op. at 8 n. 1. The penalty will not be assessed, however, if the federal Attorney General determines that a state has “substantially implement[ed]” the program or that the state has a “demonstrated inability to implement certain provisions that would place the jurisdiction in violation of its constitution, as determined by a ruling of the jurisdiction's highest court.” 42 U.S.C. § 16925(b)(1). If the state cannot adopt the provisions under its constitution, “the Attorney General may determine that the jurisdiction is in compliance with this chapter if the jurisdiction has made, or is in the process of implementing reasonable alternative procedures or accommodations, which are consistent with the purposes of this chapter.” Id. § 16925(b)(3).

The Pennsylvania General Assembly passed SORNA as Act 111 of 2011, signed December 20, 2011.³ In so doing, it provided for the expiration of prior registration requirements, commonly referred to as Megan's Law, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791 –9799.9, as of December 20, 2012, and for the effectiveness of SORNA on the same date. The General Assembly set forth its purposes in adopting SORNA, which included bringing Pennsylvania into substantial compliance with the Adam Walsh Act and providing a mechanism for the general public and law enforcement to obtain information concerning sexual offenders. Id. § 9799.10. SORNA also includes legislative findings and a declaration of policy instructing that “[t]he Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 provides a mechanism for the Commonwealth to increase its regulation of sexual offenders in a manner which is nonpunitive but offers an increased measure of protection to the citizens of this Commonwealth.” Id. § 9799.11(a)(2) ; see also Id. § 9799.11(b)(1). The legislature made additional findings that the release of information, especially through electronic means, allows the community to prepare and protect themselves from recidivist acts by sexual offenders. Id. § 9799.11(a)(3), (7), (8), (b)(2). It reiterated that release of the information regarding sexual offenders subject to registration was “a means of assuring public protection and shall not be construed as punitive.” Id. § 9799.11(b)(2).

Of substantial importance to the constitutional issues raised before this Court, SORNA includes specific legislative findings regarding sexual offenders, which Section 9799.12 defines as including all individuals required to register under SORNA:

(4) Sexual offenders pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses and protection of the public from this type of offender is a paramount governmental interest.

Id. § 9799.11(a)(4).⁴ The legislature also stated that registration would “further the governmental interests of public safety and public scrutiny of the criminal and mental health systems so long as the information released is rationally related to the furtherance of those goals.”Id. § 9799.11(a)(6).

In regard to juveniles, SORNA's requirements are applicable only to “juvenile offenders,” a term which is statutorily limited to those who are fourteen or older when they commit “an offense which, if committed by an adult, would be classified as an offense under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121 (relating to rape), 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse) or 3125 (relating to aggravated indecent assault)” or an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy offense related thereto, and are adjudicated delinquent of the offense on or after the effective date of the statute. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.12 (“Juvenile offender”) (1).⁵ Additionally, as relevant to the Juveniles before this Court, SORNA's registration requirements also apply to individuals who were adjudicated delinquent prior to the effective date but are “subject to the jurisdiction of the court on the basis of that adjudication of delinquency.” Id. §§ 9799.12 (“Juvenile offender”)(1)(ii), 9799.13(8)(8.2).⁶ The term also applies to individuals who on or after the effective date of the act were required to register as a sexual offender in another jurisdiction based upon a delinquency adjudication. Id. § 9799.12 (“Juvenile offender”)(3).

For adult sexual offenders, SORNA classifies sexual offenses into three tiers, with different levels of registration requirements. While Tiers I and II contain numerous sexual offenses, more than a dozen of the most serious sexual offenses are reserved for Tier III. Id. § 9799.14. Tier I offenses require registration for fifteen years, and Tier II mandates twenty-five years of reporting. Id. § 9799.15(a). Lifetime registration is reserved for those convicted of a Tier III sexual offense, those determined to be sexual violent predators under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24, sexually violent delinquent children,⁷ and as relevant to the case at bar, the following juvenile offenders:

(4) A juvenile offender who was adjudicated delinquent in this Commonwealth, or who was adjudicated delinquent in another jurisdiction or foreign country as a consequence of having committed an offense similar to an offense which would require the individual to register if the offense was committed in this Commonwealth, shall register for the life of the individual.

Id. § 9799.15(a)(4).

Juvenile offenders and others subject to Tier III registration must appear in person at an approved registration site quarterly to verify specified personal information and have a photograph taken. Id. § 9799.15(e), (h)(2). In contrast, those individuals subject to Tier I registration appear only annually and Tier II offenders appear semiannually. Id. § 9799.15(e). Further, juvenile offenders and others subject to registration must appear in person at an approved registration site within three business days of any one of nine specified occurrences, including a change in residence, employment,...