In re J.B.

Citation469 N.J.Super. 576,267 A.3d 1162
Decision Date11 March 2020
Docket NumberDOCKET NO. FA-000010-20
Parties In the MATTER OF the ADOPTION OF A MINOR CHILD BY J.B.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court

Rebecca Jaffe, for petitioner (Cipriano Law Offices, PC, attorneys).

Lauri Steinberg, Guardian Ad Litem for B.K.B. (Pine & Steinberg, LLC).

GAUS, J.S.C.

The adoption petition submitted presents the following question: now that Garden State Equality v. Dow 1 and Obergefell v. Hodges 2 have declared same-sex marriage legal in the State of New Jersey and nationwide, must an adoption petitioner be legally married to the child's natural parent in order to abide by the strict language of N.J.S.A. 9:3-50(c) to avoid terminating the parental rights of the natural parent? Such adoptions have commonly been called step-parent adoptions if the parties are married and second-parent adoptions if they are unmarried. A strict reading of New Jersey's Judgment of Adoption statute would answer the question in the affirmative.3 Notwithstanding this language, twenty-five years ago—long before same-sex marriage was legalized—our Appellate Division held in H.N.R. 4 that the best interests of the child and a liberal construction of the adoption statutes allowed for an adoption without satisfying the marriage criterion or terminating the parental rights of the natural parent.

N.J.S.A. 9:3-50(c) provides that "[t]he entry of a judgment of adoption shall ... terminate all parental rights ... except for a parent who is the spouse of the petitioner," i.e., a step-parent to the child to be adopted. N.J.S.A. 9:3-50(c) (emphasis added). Conversely, H.N.R. held in 1995 that the best interests of the child are paramount, and per N.J.S.A. 9:3-37 ’s insistence on a liberal construction, when such interests will be served, an adoption can proceed without terminating parental rights of the natural parent though they remain unmarried to the petitioner.

Of course, at that time the prospect that any such couple could have satisfied the statutory requirement of marriage in the State of New Jersey was not within the realm of legal possibility.5 However, since then, Dow and Obergefell have legalized same-sex marriage in this state and throughout the United States, respectively. This societal sea change in the recognized family structure raises the legal quandary presented in the current matter. In the absence of any sexual orientation prohibition on marriage, must a couple—whether same-sex or not—enter into the bonds of matrimony to satisfy a strict reading of N.J.S.A. 9:3-50 that all parental rights of unmarried parents must be terminated upon granting a judgment of adoption, or did the scope of the stepparent exception created by H.N.R. and related jurisprudence establish, once and for all, that the best interests of the child shall take precedence normatively? In other words, was H.N.R. merely a convenient work-around to an archaic and restrictive statute with no other plausible relief, or did the court intend to create a new basis for granting adoption judgments notwithstanding the statutory requirement of a spousal relationship? If H.N.R. did merely intend to create a narrow statutory work-around, does that exception still apply today now that couples can legally satisfy the marriage requirement regardless of sexual orientation, and should that exception apply in such circumstances? Petitions such as the one currently before the court are most often uncontested, but these answers are nonetheless critical to the court's determination.

On September 19, 2019, petitioner, J.B.,6 filed a complaint for adoption of a child named B.K.B. The complaint sought to establish the same relationship between the child and J.B., the adopting parent, as if such child had been born to such adopting parent in lawful wedlock including the right of inheritance. J.B. and her partner, the child's natural mother, R.L., have been in a committed relationship for five and a half years, and have lived together for nearly five years. More than four years ago, J.B. and R.L. made a decision as a couple to have a family together. At first, the couple tried to have a biological child through artificial insemination, but following years of failed attempts, they enrolled with the Reproductive Medicine Associates of New Jersey (RMANJ) Embryo Program around January 2018. R.L. became pregnant with B.K.B. in November 2018 via artificial insemination

through the implantation of an embryo resulting from anonymous egg and sperm donors. B.K.B. was then born on XX/XX/2019 in Morris County, New Jersey. Since then, the child has been under the continuous care of J.B. and R.L., with J.B. in every way acting as a co-equal parent to the couple's child. Shortly after B.K.B.’s birth, J.B. sought to formalize her relationship to their child by way of this petition for adoption. The verified complaint and proposed judgment seek, inter alia, the following relief:

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:3-50(c), the Judgment of Adoption shall in no way affect any rights, duties and obligations founded upon the relationship between the child and his mother, and as to him shall in no way affect any related rights of inheritance that may exist under the laws of this State. All such rights, duties and obligations between the child and his mother are specifically deemed to survive the entry of the Judgment of Adoption.

As will be discussed, a question remains as to whether the statutory language of N.J.S.A. 9:3-50, entitled "Entry of Judgment of Adoption," permits an adoption wherein an unmarried partner seeks to establish parental rights to a child while also preserving the natural parent's rights. This fundamental question has seen both significant court attention and a corresponding absence of legislative reaction regarding recent legal developments. N.J.S.A. 9:3-50(c) states, in full:

The entry of a judgment of adoption shall:
(1) terminate all parental rights and responsibilities of the parent towards the adoptive child except for a parent who is the spouse of the petitioner and except those rights that have vested prior to entry of the judgment of adoption;
(2) terminate all rights of inheritance under intestacy from or through the parent unless that parent is the spouse of the petitioner or that parent or other relative had died prior to the judgment of adoption; and
(3) terminate all rights of inheritance under intestacy from or through the child which existed prior to the adoption.

The adoption statute has not been amended since 19947 —a time when the nation's landscape of family units and dynamics looked vastly different than today; the types of couples who were legally able to enjoy the title of "spouse" at that time form a limited list compared to the present. In the absence of legislative guidance, New Jersey's courts have issued decisions ensuring that the law neither deprives beneficial family units from recognition, nor fails to protect the best interests of each child. Nevertheless, amidst a new era ushered in by V.C. v. M.L.B. (recognizing the concept of the psychological parent),8 Lewis v. Harris (recognizing domestic partnerships),9 Garden State Equality v. Dow, and Obergefell v. Hodges, such precedents require reconciliation with the statute's plain language and strict interpretation in consideration of petitions from families for whom the act of marriage was only recently made available.

The evaluation of J.B.’s petition to adopt B.K.B. presents an opportunity to examine the case law and present statutory landscape, and to then discern whether adoption applications submitted by unmarried couples who have the ability to marry, yet opt for alternative recognition, still fit within the exceptions and interpretations previously identified by New Jersey's courts. Previous judicial analysis of recent legal developments regarding parental rights, marital rights, and adoptions has permitted marriage by same-sex couples, recognized modern family compositions, and brought to bear a new perspective on the Judgment of Adoption statute's language; so, too, have exceptions emphasizing a liberal statutory construction and the children's best interests. New Jersey cases that clarify what constitutes a "familial" relationship in the context of similar statutes prove informative—particularly regarding statutes requiring a finding of a marital, bonded, or intimate relationship. Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981) (construing the child custody statute and the concept of joint legal custody in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 ); V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539 (2000) and Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235, 748 A.2d 558 (2000) (rights of third party non-biological parents in custody matters); Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309, 166 A.3d 1155 (2017) (analyzing best interest of child in connection with the child removal statute, N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 ); H.N.R., 285 N.J. Super. 1, 666 A.2d 535 (the adoption statute N.J.S.A. 9:3-37 to 56); In re Adoption of Child by Nathan S., 396 N.J. Super. 378, 934 A.2d 64 (Ch. Div. 2006) (holding it would be extending the adoption statute too far by allowing a biological mother and the maternal grandfather to both be legal parents of the same child); Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 827 A.2d 203 (2003) (enforcing grandparent rights under N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 ); K.D. v. A.S., 462 N.J. Super. 619, 228 A.3d 875 (App. Div.), certif. den., 244 N.J. 169, 237 A.3d 296 (2020) (holding it would violate public policy for a biological mother to invoke sibling visitation rights under N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 after surrendering her parental rights where her children were then adopted by her biological parents); Dow, 434 N.J. Super. 163, 82 A.3d 336 (analyzing the marriage statute N.J.S.A. 37:1-33 ). By undertaking this process, this court hopes to clarify whether an unmarried petitioner seeking a judgment of adoption may attain such without severing the parental rights of a natural parent by way of unintended...

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