IN RE J.D.C.

• Decision Date: 03 July 1991
• Docket Number: No. 91-345,91-345
• Citation: 594 A.2d 70
• Parties: In re J.D.C., Appellant. The Washington Post, Intervenor.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

594 A.2d 70

In re J.D.C., Appellant The Washington Post, Intervenor.

No. 91-345.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued June 5, 1991.

Decided July 3, 1991.

Appeal from the Superior Court, District of Columbia, Eric H. Holder, Jr., J.

Elizabeth G. Taylor, Public Defender Service, with whom James Klein, Gretchen Franklin, Sandra Levick, Stephen I. Singer, and Robert Wilkins, Public Defender Service, were on the brief, Washington, D.C., for appellant.

Michael A. Simons, with whom Barbara P. Percival and Mary Ann Werner were on the brief, Washington, D.C., for The Washington Post, intervenor.

Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, John Payton, Corp. Counsel, and Donna M. Murasky, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., filed a memorandum in lieu of brief.

Theodore J. Boutrous, Washington, D.C., and Richard J. Tofel, New York City, filed an amicus curiae brief, for Dow Jones & Co., Inc.

Before STEADMAN, SCHWELB and WAGNER, Associate Judges.

SCHWELB, Associate Judge:

J.D.C., who is fourteen years of age, has been charged as a juvenile in the shooting death of fifteen-year-old Jermaine Daniel, whose friendship with former Chief of Police Maurice T. Turner, Jr., had received considerable publicity in the media. J.D.C. has filed this expedited appeal from an order of a judge of the Family Division of the Superior Court denying in part his motion to exclude members of the media from attending the factfinding hearing¹ and subsequent proceedings in his case.

J.D.C.'s motion was predicated primarily on the publication in The Wall Street Journal, several days before the scheduled trial date, of an article which identified J.D.C. by name and which, among other things, stated as a fact that he had shot Daniel to death. J.D.C. contended below, and now maintains on appeal, that in light of the disclosure of his identity, any further press coverage would inevitably be linked with him, for his name would be readily discoverable by anyone who cared to know it. The trial judge granted J.D.C.'s motion as to the Journal, but denied it as to The Washington Post and other media which had not disclosed J.D.C.'s identity.

The primary purpose of D.C.Code § 16-2316(e) (1989) and of Super.Ct.Juv.R. 53, which provide that in general the public shall be excluded from juvenile proceedings, is to preserve the anonymity of juvenile respondents in order to foster an atmosphere conducive to rehabilitation. Both the statute and the rule authorize the judge to permit members of the media to attend juvenile proceedings provided that they do not divulge information identifying the child or members of his family. We hold that the proscription against disclosure of the juvenile's identity represents a legislative intention to authorize admission of the press only if there is reasonable assurance that the primary goal of protecting the child's anonymity can be achieved.

We recognize that the judge made a thoughtful and conscientious effort to exercise his discretion judiciously and to balance what he viewed as the legitimate competing interests. We conclude, however, that in light of the unusual circumstances generated by the publication of the Journal article, there is no reasonable assurance that J.D.C.'s anonymity can be adequately protected in the event of press coverage of further proceedings in the case. Accordingly, we reverse the order on appeal and remand the case with directions that the trial court grant J.D.C.'s motion to exclude the media.

I THE FACTS

Shortly after Jermaine Daniel's death, J.D.C. surrendered to police. A judge found probable cause to believe that he had committed the offenses with which he was charged. J.D.C. was detained at the Children's Center, where he remains to the present date. His case was promptly scheduled for trial.

A few days before the designated trial date, however, The Wall Street Journal published an article headlined

KILLING OF 15-YEAR-OLD IS PART OF ESCALATION OF MURDER BY JUVENILES.

The article opened as follows:

WASHINGTON — [J.C.]² and Jermaine Daniel face each other in the concrete courtyard of their inner-city housing project. They had argued about a girl. Now, a crowd gathers as Jermaine flicks insults at [J.].

Suddenly [J.] pulls out a gun and shoots Jermaine three times in the chest.

The dead boy is 15. The shooter is 14.

The Journal's story contained other material regarding J.D.C. which depicted him and his family unfavorably, and which related a number of alleged facts of a private nature. Counsel for J.D.C. maintain that much of the information in the article is inaccurate.

Prior to the publication of the Journal article, reporters from The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, and at least one other newspaper had attendedcourt hearings in the case, despite J.D.C.'s objection to their presence. Each reporter had agreed in writing, pursuant to Super.Ct.Juv.R. 53(a), not to divulge information identifying J.D.C. and his family. Two days after the publication of the Journal article, counsel for J.D.C. filed a written "Unopposed"³ Motion to Exclude Media From All Further Proceedings." On the scheduled trial date, the Post, in a story headlined

PRINTING OF DANIEL SUSPECT'S NAME BASIS OF MOVE TO CLOSE TRIAL,

revealed the disclosure of J.D.C.'s identity by the Journal, as well as the date of that disclosure, and repeated some of the unfavorable statements about J.D.C. contained in the earlier article in the Journal.

Although the judge ultimately had three separate occasions to articulate the reasons for his ruling — once orally and twice in writing — his reasoning remained generally consistent throughout.⁴ He stated in his initial written order dated April 5, 1991, that it was his responsibility to "balance the confidentiality interest of the respondent against the legitimate interest of the media in covering the workings of the juvenile system." He indicated early in his oral ruling that "if I am going to err, it ought to be on the side of protecting the identity of the respondent." Applying these principles to the case before him, the judge stated in his April 5 order that The Wall Street Journal had revealed J.D.C.'s name.

in apparent violation of its pledge not to reveal identifying information.⁵ Subsequent coverage by The Wall Street Journal, even where the respondent's name was not used, would have to connect him, at least with regard to its readers, to the earlier coverage.

Though subsequent Wall Street Journal coverage would tend to identify, and possibly harm, the respondent among its readers, the Court does not believe that others who follow the case by other means would necessarily be similarly affected. There is simply no way to determine the set of those people who read The Wall Street Journal article and who have also followed this matter by other media means. Without proof of a connection between these other readers or viewers and The Wall Street Journal coverage the Court is reluctant, given Rule 53, to bar those members of the media who have complied with the rules. By not permitting The Wall Street Journal access to further proceedings, the damage done to respondent's interests can, hopefully, be minimized.

J.D.C. filed a motion for reconsideration in which he represented to the court that the Journal's circulation in the District is fifty-five thousand copies per day, and the judge so found. In denying J.D.C.'s motion, the judge wrote, in pertinent part, as follows:

The potential harm to respondent is not due to the media's attending or reporting on this matter. Harm flows from disclosures made in violation of Rule 53. Such a disclosure was made by The WallStreet Journal and that organization has now been excluded from any further court related proceedings. Though there is some overlap between those who read The Wall Street Journal and those who will follow this case by other means, there is simply no way to determine the extent of this overlap. Similarly, there is no way to quantify that group of people who will actually connect the respondent, as a result of the improper disclosure, to other coverage. The inability to quantify these overlaps (or inability even to say that an overlap actually exists) when coupled with the statutorily defined media interest is critical. There is no factual basis to support the action sought by respondent.

Order of May 29, 1991, at 3. Acknowledging that he too had "engaged in some degree of speculation," and that he could not "claim to know" whether readers of the Journal would still recall the article months later, id. at 3, the judge continued:

If the Court felt that there was any realistic chance that further coverage would materially affect respondent's privacy interest or, in the event of conviction, his chance at rehabilitation, the Court would bar all members of the media from further proceedings. The Court finds, however, that the welfare of the respondent will not be harmed by continued coverage of this matter by those who adhere to Rule 53.

Id. at 3-4.

II LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. The statute, the rule, and the trial judge's discretion.

Both in the trial court and on appeal, the Post has explicitly disclaimed any contention that it has a constitutional right to attend J.D.C.'s trial.⁶ Rather, the Post relies entirely on the discretionary authority of the judge pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-2316(e) (1989) and Super.Ct.Juv.R. 53 to admit representatives of the media to juvenile proceedings.

Section 16-2316(e) provides as follows:

Except in hearings to declare a person in contempt of court, the general public shall be excluded from hearings arising under this subchapter. Only persons necessary to the proceedings shall be admitted, but the Division may, pursuant to rule of the Superior Court, admit such other persons (including members of the press) as have a proper interest in the case or the work of the court on condition that they refrain from divulging information identifying the child or...